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Abstract
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the degree of 
international competitiveness of the small European state in 
the 1980s resulted from its unique internal process of 
interaction derived from its industrial culture, developed 
from state priorities and societal values. Small European 
states, because of their position as international price 
takers, controlling relatively few product markets, were 
forced to rely on various forms of domestic intervention, 
such as monetary, labour market, and industrial policies, to 
stimulate international competitiveness. A systematised 
dialogue and communication process among internal economic 
actors due to geographic proximity and consequent actor 
familiarity was the small European state's competitive 
advantage necessary to compete for world markets against 
larger states possessing both natural and human resource 
advantages. The more systematised the internal interactive 
process was, however, the more flexible the internationally 
vulnerable small European state would be to respond to 
changing global political and economic conditions.
In cases such as Sweden and Switzerland, the small European 
state was able to fashion this process of interaction into a 
system, where peak associations were able to communicate 
effectively to preserve a flexible industrial environment 
and where the principal actor maintained a key role in 
directing the national economy. The economic success of 
Sweden throughout the 1980s was facilitated by the trade 
unions, while in Switzerland the economy was guided by its 
financial institutions. Because of these principal actors, 
both states were highly independent, having developed 
oligopolised, high technology oriented industrial structures 
that featured powerful multinational corporations.
However, during the 1980s, in small European states such as 
Denmark and Ireland, with weak industrial structures, high 
levels of international dependence on the European 
Community, and poor economic performances, confused 
consultation processes bred incoherent policy-making that 
resulted in low levels of international competitiveness. In 
both states, the State as the principal actor attempted to 
facilitate industrial adjustment, aspiring to modernise 
their relatively weak indigenous industrial structures.
The thesis examines actor relations and policy-making in 
three functional areas: finance-industry relations and 
monetary policies; trade union-industry relations and 
supportive labour market policies; and state-industry 
relations and industrial policies. Given the myriad of 
policies that small state policy-makers employed during the 
1980s, the thesis argues and illustrates that small European 
state interventionism was both state-specific and necessary 
because of the pressures of the world market.
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Chapter One
The Small European State International Competitiveness 
Process
1.1 Introduction and Methodology
This thesis will examine the political-economic 
performance of Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland 
from 1980-1987, using a chapter-by-chapter comparative 
approach, as opposed to separate state studies. It will 
draw upon the lessons of the past literature of small states 
operating in foreign markets. The evidence used to compare 
the case studies includes primary documents and personal 
interviews in each of the four countries with 
representatives from important ministries, trade unions, 
employers' confederations, industrial associations, 
financial institutions, universities, and research 
institutions. (See interview listings after Chapter Six.)
As the basis for forming comparisons, the four selected 
small European states have some common points: each is
relatively small, with a population of less than ten 
million; all are located on or near the continent of Europe; 
and all are heavily dependent on international commerce. 
However, there are differences. Three of the states - 
Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland - are neutral, while 
Denmark is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). While Denmark and Ireland are members 
of the European Community (EC), Sweden and Switzerland are 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
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The most important difference among the case states is 
that each has a distinct, state specific process of internal 
interaction among its influential economic actors; 
variations in these processes help to explain small European 
state economic performance. Using this approach based on 
the case studies, this thesis will argue and interpret why 
some small European states were more internationally 
competitive than others in the 1980s, as well as the 
prospects for these states to maintain or augment their 
levels of international competitiveness into the 1990s.
Most scholars have agreed that international 
competitiveness assumes that a state's economic problems, 
such as unemployment, inflation, and slow growth, can be 
overcome by substantial increases in productivity such that 
the state can increase its global market share by increasing 
exports and reducing imports.^ A strong current account 
balance, a balanced fiscal budget, stable growth, and low 
levels of unemployment and inflation indicate that a state 
has achieved a high level of international competitiveness. 
In the 1980s Sweden and Switzerland enjoyed such relative 
economic success.
Conversely, a large deficit in a state's balance of 
payments^ and a decline in relative purchasing power is 
indicative of declining international competitiveness. 
Throughout most of the 1980s Denmark and Ireland experienced 
high levels of foreign debt, wage-inspired inflation, 
mammoth levels of unemployment, and enduring current account 
deficits; these adverse economic indicators typify a
20
deficient level of international competitiveness.
International competitiveness as used in this thesis 
denotes the degree to which a state's industries produce 
goods and services for markets abroad, both through trade 
and foreign direct investment, while expanding the incomes 
(and therefore the standard of living) of its citizens. The 
level of a state's international competitiveness is either 
fostered or inhibited as a result of the internal process of 
interaction among its important economic actors.
Quadrilateral relations between and among financial 
institutions, labour, the Stated, and industry lead to 
either a systematised or a confused process of communication 
and policy-making. Particular attention in this thesis will 
be on how state actors attempt to undertake policies that 
would enhance productivity and stimulate product 
desirability in foreign markets. Such state-specific 
interaction and policy-making determines a state's level of 
growth, employment, prices, current account balance, level 
of technological sophistication, direct investment abroad, 
and industrial structure - the prime indicators of a state's 
level of international competitiveness. (See Figures 1.1 
and 1.2.)
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Figure 1.1
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD 
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Figure 1.2
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Source: OECD (1987)
* Misery Index = inflation (% change over previous year) + 
unemployment (as % of workforce)
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New and increasing global pressures tested the ability 
of the small European state to remain internationally 
competitive in the 1980s. The pressures of the decade 
included the proliferation of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, the advent of competition from the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs), and changes in the 
relative economic position of the United States. By the 
mid-1980s the prospect of an internal market for the EC to 
be created by 1992 under the terms of the Single European 
Act was perhaps the most interesting development for the 
small European state.
While international competitiveness has been a popular 
term used by scholars to refer to the condition of economic 
vitality of larger states such as the United Kingdom and the 
United States, it takes on a whole new meaning and 
importance for the internationally vulnerable small state. 
Its sensitivity to global political and economic pressures 
tends to be greater than larger states because of its 
relatively greater dependence on international commerce. As 
a result of its modest domestic market, the trade to gross 
national product (GNP) ratio of the small European state is 
higher than those in larger states Moreover, as will be 
discussed later in the chapter, small state industries tend 
to be price takers as opposed to price makers.
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1.2 The Economic Consequences of Being a Small State
A. Limited Political Power
In comparison to large industrialised states such as 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, small states^ like Denmark, 
Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland encounter a high degree of 
economic and political^ vulnerability. The small European 
state tends to be similar to its larger Organisation for Co­
operation and Development (OECD) counterparts in terms of 
overall standard of living, yet it remains more sensitive* 
to global political and economic pressures. This 
sensitivity exists because of its limited strategic and 
political power vis-a-vis larger powers and its high level 
of dependence on international commerce. In the political 
realm, David Vital correctly states that "a small state [in 
comparison to larger states] is more vulnerable to pressure, 
more likely to give way under stress, more limited in 
respect of the political options open to it and subject to a 
tighter connection between domestic and external affairs."^
As a result of its comparatively weak political 
position, the small state has generally attempted to avoid 
conflict of any kind (military, economic, etc.) with larger 
powers.® Unlike mini-, micro-, or client- states* such as 
Andorra, Monaco, or the Channel Islands, small states, 
operationally defined here and in much of the small state 
literature as industrialised states with population sizes of 
less than ten to fifteen million^®, have identity and
25
autonomy - the "capacity to withstand opposition and stick 
to purposes thought commensurate with the national 
i n t e r e s t . T h e y  are not "mere pawns" in the strategic 
relations between large powers, but can have some, though 
often slight, international or global impact, primarily as a 
result of their national political and economic autonomy and 
geo-political puissance in certain areas of the world.
Nonetheless, much of the small state literature has 
equated "smallness" with "weakness.The small state, 
though internationally more powerful than mini- or client- 
states as a result of greater political and economic 
autonomy, has a limited ability to "induce change in the 
structure of international relations ; in addition, it 
"... needs to avoid being regarded as 'hostile'" by larger 
allies.^ Small states toe a fine line between retaining 
the responsibility for their identity and autonomy, and at 
the same time avoiding conflict, both militarily^** and 
economically, with larger powers.
Small European states such as Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland have attempted to avoid 
international conflict through permanent neutrality. This 
policy has sent an "unequivocal message" to larger powers 
that these small European states will avoid all forms of 
conflict, hence minimising or perhaps averting large-scale 
politics and security matters, even during wartime.^
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B. Limited Economic Power
Most important to this thesis, however, are those non­
military forms of international pressure, those which imply 
"injury by deprivation" rather than through military might. 
Nonetheless, because the territorial-state system defines 
the parameters of the international economic system, the 
small state's vulnerable strategic and political position 
sets the framework for its ability to exert international 
economic power. Indeed, power in the international system 
supports the state's attempts at accumulating plenty. As 
Gautam Sen contends, "The real causes of international trade 
disputes hinge on the division of international power among 
competitive nation-states."^ International economic 
relations are inherently political, and there is little that 
a small state can do from either a political or an economic 
standpoint to alter this situation.^
While large powers can either organise the 
international economic system (system makers) or mobilise 
their significant domestic resource base to garner a 
beneficial position in the international division of labour, 
small states have limited options due to their inferior 
resource base. In referring to Robinson's important work in 
1960 on the Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, 
S.N. Eisenstadt identifies that small states' internal 
markets are not sufficiently large nor diversified to 
produce all that the small state needs, nor does it have the 
ability to consume all that it produces. Therefore, the
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small state must seek external markets for both consumption 
and production purposes.
What will be argued in the following section is that 
the high level of dependence of small states on foreign 
markets has fostered policy-makers in these states to 
pontificate about their commitment to openness and policies 
based on laissez-faire principles, when in fact these self­
identified tenets are examples of "symbolic politics"^ and 
fallacious self-characterisations. With their understanding 
of the politicisation of trade and with increasing 
international pressures, small states have used various 
forms of compromising rhetoric^^ towards their larger state 
counterparts, whose markets remain vital to the small state 
and whose international military, political, and economic 
power overrides their own. Moreover, with the international 
political and economic shield of larger state membership in 
the European Community, as well as the continuing political 
unity of the twelve member states, common external tariffs 
provide trade policy options for small member states not 
available to those small European states outside the EC.
Hence, unlike numerous scholars who have argued that 
small states are forced to develop programmes based on 
laissez-faire principles and openness as a result of a 
comparatively weak international political stature, it is 
argued here that small state interventionism, which consists 
of various labour market, monetary, and industrial policies, 
is indeed consistent with the pressures of the world market 
and necessary because small states are price takers.
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1.3 The Small European State in the International Market
A. Price Dependency and Flexible Specialisation
Because small states have limited abilities to control
product markets, they tend to be internationally dependent
price takers.^ This means that small state industries are
vulnerable to world price fluctuations influenced in most
cases by large state enterprises with greater market impact.
Only in relatively few circumstances are small states able
to take on the position of controlling product markets, or
becoming price makers.Subsequently, the small state must
maintain a high degree of flexibility vis-a-vis those
international markets on which it is dependent.
Being "peculiarly vulnerable to 'external shocks,
or even changes in the overall international economic
climate, small state entrepreneurs must be able to compete
against larger, more powerful competitors in the
international marketplace. Various exogenous turbulences,
such as an international recession or increasing prices of
production inputs (e.g., oil price shocks), can have serious
ramifications for the small state economy.
Moreover, as Conybeare correctly asserts, the small
economy has more to gain from open trading relations as a
result of its price taking status than larger states.
The pure theory of trade suggests that most of the 
gains from trade will accrue to smaller countries, 
because the terms of trade are determined by domestic 
prices in the larger countries; hence, a small country 
will experience a large increase in the price of its 
export when trade begins, the large country perhaps 
none at all
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Both flexibility and specialisation (i.e., "flexible
specialisation"^^) are vital to small state industry, which
must carefully choose a relatively small range of products,
often in niche markets, that highly correspond to global, as
opposed to (a limited) domestic, demand. Due to natural and
human resource disadvantages vis-a-vis large states, small
state industries are precluded from developing a broad range
of products for export.
As a result of its limited export product range, small
state markets must adjust to global demand fluctuations by
continually, indeed flexibly, replacing antiquated products
with those in higher demand (i.e., the Schumpeterian notion
of "creative destruction")If a state tends to produce
"sunrise" industry products, those in which global demand is
expected to increase, such as telecommunications equipment,
computers, and pharmaceutical products, then generally it
has a better opportunity for future global market growth
than it would by producing "sunset" industry goods, those in
which global demand is decreasing. While this principle
generally applies to all states, the small state, because of
its price taking status and limited ability to produce a
broad range of items relative to larger states, must be more
flexibly specialised than the larger state. As S.N.
Eisenstadt explains,
...the type of specialization open to small states and 
the nature of their dependency may change throughout 
history. One of the great problems of small states is 
that they may become so attuned to one type of 
international market that they collapse entirely if 
this market changes....Thus, a basic problem faced 
above all by the small state is the need for a high 
degree of flexibility vis-a-vis those international
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markets on which they are dependent.^’
Having a sunrise product export orientation increases 
the likelihood that a small state, highly dependent on 
international trade, will be able to maintain its 
international competitiveness in the future. The Swedish 
and Swiss export orientations in the 1980s were geared 
towards high technology products. Indigenous Danish and 
Irish industries exported primarily in the agricultural 
field. (See Figure 1.3.) In both Sweden and Switzerland, 
for example, exports significantly increased in the 
telecommunications field, where OECD demand continued to 
grow. (See Figures 1.4 and 1.5.) In the decade the Irish 
and Danish economies were heavily dependent on the 
agriculture sector, even though global demand levelled. (See 
Figures 1.6 and 1.7.)
In addition to the export of goods, a few small 
European states were highly successful in exporting another 
specialised product: services. (See Figure 1.8.) The 
tertiary sector, particularly banking (and to a lesser 
extent tourism), in Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands enabled these states to maintain surpluses 
in their balance of services and was a major reason for the 
economic success of these countries.
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Figure 1.4
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Figure 1.5
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Figure 1.6
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Figure 1.7
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These three profiles - sunrise industries, agriculture, 
and services - can be explained as (a) indicators of 
industrial development and (b) historical industrial 
preferences.
a) Industrial Development. Throughout the 1980s 
Ireland's level of industrial development, for example, was 
significantly lower than the Swiss or the Swedish level.
This difference helps to explain why the Irish economy 
remained heavily dependent on its indigenous agricultural 
sector and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) while 
the Swedish and Swiss economies depended on powerful 
international banks and giant multinationals in such high 
tech areas as sophisticated machinery equipment and 
pharmaceutical products.
b) Industrial Preferences. Though the agriculture 
sector is often cited as a low-growth sector, Danish 
agriculture, renowned for having highly mechanised 
productive techniques, has been a highly productive force in 
the e c o n o m y . I n  the same vein, as a result of the number 
of forests in Sweden, the forestry industry has remained a 
relatively large industry in the country. Certainly the 
large agriculture sector in Switzerland has been a 
manifestation of its historical presence in the dairy 
industry, particularly with regard to the production of 
cheese and chocolates.
38
B. Reliance on Trade and Inward and Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment
No matter the level of industrial development, the 
degree of trade dependence of the small state tends to be 
much greater than the larger state. (See Figure 1.9.) In 
1986 United States exports totalled 5.2% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and Japan's exports amounted to 
10.8% of its GDP. Imports totalled 8.8% and 6.5% of their 
respective GDPs. However, in small states like Belgium and 
the Netherlands, exports totalled 58.7% and 46.0% of their 
respective GDPs, while imports in these states amounted to 
61.1% and 43.0%.^^
While some small European states such as Ireland have 
welcomed inward FDI in order to spur its industrial 
development, in the 1980s such small European states as the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland^^ were less accepting 
of inward FDI from foreign sources as evidenced by 
restrictive share-holding policies that obstruct foreign 
takeovers of indigenous industries. These states, whose 
investment success has also been a manifestation of their 
level of industrial development and historical industrial 
preferences, have gained much of their national wealth 
through profits from direct investment abroad that has been 
either repatriated, reinvested, or exported from the 
offshore site to other locations overseas. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have followed industrial organisation 
theories for growth based on both horizontal and vertical 
integration, the latter "where the production of outputs in 
one plant serves as inputs for other plants.
Figure 1.9
FOREIGN TRADE AS PERCENT OF GDP (1986)
FOR SELECTED SMALL EUROPEAN STATES VS. JAPAN
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C. Small European State Trade Policy Options
With such a high degree of dependence on world markets, 
coupled with the necessity to avoid costly trade conflict 
with large powers, a number of authors have asserted that 
the small state must opt for openness and economic 
programmes based on laissez-faire principles. Authors such 
as Peter J. Katzenstein assert that small state industrial 
and trade policies from the 1930s through the 1970s tended 
to be reactive, or defensive, while larger states with more 
international muscle, like Japan and France, were able to 
form a number of mercantilist or offensive programmes such 
as targeting, pick the winners, and administrative guidance 
that could directly influence the composition and location 
of industrial output. Moreover, it has been argued that 
because of their lack of international power and dependence 
on international commerce, small states cannot develop these 
offensive, seemingly protectionistic policies that could 
foster animosity from large states for fear that the 
consequent retaliation could result in the elimination or 
restriction of vital foreign markets.
According to many scholars writing about the small 
state in the past, negative sanctions, such as voluntary 
export restraints (VERs) and orderly marketing arrangements 
(OMAs), have been avoided by the small European state, not 
only because of the impracticality of such measures for 
small states dependent on export-led growth, but also as a 
result of their fear of larger state retaliation and the
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consequent loss of vital trading lanes. Instead, as David 
Yoffie asserts, long-run political strategies are developed 
to prevent crises in bilateral trade regimes with larger 
states, including the short-term acceptance of VERs and OMAs 
imposed by larger states to quell further, long-term 
antagonism.^" In spite of some exceptions, negative 
sanctions, such as embargoes, boycotts, tariff increases, 
and blacklisting,^" have generally been avoided by the small 
European state.
What should be apparent is that other instruments of 
intervention have been available in the small state's 
"economic statecraft" repertoire. It is argued here that 
small states have been able to develop and implement a 
number of programmes that directly influence the composition 
and location of industrial output as part of a strategic 
trade policy. (See Figure 1.10.) Indeed, the "small country 
assumption" accepts that, "In the case of a small country, 
even if its domestic policies cause its exports to increase 
or imports to decline, these effects are insignificant for 
all trading partners and, thus, they have no reason to 
r e a c t . W i t h  inferior international political power, such 
frequently used terms by small European state policy-makers 
as "laissez-faire" and "openness" have helped induce large 
state acquiescence towards, or oversight of, acts of market 
intervention by the governments of small states.^®
Figure 1.10
THE EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
ON SMALL STATES IN THE 1980s
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Moreover, as Paul Krugman explains, the optimum form of 
intervention has not been trade intervention, but domestic 
intervention, such as loan guarantees, manpower programmes, 
and research and development policies.^’ A number of 
monetary, labour market, and industrial policies have been 
developed in small European states to maintain or increase 
their levels of international competitiveness. In many ways 
this is the other side of David Baldwin's "economic 
statecraft" coin. (See Figure 1.11.)
Fiaure 1. 11
Examples of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions
Trade Capital
Tariff discrimination Providing aid
(favourable) Investment guarantees
Granting 'most-favoured-nation Encouragement of private
capital
treatment' exports or imports
Tariff reduction Taxation (favourable)
Direct purchase Promises of the above
Subsidies to exports or
imports
Granting licenses (import
or export)
Promises of the above
Source: David A. Baldwin (1985) Economic Statecraft: 42.
Nonetheless, the experience of the four small European 
states suggests that when particular sectors experienced 
stagnation because of changing international economic 
conditions, the State was forced to respond flexibly despite 
its price taking status making such aid to declining sectors 
futile economic statecraft. Sweden's giant shipbuilding 
industry eventually could not compete with Japanese and
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Korean shipbuilders in the 1970s, yet the Swedish State 
continued to subsidise the industry even in a short and 
atypical period when the government was led by a centre- 
right coalition, rather than the historically powerful 
Social Democrats. Nonetheless, after some consideration and 
attempted priming, Swedish policy-makers allowed the 
industry to run its course.
In Denmark, the State continued to subsidise the 
declining shipbuilding industry, neglecting to understand 
its internationally vulnerable price taking status much as a 
consequence of increased competition from Asia. Likewise, 
the watch industry in Switzerland was subsidised in the 
1970s as a result of increased competition primarily from 
Japan, yet unlike the Danish shipbuilding case, the Swiss 
watch industry recovered and became successful again as a 
result of innovation and product differentiation. These 
three cases - Swedish shipbuilding, Swiss watchmaking, and 
Danish shipbuilding are the most important, not to mention 
unique, examples of State subsidisation in the case states. 
As a result, these cases will be addressed in detail 
throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter Five. Of 
course, the agriculture sector, particularly in Denmark and 
Ireland, has also been heavily subsidised.
The Irish and Danish cases underscore the importance of 
the EC for small states. With the international political 
and economic shield of larger state membership, as well as 
the continuing political unity of the twelve member states, 
common external tariffs and the common EC stance at the
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have provided 
trade policy options not open to those small states outside 
the EC. For example, with Danish and Irish membership in the 
EC, along with West German, French, English, and Italian 
membership, small "European" state trade policy options have 
been less constrained than for those small European states 
that have not been members, such as Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
These latter states have been members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), and hence have received 
favourable terms of access for their manufactured goods (not 
agricultural ones) into the European Community market, the 
destination of three-fifths of EFTA's exports throughout the 
1980s. However, their position outside the more 
economically and politically powerful Common Market has not 
afforded them the same trade policy options as those small 
states forming common policies and political ties with 
larger states in the EC. Certainly one of the greatest 
advantages for these states is that the EC has trade 
creation benefits resulting from the lack of internal 
tariffs.^
One can infer the following about the small European 
state's policy actions in terms of the limitations imposed 
upon it as a result of international pressures:
a) While both larger states and small states encounter 
many similar external pressures (e.g., oil shocks, 
international recession, etc.), the major difference between 
large state and small state pressures is that large state
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industries tend to be price makers, which means they have 
greater ability to control product markets than most smaller 
state industries, who have significantly less control on 
international markets as price takers.
b) As a result of international pressures, small 
European states have pursued strategic trade policies in 
some cases even more rigorously than larger states. Some 
authors have asserted that small state trade policies have 
tended to be only reactive, or defensive, while larger 
states with more international muscle have been able to form 
a number of mercantilist, offensive programmes that directly 
influence the composition and location of industrial output. 
An important point is that while larger states such as Japan 
and West Germany have developed interventionist policies, a 
key distinction is that their industries are price makers. 
Yet because of the small European state's price taking 
vulnerability, interventionism has been used to combat 
international economic pressures. The degree of 
intervention has ranged from the highly active Irish State 
to the moderately active Danish and Swedish States to the 
less active Swiss State.
c) Knowledge of the internal process, in which 
critical economic actors form important bargaining 
relationships that breed flexible specialisation, is the key 
to understanding how particular small European states remain 
internationally competitive. The degree of success of small 
European states in the international marketplace is 
significantly determined by internal conditions, which
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differ as a result of varying industrial cultures and 
consequent internal bargaining processes.
1.4 Efficient Collectivism as a Source of International
Competitiveness
A. The Collectivist Literature
This thesis posits that all small European states are 
neither always similar nor uniformly economically 
successful, but rather that economic outcomes depend on the 
internal conditions of the state. Small states are, 
however, similar in that they often, though not always, face 
similar exogenous conditions. For instance, the economic 
vitality of Ireland and Switzerland are appreciably 
different despite both being small states. While small 
European states possess the commonality of size, they have 
reacted in different ways to changing external conditions. 
Indeed, a major reason for these varied reactions can be 
attributed to internal factors which, beyond a few works, 
have been "wholly neglected in the studies.
Small states can create the necessary domestic 
conditions for their industries to remain globally 
competitive in order for the state itself to realise an 
advantage in the world trading system. John Zysman and 
Laura Tyson illustrate the importance of the ability of a 
state's actors to spur productivity levels, particularly in 
growth sectors, and to support high incomes. Most 
importantly, they affirm that "National and corporate 
competitiveness are analytically distinct but practically
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intertwined.”^  ^ In a similar sense, Michael Porter explains
that ”a favorable competitive position in an industry [is]
the fundamental arena in which competition occurs.
Several political economists who are associated with
the collectivist school, including Andrew Shonfield,^' have
examined the institutional relationships among trade unions,
employers' confederations, industrial associations,
financial institutions, and the State.Ricardian trade
theory assumes that the ability of any state to gain
comparative advantages in international trade is a product
of an "efficient state," and these interactive relations may
"create" the necessary domestic conditions for (in
particular) a small state to remain efficient.
Shonfield's Modern Capitalism is the original and most
renowned of the collectivist literature, and it has spawned
a number of works from such academics as Lehmbruch,^'
Lindberg,^® Maier,^’ Schmitter, and Streeck.^" Differentiated
from mainstream economists and rational choice theorists who
"conclude that politicians, bureaucrats, and lobbyists take
collective action which neglect market incentives, debase
allocative efficiency, and downgrade economic
performance,"^ the collectivists have studied the economic
purpose of intergroup consensus and tripartite negotiation
between the State, industry, and labour.
[These authors] emphasize the interaction among 
economic agents and group interests and between them 
and the state. Patterns of economic production and 
consumption, the economic goals pursued and instruments 
chosen, and the ability of political authorities to 
adapt policies and implementation of strategies to 
changing political and economic conditions are largely
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institutionally constrained or determined.
This thesis, therefore, posits that in studying the 
international competitiveness of small states it is 
necessary to examine the structure of the relationship 
between the State and the market, in which domestic economic 
actors provide "resources and incentives that in an 
interactive process, reinforce g o v e r n i n g . A t  the heart 
of this institutional perspective is the dynamic process in 
which policy-making is developed and the collective and 
individual impact these policies eventually have on the 
ability of the small state to be internationally 
competitive. This process is extracted from political and 
institutional struggles that are based and arbitrated by a 
preestablished organisation of state power.
B. The Small State Advantage and Democratic Corporatism
Many scholars have accepted that small states hold a 
distinct advantage over larger states simply because 
smallness tends to breed "economic efficiency" and "cultural 
productivity".^" They argue that the small European state 
has been able to profit from frequent formal and informal 
discussion and bargaining between (and among) the State and 
peak associations,^' the top-echelon centralised level of 
representation for each particular economic institution.
With paradigms derived from the collectivist school of 
political economy, Peter J. Katzenstein, David Cameron, 
Charles Maier and Mancur Olson,for instance, have 
accepted institutionalised bargaining, coupled with
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political stability, as the root of economic success for
such nations as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland from the 1930s through the 1970s.
Katzenstein, for example, has labelled the consensus
formation of small states as democratic corporatism, which
is characterised by three traits:
an ideology of social partnership expressed at the 
national level; a relatively centralized and 
concentrated system of interest groups; and voluntary 
and informal coordination of conflicting objectives 
through continuous political bargaining between 
interest groups, state bureaucracies, and political 
parties.^
He proposes that since the 193 0s a number of small states
have been forced to develop economic programmes based on
laissez-faire principles in order to avoid policies that
larger states might perceive as being protectionistic, thus
causing possible large state retaliation with consequences
that are extreme for small states dependent on foreign
trade.Subsequently, economic smallness typically
translates into economic openness.
This view is held because small states must achieve 
specialized niches in the world economy if they are to 
thrive and because productive specialization requires 
ample free trade both to obviate consumer shortages and 
to avert risks of crippling foreign tariff retaliations 
that might be provoked by protectionism.^^
He proposes that if small states are forced to have
open economies without the aid of offensive industrial
policies, they remain economically strong by being flexible.
The government rewards its citizens for the costs of being
flexible (or "investment and employment instabilities"^^) by
compensating them through various manpower, incomes, and
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employment policies. He applauds the ability of several
small European states who preserve their economic openness,
manifested through both import dependence and export
specialisation, by being capable of adjusting to
international political and economic conditions.
The "flexible industrial adjustment" programme of the
small European state, furthermore, does not include
exporting the costs of change, an option open to larger
states; rather, the small state tends to live with these
conditions, responding to them as they come.
The strategy of the small European state is flexible, 
reactive, and incremental. It does not counter adverse 
changes by shifting its costs to others abroad; it does 
not attempt to preempt change by ambitiously reordering 
the economy at home. Instead the small European states 
continually improvise in living with change.
Katzenstein attributes democratic corporatism, in
combination with a system of proportional representation^,
which leads to minority governments that "attempt to
influence policy" as opposed to trying to "accumulate
patronage," as the root from which the small European state
attains flexible industrial adjustment. "Democratic
corporatism, which creates a relatively dull and predictable
kind of politics, manifests itself through an ideology of
social partnership - centralised and concentrated interest
groups that form an integral part of a comprehensive
bargaining system - and through a system of voluntary and
informal coordination between conflicting objectives."^"
Thus, he concludes that "these [small European state]
traditions, institutions, and structures form a context and
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impose policies which bear no resemblance to those of the 
larger European countries."^
C. The Thesis Model of Actor Interaction
This thesis contends that each small European state has 
a distinctive process of internal interaction that cannot be 
generalised through imprecise nomenclature such as 
democratic corporatism. It is assumed here that the process 
of internal actor interaction is both dynamic and state- 
specific; as a result, generalisation and the use of vague 
terminology are less helpful than comparing each state 
individually. To frame a state-specific process of 
interaction in universal overtones undercuts the meaningful 
aspects of how each small European state attempts to 
maintain or augment its level of international 
competitiveness. Differences between the Katzenstein model 
and the approach used in this thesis are further enumerated 
in the final section of this chapter (Section 1.6).
This thesis sets out a relatively straightforward 
framework to examine variances in the communication 
processes of small European states. There is no grand 
scheme or recipe for small European state political-economic 
success; rather, the model provides a useful method to 
analyze actor interaction within the small European state to 
determine the reasons for political-economic success or 
failure.
At its most basic level, communication within the small 
European state can be examined through dialogue between two
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actors, where relations can be characterised as either 
cooperative or detached.
Actor A Actor B
Cooperative Bilateral
Actor A  Actor B
Detached Bilateral
Under cooperative bilateral relations, actor interaction is 
familiar, and consultation and exchange is frequent and 
orderly. Typically such ties breed high levels of 
cooperation necessary for the state to remain 
internationally competitive. If bilateral interaction 
involves the State itself, cooperative relations usually 
lead to policy progress. In contrast, detached bilateral 
relations occur when actor interaction is characterised by 
distant and infrequent communication, and where the lack of 
dialogue inhibits cooperation. Under detached bilateral 
relations involving the State, policy-making is usually 
unproductive and ineffective.
The level of international competitiveness of the small 
European state can be evaluated by assessing a subsequent 
level of actor interaction within the state between and 
among the fundamental market actors and the State.
Therefore, the model of actor communication used in this
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thesis involves evaluation of the process of relations among 
the four major actors - financial institutions, labour, 
industry, and the State - that support and augment 
international competitiveness.
Under a best-case scenario of communication among these 
actors, where all relations are cooperative, communication 
within the state can be characterised as continuous 
quadrilateral.
State
LabourFinance
Industry
Continuous Quadrilateral
Under continuous quadrilateral actor relations, the dialogue 
process is systematised and orderly. The State is able to 
form monetary, labour market, and industrial policies that 
act as necessary complements to cooperative bilateral 
interaction between finance and industry, labour and 
industry, and the State and industry. Continuous 
quadrilateral relations breed high levels of cooperation 
necessary for the state to achieve high levels of political- 
economic performance.
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Under a scenario where some (or all) forms of 
communication are detached, the level of interaction within 
the state can be characterised as intermittent 
quadrilateral.
State
Finance Labour
Industry
Intermittent Quadrilateral
Dialogue among actors can be detached, causing a less 
systematised process of interaction that can be 
characterised as intermittent quadrilateral. Further, the 
State is not always able to form monetary, labour market, 
and industrial policies. As a result of less efficient and 
effective policy-making and more distant actor relations, 
the state is less able to achieve a high level of 
international competitiveness.
1.5 The Interactive Process and the Roles of the Major 
Economic Actors in the Small European State
Undeniably the paradox of the small state is that while 
it faces international political and economic vulnerability
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because of limited international power vis-a-vis large 
powers, its small size is also its greatest asset to 
maintain or augment its level of international 
competitiveness. Because of its geographic proximity that 
encourages actor familiarity, communication between and 
among actors can be facilitated. A major advantage the 
small state possesses over large states is the monocephalic 
nature of its society, one in which "all resource-holders 
within a territory tend to congregate within short distances 
of each o t h e r . . . I n  contrast, a polycephalic society is 
defined as one in which there is "a marked geographical 
dispersion of different types of arenas across a very wide 
area. . . .
In general, small states hold the monocephalic 
advantage, with both governmental and industrial power 
located in the same location, while larger states like 
"Japan and West Germany ... have a clear-cut dissociation of 
the political from the economic c e n t r e s . I n  Denmark, 
Ireland, and Sweden, the governmental, financial, and 
industrial centres are located within the capitol city.
Only in Switzerland are the governmental and 
financial/industrial centres in different locations, yet the 
distance is short between the three centres (Zurich, Basel, 
and Berne). Because the role of government in Switzerland 
is extremely limited, most interest representation occurs in 
Zurich, the powerful financial centre.
Because of this small state advantage, interest 
representation, particularly from industry and labour, is
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often centralised through confederations. One can readily 
think of the Manufacturer's Association of Israel (MAI) and 
Norway's Industrirardet as good examples of powerful small 
state employers' confederations. Among the case countries, 
the Swedish Arbetsgivarforeningen (SAF), the Swiss Vorort, 
and the Danish Industrirardet are excellent examples of 
strong employers' confederations; on the labour front, the 
Swedish Landsorganisationen (LG) and Tjanstemannens 
Centralorganisation (TOO), the Danish LG, and the Swiss 
Gewerkschaftsbund (SGB) are powerful labour confederations.
A number of small European states have been able to 
manipulate the relations among centralised bodies, often in 
conjunction with the State, into streamlined systems of 
communication and bargaining. Such forms of interest 
representation help to avoid societal conflict and to 
promote economic structures that stimulate a progressive and 
flexible dialogue, resulting in high levels of international 
competitiveness for the state. When communication fails, 
the small European state negates its monocephalic small 
state communication accessibility advantage over its larger 
competitors. Indeed, it is this assertion that will be 
discussed throughout the thesis.
A particular process of interaction between and among 
financial institutions, organised labour, the State, and 
industry develops as a result of the small state's 
industrial culture, which is composed of nationally specific 
institutional goals that guide the state and society, both 
knowingly and unknowingly, in either inhibiting or promoting
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industrial progress. This institutional framework "... 
mediate[s] the interests and capacities ... [within] the 
large-scale and historically evolving organisational 
structure of state and s o c i e t y . A n  attitude or ideology, 
particularly towards the role of the State, becomes manifest 
through a state's industrial culture.
While its small size is an advantage over large state 
competitors, what is also important is that the role of a 
particular actor, coupled with an institutional framework 
that streamlines the process of interaction among the four 
key actors, can produce the necessary internal situation for 
increasing a small state's share in growing foreign markets, 
which in turn expands the incomes of its citizens. In the 
1980s the State did not always act as the primary impetus 
within the small European state in attempting to preserve or 
increase its level of international competitiveness. What 
will be illustrated in this thesis is that depending upon 
each state's specific industrial culture, other actors such 
as financial institutions and labour assumed the role of the 
small European state's principal actor.
Therefore, while the small European state has the 
monocephalic advantage that lends itself to communication 
and dialogue accessibility, its industrial culture, which is 
composed of rules of behaviour, norms, roles, or "patterned 
habits of thought learned by individuals performing these 
roles,determines how the major economic actors in 
society bargain to attempt to foster the development of 
industry. The impact of the three major actors, financial
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institutions, labour, and the State on industry is discussed 
below.
A. The Interaction Between Financial Institutions. 
Industry, and the State
The nature of the tripartite finance-industry-State
relationship can determine whether financial institutions in
small states foster international competitiveness.^ Where
there are financial institution relationships in a credit-
based system, in which much of the political economy
literature has focused on the Japanese and West German
systems, as opposed to a capital market-based system, such
as in the U.K. and the U.S., these relations can facilitate
the ability of industry to remain internationally
competitive. As John Zysman explains.
In capital market-based systems with elaborate 
secondary markets, entrance to and exit from different 
financial holdings are quite simple processes.... In 
credit-based systems with fewer arrangements for an 
easy exit, financial institutions are obliged to remain 
loyal to their customers.
Under a credit-based system, industry is able to maintain
high levels of investment because of a high debt-equity
ratio; the amount of equity employed in a company's
financial structure is a combination of the actual cost of
equity versus debt to the firm. In addition, having highly
leveraged firms ensures strong financial institution-
industry relations because of financial institutions
controlling industries' debt.
However, it is impossible for a state's financial
institutions to provide low rates of credit, even for their
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most valued customers when monetary authorities are unable 
to maintain low real interest rates as a result of 
inflationary problems. In addition, high real interest rates 
cause overvaluation vis-a-vis the currencies of the trading 
partners, which in turn causes the prices of the state's 
exports to be higher for the foreign consumer.
Throughout the 1980s, Switzerland was able to maintain 
lower real interest rates than its competitors and was able 
to maintain a relatively stable national currency. The 
relationship among monetary authorities, financial 
institutions, and industry produced a coordinated interest 
rate and exchange rate policy that was quite beneficial to 
Swiss industry. Moreover, in Sweden by the beginning of the 
1980s active monetary policy-making primarily through 
devaluation led to increased industrial growth.
Consequently, because of the monocephalic nature of the 
small state, during the 1980s the proximity of financial 
institutions to industry could breed a strong working 
relationship between the two parties. Certainly in Sweden 
and Switzerland financial relationships were such that most 
corporations tended to seek financing with particular banks. 
In Switzerland in particular, financial institution-industry 
relations were similar to those in the Federal Republic of 
Germany; strong banking relationships produced lower real 
costs of capital for Swiss industries relative to that which 
its international competition paid, which allowed for strong 
industrial market development and research investment. 
However, in the cases of Denmark and Ireland under
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deleterious domestic monetary conditions, weak banking 
relationships existed. As a result both small states lost 
an advantage in competing against other states, both small 
and large.
B. The Interaction Between Labour. Industry 
and the State
With high levels of international economic 
vulnerability, small states can less afford to have inflated 
labour costs and/or needless periods of labour disruption 
when competing against larger states with greater natural 
and human resources. Labour unrest can paralyse a major 
export industry in any state, as evidenced by the effects of 
strike activity in Italy and the United Kingdom throughout 
the 1970s and into the 1980s. However, increasing labour 
costs and excessive strike activity can have a much more 
serious impact on a small, tightly concentrated, export-led 
economy than on a larger economy less dependent on foreign 
commerce and less sensitive to international prices. In the 
same vein, unsuccessful collective bargaining in a small 
state may not result in industrial action, but inflated 
wages damage industries' price competitiveness. For the 
small European state as an international price taker, these 
problems simply thwart international competitiveness.
For small states, the ability to possess strong 
bargaining structures between industry and labour is 
enhanced by the fact that the labour community can 
communicate with the advantage of monocephalic
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centralisation and a relatively small labour pool. With 
this internal bargaining advantage in comparison to larger 
states, small states could possibly avert the dual Achilles 
heels of many large states such as France, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom: rising labour costs due to mismanaged
collective bargaining and periods of industrial 
unproductivity as a result of labour unrest.
As in all states, the process of interaction among 
labour, the State, and industry can have either: (1) little 
negative influence on international competitiveness by 
maintaining a social compact, but without significant 
programmes to help labour; (2) a positive influence, where 
low levels of unemployment and industrial action are 
complemented by active labour market policies; or (3) a 
negative influence, where the labour market system is 
inflexible or the structure is inadequate.
For a number of small European states, there has been 
the propensity to form social compacts between employers and 
trade unions in order to avoid needless periods of 
unproductivity in the face of industrial action.
Switzerland, for instance, has been able to avoid labour 
disputes, and Sweden has also maintained active labour 
market programmes that act as mechanisms to complement low 
levels of industrial action. In the Swedish case the trade 
unions and the major political party, the Social Democrats, 
have been able to form a Solidaristic Wage Policy, or an 
"equal pay for equal work" system. In the 1980s active 
labour market and retraining programmes kept the population
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employed and trained due to the centralisation of trade 
union - employers' confederations - industry bargaining. In 
addition, due to high levels of labour productivity, real 
unit labour costs remained low.
However, in small states where the interactive process 
lies somewhere between centralisation and decentralisation, 
the labour market structure can actually impede 
international competitiveness, resulting in inflated wages 
or significant strike activity. Denmark and Ireland, for 
example, have faced these structural problems and have added 
to them by continuing to rely on significant benefits for 
the unemployed without serious reemployment incentives.
Because of its size, the small state would seem to have 
a collective bargaining advantage, both as a result of 
strong peak organisation centralisation and the proximity of 
important labour and industrial actors to one another. 
Whether the small state could take advantage of this in the 
1980s, however, was another question.
C. The Interaction Between the State and Industry
One of the most important means of distinguishing 
differences in the ways states attempt to achieve higher 
levels of international competitiveness is the amount of 
State direct industrial intervention, or the degree to which 
the State plays a direct role in changing the composition 
and location of industrial output. The State can play a 
direct role by developing industrial policies,^ most easily 
identified by the two defensive policy avenues of direct
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sectoral subsidy and nationalisation. However, the State 
can play other interventionist roles by stimulating 
industrial competitiveness, namely through targeting, credit 
mechanisms, taxation schemes, public procurement, regional 
policies, competition policies, mergers and acquisition 
policies, and perhaps most importantly, research and 
development (R & D) programmes. Of course, nearly all 
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in some way or 
another influence the structure of industry. Policies that 
the government intends for other purposes can also 
inadvertently have an impact on industry.
Industrial policy weapons vary in name from state to 
state depending upon levels of economic development, changes 
in political circumstances, and industrial culture. As was 
explained earlier in the chapter, small state policy-makers 
have claimed that their economic programmes have been based 
on laissez-faire principles as a consequence of their 
international vulnerability. However, as Robert Ozaki 
explains,
...while specific names and designs may vary, 
practically all nations have practiced and continue to 
practice industrial policy of one kind or another. 
Laissez-faire, or a total absence of industrial policy, 
has never existed except in the realm of ideological 
imagination.
For example, in attempting to maintain economic 
vitality in the face of increasing international pressures, 
small states have resorted to defensive subsidisation. The 
State has reacted to help injured industries, sectors, or 
regions, in most cases as a consequence of their price taker
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status and vulnerability to a changing international 
economic environment. Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, and 
Switzerland have all at one time subsidised injured or 
declining industries or sectors, and all have policies 
designed to aid depressed regions.
To varying degrees the State has employed industrial 
policies to stimulate industrial competitiveness. In 
Ireland the State has actively attempted to attract inward 
foreign direct investment, and there continues to be a 
substantial State enterprise sector. In Denmark, while the 
State has historically attempted to maintain a "persistently 
liberal"^ approach to economic policy-making, the pressures 
from the world oil shocks and the decline of the Danish 
economy have forced the State to reconsider its policy 
options, focusing by the mid-1980s on the development of 
technology as a means to modernise its industrial structure.
Moreover, membership in the EC has created a very 
different environment for Denmark and Ireland, as opposed to 
Sweden and Switzerland, owing to 1) common external tariffs 
that protect their domestic markets with the powerful 
security and protection of the twelve EC members (that 
include such powerful large states as the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy, and the U.K.), 2) EC competition 
policy, and 3) the common EC stance at the GATT. Since 
Denmark and Ireland have also remained highly dependent on 
agriculture, the EC's Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) has 
allowed European interventionism in a major domestic sector 
in these countries, yet with the political protection of the
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Common Market.
In the more developed and internationally powerful and 
recognised Swedish and Swiss economies, interventionism has 
been focused more on labour market policies and monetary 
policies. Nonetheless, the State has worked closely with 
each state's principal actor to form state-specific 
industrial policies that attempt to stimulate industrial 
competitiveness. Both states to different extents have 
utilised export credit guarantee programmes, export 
promotion schemes, and R & D policies. Notably in Sweden, 
with labour acting as the principal actor, active employment 
policies have been incorporated with industrial policies in 
declining regions as a result of shipbuilding closures.
1.6 A Revised Small European State Model
A number of scholars, such as Katzenstein, Cameron,
Maier and Schmitter, have advanced the argument that the 
small European state attempts to achieve its competitive 
advantage by opting against protectionism and direct 
intervention; it instead utilises its small size to achieve 
fluid and effective lines of communication among peak 
associations, allowing a flexible response to global 
economic changes. This thesis, however, will take a step 
beyond this often accepted argument and develop a revised 
small European state model for international competitiveness 
during the 1980s. (See Figures 1.12 and 1.13.)
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The approach used in this thesis modifies the Katzenstein 
model in a number of ways, including six revisions.
1. Symbolic politics and intervention.
Understanding the politicisation of trade and with 
increasing international pressures, small state policy­
makers during the 1980s directed various forms of 
compromising rhetoric towards their larger state 
counterparts, using such phrases as "openness," "economic 
programmes based on economic liberalism," and "laissez- 
faire." Such self-characterisations were forms of what 
Edelman has termed "symbolic politics" towards their larger 
state counterparts, whose markets remain vital to them and 
whose international military, political, and economic power 
overrode their own. With the international political and 
economic shield of larger state membership in the European 
Community (as well as the continuing political unity of the 
twelve member states), the small European state within the 
EC, unlike the non-EC small European states, was able to use 
common external tariffs to protect its domestic market. 
Unlike numerous scholars who have argued that small states 
are forced to develop programmes based on laissez-faire 
principles and openness as a result of a comparatively weak 
international political stature, it is argued here that 
small state interventionism in the 1980s was indeed 
consistent with the pressures of the world market and 
necessary because small state industries were usually price 
takers.
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2. A bargaining process does not necessarily bring 
success.
There are those who assume that democratic corporatism 
is the competitive advantage answer to being able to respond 
flexibly to international economic changes,^® but merely 
having a bargaining process did not necessarily breed 
international competitiveness for the small European state 
in the 1980s. Denmark faced stagnation, inflation, 
unemployment, terms of trade deficiencies, a current account 
deficit, and foreign debt. These economic difficulties, 
coupled with problems in the structure of both the labour 
market and its industry, caused Denmark to be less 
internationally competitive than its Scandinavian partner, 
Sweden. The question is. Why were countries like Denmark 
less able to respond to changing international economic 
conditions than countries like Sweden and Switzerland, who 
also maintained bargaining or corporatist processes of 
interaction?
3. Size alone does not bring success.
It is also not assumed in this thesis that all small 
European states during the 1980s were able to use their size 
to form corporatist structures. In Katzenstein's Small 
States in World Markets, the "economic success stories" of 
the small European "corporatist" states such as Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden were compared. However, small 
European states like Greece, Iceland, and Ireland, though 
having populations less than ten million, have had
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relatively underdeveloped bargaining structures and inferior 
human (and natural) resources. Were these less 
industrialised small European states developing bargaining 
relationships found in more industrialised small states, 
such as Sweden and Switzerland, as part of the small state 
competitive advantage, thus producing policy progress that 
fostered higher levels of international competitiveness?
4. Industrial culture is a key determining factor for 
international competitiveness.
Through their own distinctive interactive systems, 
small European states could be either aided or bound by 
their industrial culture, those nationally specific 
economic, political, and social institutional priorities and 
values that guide the State and society, both explicitly and 
implicitly, in either inhibiting or promoting industrial 
progress. During the 1980s specific strengths or 
deficiencies in the ability of important actors to 
communicate with each other either promoted or hindered the 
small state flexibility necessary to respond to 
international economic changes. In Sweden and Switzerland 
the dialogue process ran fluidly and effectively between 
peak associations. The results for these countries in the 
1980s was stable economic growth, low rates of inflation and 
unemployment, and high standards of living.
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5. Macroeconomic policies developed through
interaction act as necessary complements to actor 
relations.
The interaction among and the role of key dialogue 
players - financial institutions, trade unions, employers' 
confederations, industrial organisations, and government 
ministries - in the small European state in the 1980s led to 
the introduction, development, and implementation of a 
number of active macroeconomic policies geared to enhance 
productivity, state efficiency, and international 
competitiveness. To varying degrees of use and success, 
monetary, labour market, and industrial policies acted as 
necessary complements to working relations between financial 
institutions, trade unions, industrial organisations, and 
the State.
5. Variances in the communication process influence 
degrees of success.
Specific strengths or deficiencies in the communication 
process among the key actors can either aid or hinder the 
necessary flexibility of the small European state to respond 
to changing international economic conditions. In some 
cases, the small European state has been able to fashion 
this process of interaction, directed by the state's 
principal actor, into a system characterised by orderly and 
effective communication between peak associations and 
effective complementary policy-making. Unlike what has been 
argued in the past about the small state advantage of 
particular countries like Sweden and Switzerland, some small
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European states in the 1980s, such as Denmark, have been 
unable to take advantage of their small size to enhance 
communication between actors; the dialogue process has not 
facilitated policy progress or coordination among economic 
actors. In cases like Ireland, while the State has 
attempted to develop industrial policies, an unsystematised 
consultation process has bred incoherent policy-making that 
has contributed to poor economic performance.
This thesis will therefore test the following 
hypothesis:
The degree of international competitiveness of the small 
European state in the 1980s resulted from its internal process 
of interaction, derived from its industrial culture, which 
framed national attitudes, goals, and policies that evolved 
through years of development. The more systematised this 
interactive process was among financial institutions, labour, 
the State, and industry, the more flexible the small European 
state would be to respond to changing global economic and 
political conditions. Without the capability for dialogue and 
communication, the internationally vulnerable small European 
state lost the small state competitive advantage necessary to 
compete for growing markets against larger states, which 
possess both natural and human resource advantages. Small 
state interventionism was not only nationally-specific but 
also consistent with the pressures of the world market 
necessary because in most cases small state industries were 
price takers.
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Notes for Chapter One
1.This assumption is more tendentious rather than steadfast.
2.The balance of payments remains perhaps the most important 
indicator of a state's international competitiveness because 
it remains the most comprehensive system of recording a 
country's economic transactions with the rest of the world. 
The balance of payments also helps to evaluate and forecast 
the strength of a state's currency.
3.Although grammatical rules dictate otherwise, the term 
"state" is capitalised when referring to the supreme public 
power within a sovereign political entity. It is not 
capitalised when referring to the body politic.
4."Small state," as used in this thesis, reflects David 
Vital's guidepost for industrialised states with population 
sizes of less than 10-15 million. Opinions on the exact 
population size of small states do, however, differ. A study 
by Jalan on small developing countries placed the number at 15 
million. Sutton defines a small state as a country with a 
population size of one million or less. See Vital (1980) The 
Inequality of Nations: A Study of the Small Power in 
International Relations: 8; Bimal Jalan (1982) "Classification 
of Economies By Size" in Jalan, ed. Problems and Policies in 
Small Economies: 39-45; Paul Sutton (1987) "Political Aspects" 
in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, eds. Security and Development 
in Small States: 6.
5.This specifically implies the security of the small state.
6.Some have termed this vulnerability as "stress sensitivity:" 
"the degree to which societal structures are affected by 
changes in the external environment." See Niels Amstrup 
(1976) "The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of
Research Efforts." Cooperation and Conflict: 168.
7.Vital (1980) op^cit.: 3.
8.Though there are some notable exceptions, such as Iceland's 
Cod War against the UK.
9.One might use the following example categorisation of states 
for purposes of the thesis:
Mini-, micro-, or client- states Small states
Andorra Austria
Bahamas Belgium
Bermuda Denmark
Channel Islands Finland
Cyprus Greece
Faeroe Islands Iceland
Jamaica Ireland
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Maldives Israel
Mauritius Luxembourg
Monaco Netherlands
Puerto Rico Norway
Sri Lanka Portugal
10.See Note 2.
11.David Vital (1971) The Survival of Small States: Studies in 
Small Power/Great Power Conflict: 9; Vital (1980) op.cit.: 
184.
12.Niels Amstrup (1976) op.cit.: 169. Robert O Keohane (1971) 
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13.See, for instance, Jorn Levinsen and Peer Hull Kristensen 
(1983) The Small Country Squeeze: 62; Amstrup (1976) op.cit.: 
167-169.
14.Vital (1971) op.cit.: 9-10. The "influence capability" of 
states is "the degree to which a state can affect or 
manipulate its external environment." See Amstrup (1976) 
op.cit.: 168.
15.Keohane (1971) op.cit.: 167.
16.Security pressures are mitigated through the decision to 
become neutral, as evidenced by countries such as Sweden and 
Switzerland, or through alliances with larger states. See Hans
H. Indorf (1985) Strategies for Small-State Survival. A path- 
breaking book by Annette Baker Fox showed that alliance- 
seeking small states must form an association with a greater 
power as part of a larger strategy. An alliance of small 
states would certainly fail because the sum total of their 
aggregate influence was still weakness. See Fox (1959) The 
Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II.
17.See Efraim Karsh (1988) Neutrality and Small States: 196.
18.Gautam Sen (1984) The Military Origins of Industrialisation 
and International Trade Rivalry: 249.
19.See David Yoffie (1983) Power and Protectionism: 
Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries: 18.
20.S.N. Eisenstadt (1985) "Reflections on Centre-Periphery 
Relations and Small European States" in Alapuro, Risto et. al. 
Small States in Comparative Perspective: 44.
21.See Murray Edelman (1971) Politics As Symbolic Action: Mass 
Arousal and Quiescence. (See particularly Chapter 9.)
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22.Katzenstein asserts that "Reliance on political rhetoric 
... [is] politically costless.” See Peter J. Katzenstein 
(1985) Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in
Europe: 49.
23.See, for instance, Vittorio Corbo and Fernando Ossa (1985) 
"Small Open Economies: The Main Issues" in Vittorio Corbo,
Anne O. Krueger, and Fernando Ossa, eds. Export-Oriented 
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Industrializing Countries: 5-25.
24.For instance, one could contend that the Swiss 
pharmaceutical industries do have some price making abilities. 
See Chapter Two.
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27.See Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel (1984) The Second 
Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity,
28.See Joseph A. Schumpeter (1939) Business Cycles: A
Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process.
29.Eistenstadt (1985) op.cit.: 45.
3 0.However, much of Irish inward FDI was for export.
31.In the same light. New Zealand is often mentioned in the 
same breath as Denmark as a result of its highly mechanized 
agricultural sector. See Sen (1984) op.cit.: 2.
32.OECD (1988) Economic Surveys.
3 3.Bhagwati points to two notable economists who have studied 
the export orientations of Swedish and Swiss multinationals 
respectively. See Magnus Blomstron (1986) Swedish
Multinationals Abroad and Silvio Borner (1986) 
Internationalization of Industry.
34.Robert Gilpin (1987) The Political Economy of International 
Relations: 235.
35.See Yoffie (1983) op.cit.: 21-22.
3 6.David Baldwin (1985) Economic Statecraft: 41.
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Policy." International Organization: 98.
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Chapter Two
External and Internal State Priorities, Societal Values, and 
Industrial Culture in the Small European State
2.1 Characterising Priorities. Values and Industrial 
Culture
One of the main theoretical challenges of this thesis 
is to integrate the individual case studies into a 
manageable framework of concepts; industrial culture is a 
means to compare underlying factors affecting the 
international competitiveness of small European states.
This chapter will examine the role of industrial culture, 
which is developed as a result of internal and external 
factors and is based on state interests and societal values. 
State interests include measures necessary for a state to 
maintain or augment its level of international 
competitiveness, and societal values determine the means by 
which interests are achieved. This section outlines the way 
in which industrial culture will be discussed in the 
chapter.
I. External and internal conditions affect industrial 
culture.
Changing internal and external conditions can actually 
foster shifts in state interests and societal values.^ As 
will be shown in this chapter, these factors tend to cause 
wide deviation in industrial culture among small states. 
Internal factors might include the current and historical 
levels of economic performance (such as growth, stagnation.
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income distribution, and unemployment) and the state's 
industrial structure (such as the size and orientation of a 
state's enterprises). External factors might include 
resource dependencies, foreign sources of capital, 
immigration, membership in international organisations, 
changes in the international economic climate, and 
international competition itself.
2. Industrial culture reveals societal priorities.
A state's industrial culture reveals its particular 
social, political, and economic priorities; these 
undercurrent beliefs or cultural qualities can either 
progress or hinder the economic vitality of states. As Ralf 
Dahrendorf succinctly explains, "'Economic performance and 
cultural values are linked.'"^ These values may range from 
egalitarian or social policy-making, to religious 
influences, to the development of individual human 
potential. The purpose of examining the industrial culture 
of the small European state is that it provides an account 
of the impact of state interests and societal values on the 
practices of society and on the relationships that exist 
among its important political and economic actors. Duchene 
and Shepherd refer to these practices as the "idiosyncratic 
paths" of states.^ Industrial culture helps to uncover 
those underlying elements that have specific effects on 
states' political-economic performance.
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3. Industrial culture defines actor roles and
interaction, leading to state-specific policy 
preferences.
Most importantly, a state's state interests and
societal values affect the practices of its society by
providing "patterned habits of thought learned by
individuals performing these roles,creating,
a bridge by which timeless values are connected to the 
surrounding reality .... It is the hymns a community 
sings to justify and make legitimate what it is 
doing...."^
Societal practices, which typically follow a standard 
pattern over time, are important to economic actors because 
they must continually justify their power, role, and 
behaviour through this set of beliefs or assumptions that 
constitute the source of their authority. Consequently, 
societal values define the role that various economic actors 
- government ministries, industrial organisations, financial 
institutions, trade unions, employers' confederations, and 
research institutions - will play in the development of a 
state's industry.
Due to the monocephalic nature of society in small 
European states, the interaction among, and the role of, key 
dialogue players in small European states lead to the 
introduction, development, and implementation of a number of 
active macroeconomic policies geared to enhance 
productivity, state efficiency, and international 
competitiveness. Policy preferences emerge from social 
interaction, and society chooses its "preferences as part of 
the process of constructing - building, modifying, rejecting
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- their institutions."* For the State itself, the 
introduction of these policies is a means by which it can 
achieve the same desired ends for all States: to promote
social cohesion and preserve security. Though the goal is 
the same from state to state, the industrial culture of a 
particular society determines the means to that end.
4. Industrial culture justifies the role of the 
principal actor.
When actors in the small European state work together 
to justify their power, role, and behaviour through a set of 
beliefs or assumptions that constitute the source of their 
authority - societal values - then typically a principal 
actor emerges to set the guidelines by which the state 
attempts to remain internationally competitive. Remaining 
the focal point of the economy, the principal actor's formal 
power is important, but its informal influence derived from 
community value support is essential in the monocephalic 
small European state. Hence, the principal actor sets 
priorities, develops programmes, and implements changes as a 
result of the power it has garnered through years of 
development and interaction with other actors.
Most often the State assumes this position, sometimes 
out of necessity as a result of poor economic performance, 
such as in Denmark, or a relatively low level of industrial 
development, such as in Ireland. However, under conditions 
of successful economic performance in which societal values 
and actor interaction are clearly enmeshed, the State does
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not necessarily have to be the principal actor. For example, 
labour often plays a leadership role in a society when its 
communitarian values are important, such as in Sweden. Or 
when a society has complete distaste for governmental 
intervention and a desire for personal entrepreneurialism, 
financial institutions play a principal role, as in 
Switzerland.
Therefore, by examining the industrial culture of the 
small European state, state interests and societal values 
can be linked to (a) the practices and interaction among 
important economic actors and the implementation of policy­
making as a manifestation of the state's industrial culture; 
and (b) the development of the economy under the leadership 
of a principal actor, a role that evolves through years of 
interaction among major economic actors. The key points of 
discussion within this chapter are summarised in the 
following chart. (See Figure 2.1.)
Figure 2.1
INDUSTRIAL CULTURE: THE CASE STUDIES COMPARED
DENMARK IRELAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
Level of international 
independence
Moderate Low High High
Number of indigenous industries 
acting as price makers in ttiç 
world market
Hardly Any
(Canned meat products)
None Some
(Forestry Products)
Some
(Pharmaceutical products)
Strengtti and nature of industrial 
structure
Weak industrial structure; 
many niche enterprises, large 
agro-industrial complex
Weak industrial structure; 
many state owned 
enterprises, presence of 
foreign subsidiaries
Strong industrial structure; 
presence of several large 
MNCs
Strong industrial structure; 
presence of several large 
MNCs, banks
Level of economic performance 
in the 1980's (Major problems)
Poor (unemployment, inflation, 
current account deficit)
Poor (unemployment, inflation, 
foreign debt, current account 
deficit)
Excellent (some inflation) Excellent (low rate of growth)
Political stability in the 1980s Moderate Moderate High Very high
Primary societal values Communitarianism, societal 
equality
Mix between 
communitarianism and 
individualism
Communitarianism, societal 
equality
Individualism, personal 
entrepreneurialism
Historic attitude towards 
intenrentionism (welfare state; 
industry)
Very strong welfare state 
values; persistently liberal 
approach to industrial policy­
making
Very strong welfare state 
values; intervention as a 
means for industrial 
development
Very strong welfare state 
values; intervention to support 
environment for industry
Preference for limited 
intervention in both facets
86
2.2 The Small European State Facing International
Vulnerability: Independence vs. Dependence
A. The Small European State as the Price Taker
As was discussed in the first chapter, during the 1980s 
small states were highly dependent on international trade 
and multinationalisation as a result of their limited 
producing and consuming markets. As Katzenstein asserts, 
"Vulnerability in relation to the international economy is 
an inescapable fact of life for all of the small countries 
in Europe."^
Small state industries tended to be price takers, while 
larger state industries, which had the ability to control 
product markets, were price makers. From 1982 to 1987 the 
Group of Seven Nations (Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S) 
accounted for most of the world market share of exports. In 
contrast, small European states had relatively small shares 
of the world's export market; calculated by a weighted 
average market share in The World Competitiveness Report, 
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland accounted for 
3.1%, 1.8%, 3.5%, and 5.5%, respectively, of the world's 
export market.® (See Figure 2.2.)
Figure 2.2 
THE EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS OF 
SELECTED INDUSTRIALISED STATES, 1982-1987
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Weighted Average Growth in Export Markets (%)
Japan W, Germany14
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IrelandSwitzerlandFrance12
Sweden
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8
6
Denmark
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0
2
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Weighted Average Share of World Exports {%)
Circles proportional to total exports, 1982-1987
Source: IMEDE and World Economic Forum (1989), The World Competitiveness Report: 193.
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In terms of particular sectors in the four case 
studies, throughout the 1980s only in a few circumstances 
did small state industries, producing either commodity or 
differentiated products, act as price makers. In both 
Denmark and Ireland, while having relatively large 
agricultural sectors that accounted for a significant 
proportion of their exports, neither had significant world 
markets shares. The one exception to this was Denmark's 
canned meat and poultry industry, which held around a twenty 
percent of world exports in these products.* Even with such 
renowned MNCs as Denmark's Carlsberg and Ireland's Guinness, 
beer production in Denmark and Ireland combined was less 
than one percent of the world production total.While the 
Danish shipbuilding sector was the world's fifth largest in 
1985, Denmark accounted for less than one percent of the 
world production of merchant vessels.Indeed, the 
industrial structures of both Denmark and Ireland were 
composed primarily of small- and medium-sized enterprises; 
as a result, world price making by particular sectors in 
these states almost never occurred during the 1980s.
In Sweden, there were a few examples of particular 
sectors that acted as price makers. The backbone of 
Sweden's industrial portfolio, businesses based on forestry 
and steel products, accounted for significant world market 
shares; notably the pulp and paper sector maintained a 
fifteen percent share of the world's export market.
Moreover, several Swedish MNCs had significant shares in the 
specialised machinery sector. Though the home of the
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renowned automobile and commercial vehicle manufacturers 
Volvo and Saab-Scania, Sweden accounted for less than one 
percent of the world's production and less than five percent 
of the world's export market of passenger cars and 
commercial vehicles.
Switzerland remained the best example of a small 
European state during the 1980s that was able to act as a 
price maker in particular industrial sectors. While the 
watch and clock industry was severely affected by 
international competition from the Far East, Switzerland 
maintained nearly a thirty percent world export market share 
in the industry due to its dominance in the high priced 
watch market.Beyond watchmaking, Swiss industries 
maintained highly competitive in pharmaceutical products, 
specialised machinery, and chemicals; Switzerland maintained 
from ten to fifteen percent of the world's export market in 
these products.^
In sum, Swiss and Swedish industries were more 
competitive in the international marketplace than Irish and 
Danish industries, which were almost always price takers. 
Because of the international presence of Swiss and Swedish 
multinationals, both Switzerland and Sweden could remain 
more independently-minded than other small European states, 
such as Denmark and Ireland, which possessed weak industrial 
structures.
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B. Independence vs. Dependence; Comparing the Case 
Studies
Throughout the 1980s the level of economic and 
political dependency of particular small European states on 
other states or international organisations varied. David 
Baldwin explains in simple terms that the "higher the 
opportunity cost of severing a relationship, the greater the 
dependency."^* Certainly these opportunity costs differed 
among small European states during the decade.
In the 1980s the significant proportion of not only 
Danish and Irish, but also Swiss and Swedish, exports were 
destined for countries within the European market. 
Maintaining special trading relations with its Scandinavian 
partners through membership in EFTA and links with the EC, 
Sweden maintained strong trading links with a select few 
states. Switzerland remained highly dependent on the West 
German market. Danish industry exported most of its goods, 
primarily in the agricultural field, to one trading partner. 
West Germany. The Irish economy remained highly dependent 
on Britain as an export market, particularly for 
agricultural goods; throughout the 198 0s over thirty percent 
of Irish exports were destined for Britain. (See Figures 
2.3. 2.4. 2.5. and 2,6.)
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Figure 2.3
MAIN DESTINATIONS OF SWEDISH EXPORTS 
1985
COUNTRY DESTINATION
Source: The Economist (1987) The World In Figures : 261
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Figure 2.4
MAIN DESTINATIONS OF SWISS EXPORTS 
1985
COUNTRY DESTINATION
Source: The Economist (1987) The World in Figures : 263
Figure 2.5
MAIN DESTINATIONS OF DANISH EXPORTS 
1985
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Source: The Economist (1987) The World in Figures : 220
Figure 2.6
MAIN DESTINATIONS OF IRISH EXPORTS 
1985
94
10%
COUNTRY DESTINATION
Source: The Economist (1967) The World In Figures : 237
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However, while Sweden and Switzerland maintained 
trading dependencies, they remained independently minded, as 
evidenced by their reluctance to join the EC even though 
other small European states, like Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands were recipients of financial benefits 
ranging from four to six percent of their GDPs in 1982.^^ 
Valuing their independence and autonomy, both the Swedes and 
the Swiss realised throughout the 1980s that through 
economic might, political dependency could be avoided. With 
the dual goals of wealth and peace, Sweden and Switzerland 
remained two of the world's most economically advanced 
states, both having powerful financial centres and a number 
of large multinationals that could compete on a global 
scale. Both Swedish and Swiss MNCs preferred to grow 
through foreign development sites, in which profitable 
subsidiary operations could move beyond national frontiers 
and where profits would not be limited by a small domestic 
market. The strategy of these sunrise industries was to 
sell and manufacture establishments abroad as part of a 
long-term strategy for maintaining or expanding market 
shares.^® (See Figures 2.7 and 2.8.)
Figure 2.7
SWEDEN: PRODUCTION IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY: 1970=100
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225
Electrical
Machinery
200
175 Transports
Excluding
Shipyards
150 Chemicals
Machinery
(Non-Electrical)
Total
Pulp, Paper, 
Printing
125
Iron & Steel
100
Wood
Textiles,
Clothing,
Leather
1970 71 72 73 74 1975 76 77 78 79 1980 81 82 83 84 1985 1986
Source: Svenska Handelsbank (1986) Sweden in the World Economy.
Figure 2.8
Industrial Production in Switzerland. 1985-1986
(1980=100, %)
Sector 1985 1986 Change in %
Machinery 152 164 + 7.9
Watches 84 94 + 11.9
Textiles 119 122 + 2.5
Foodstuffs 160 162 + 1.3
Chemicals 304 310 + 2.0
Metals 134 137 + 2.2
Printing 190 201 + 5.8
Total Avg. 164 171 + 4.3
Source: Credit Suisse (1987) Swiss Economic Data.
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During the 1980s multinationals excelled in Switzerland 
through exceptionally high retained earnings, a very sound 
capital base inspired by strong financial institution- 
industry relations (see Chapter Three), and far-flung 
international operations/'* In Sweden, because of the 
Solidaristic Wage Policy, which will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Four, firms were forced to pay previously agreed, 
industry specific wages based on centralised wage 
negotiations. Because of the necessity of firms to pay 
relatively high wages, the Swedish industrial structure was 
concentrated by a select number of large multinational 
enterprises operating in sunrise industries. (See Figure 
2.9.)
Swedish Manufacturing
Fiaure 2.9 
Establishments Bv Size and Number of
Emolovees. 1983 and 1985
Size By 1983 1985
Emolovees A B A B
Under 10 17.2 1.5 24.2 2.3
10-49 56.7 15.5 52.4 15.7
50-99 12.4 11.1 10.5 10.1
100-199 7.5 13.5 6.3 12.5
200-499 4.8 19.5 3.9 17.0
500+ 2.5 38.5 2.3 42.2
Total 9220 762,916 12,216 926,654
A= % establishments, B= % employees
Source: Guy Standing (1988) Unemployment and Labour Market
Flexibility: 13.
In Switzerland, with an industrial structure composed of 
large, high technology oriented enterprises, a number of
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MNCs such as Nestle, Ciba-Geigy, and Hoffman La Roche, not 
only acted as major employers in Switzerland, but also 
maintained a significant presence throughout the world. 
Moreover, Switzerland's large financial institutions, 
notably its big banks Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation, 
and Union Bank of Switzerland, were among Switzerland's most 
profitable companies. (See Fiaure 2.10.)
Fiaure 2.10
Tod Profitable Swiss Comoanies fl987)
(In million S.Fr and %)
Comoanv 1987 Net Profits % Chance from 1986
Nestle 1789 + 2.2
Ciba-Geigy 1161 - 21.1
Swiss Life 781 + 0.5
Union Bank of Switzerland 776 + 12 .1
Swiss Bank Corporation 674 + 11.8
Credit Suisse 566 + 11.6
PTT 554 + 53.9
Sandoz 541 + 2.3
Hoffmann-La Roche 416 - 7.9
Holderbank 239 + 42.8
Migros 210 + 20.7
Jacobs Suchard 191 + 26.9
Winterthur Group 172 + 21.7
Swiss Re 145 + 20.8
Pirelli Group 141 + 39.6
Zurich Insurance 141 + 14.0
Coop Insurance 129 + 18.3
Patria Insurance 128 + 5.8
Swiss Volksbank 116 + 15.0
Surveillance 112 + 17.1
Brown Boveri 96 - 11.9
Source: "Top Profit Makers Throughout the Country" (1987)
Swiss Business: 13.
Similarly, in Sweden the twenty largest MNCs accounted 
for almost half of the Swedish employment during the 1980s. 
Of the twenty, basic industry (the ten largest raw material 
companies) formed 20% of employment, while other major
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sunrise industries accounted for the bulk of the rest.
Since 1982, sunrise industries, especially in electrical 
machinery and transportation flourished. The major sunrise 
MNCs included Volvo (transportation); Ericsson 
(electronics); Asea (energy); Saab (transportation); 
Pharmacea (pharmaceutical products); Atlas Copco 
(compressors and drilling equipment); Electrolux (vacuum 
cleaners and motor saws); SKF (ball bearings); Astra 
(pharmaceutical products); Sandvik (drills and cutting 
tools); AGA (tube gas); Swedish Match (matches and 
lighters); and Alfa Laval (dairy equipment).
Sweden's and Switzerland's small domestic markets meant 
that offensive, expansionary direct investment programmes 
remained the key to economic power. (See Figure 2.11.)
Figure 2.11
Swedish Direct Investments Abroad and Foreign Direct 
Investments in Sweden (Approximate) Bv Permits Granted
fin 1000 million S.Kr.)
Year Swedish Direct Investments Abroad FDI in Sweden
1976 3.80 .52
1977 4.50 .70
1978 3.20 .80
1979 3.80 .80
1980 4.00 1.20
1981 6.80 1.35
1982 9.50 1.60
1983 13.00 2.80
1984 16.00 3.00
1985 20.00 7.00
Source: Svenska Handelsbank (1986) Sweden in the World 
Economy: 14.
Much of Swiss FDI during the 1980s remained in the U.S.,
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where overall direct investments by Swiss interests accrued 
up to $1.21 billion by the end of 1986.^° FDI in West 
Germany, second only to the U.S., expanded significantly: 
in 1985 Swiss FDI totalled 537 million Deutschemarks (DM), 
in 1986 975 million DM, and in 1987 12,730 million DM.^ 
Moreover, the overseas orientation of Swiss MNCs was 
evidenced by the record of the six largest (Nestle, Ciba 
Geigy, Hoffmann La Roche, Alusuisse, Asea-Brown Hoveri, and 
Sandoz): all together they had seventy-one to ninety-five
percent of their employees abroad and sales abroad accounted 
for sixty-three to ninety-six percent of their totals in 
1986.^^ Foreign direct investment by Swiss companies 
totalled 41.0 billion S.Fr. in 1983, 46.0 in 1984, 50.5 in
1985, and 52.0 in 1986, as compared to 20.9 billion S.Fr. by 
foreign firms operating in Switzerland in 1985 and 22.0 in
1986. Moreover, in 1986 forty percent of all acquisitions 
in Switzerland involved the takeover of a foreign company by 
a Swiss concern.^
As a result of such powerful industrial structures, for 
Sweden and Switzerland, political and economic independence 
coupled with national autonomy, remained an overriding goal, 
as evidenced by their reluctance to consider joining the EC. 
Indeed, the EC offered trade policy options not available to 
those outside the Common Market, yet it continued to stand 
as a threat to its members (particularly small states with 
limited economic and political clout within the 
organisation) of compromising national autonomy and 
independence for these benefits.
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Because of their economic power extending beyond their 
geo-political influence, Sweden and Switzerland maintained 
relatively passive foreign policies based on neutrality.
Both governments continued their commitments to the 
developing world and their roles as mediator for diplomatic 
negotiation among the world's most formidable powers.^ For 
the most part, small during the 1980s European states 
preferred to rely on political deterrence as opposed to 
military defence, illustrated by most small European 
states^^ spending less than one-half the per capita 
expenditures of larger states on defence. As Katzenstein 
explains, "... interest in a reduction of international 
tensions stems from the awareness that security is best 
served by a general orientation towards war avoidance.
As a result, with some notable exceptions (such as Denmark), 
small European states such as Sweden and Switzerland 
maintained foreign policies based on neutrality.^®
For other small European states such as Denmark and 
Ireland, dependency as a result of poor economic performance 
as well as weak industrial structures made them more reliant 
on outside sources of support, such as the EC. For Denmark, 
its agricultural sector significantly overshadowed the 
importance of industrial production; among twenty-two OECD 
countries, Denmark ranked fourth in 1986 in terms of 
agricultural production (value added per capita), first in 
terms of the growth in food production from 1984 to 1986, 
but last in terms of the importance of industrial production 
(as a percentage of GDP)
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As a result of Denmark's high dependence on 
agriculture, its industrial structure was composed primarily 
of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Among Denmark's 
twenty-five largest companies between 1984-1987, nearly half 
were involved in some form of agricultural activity. 
Denmark's largest enterprises included Mejeriselskabet (milk 
products), Carlsberg (beer), Skandinavisk Holding 
(agricultural conglomerate), Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab 
(processed sugar beets). Tulip Slagterierne (slaughter­
house), Superfos (fertilisers), and Korn- og 
Foderstofkompagniet (agricultural products). Outside of 
agriculture, Denmark's largest companies in the 1980s were 
involved in banking (e.g.. Den Danske bank, Privatbanken), 
air-borne traffic (Scandinavian Airlines), and trading 
operating (East Asiatic Company)However, in comparison 
to both Swedish and Swiss multinationals, even the largest 
Danish enterprises were significantly smaller; as a result, 
Danish outward FDI was also less substantial. From 1980 to 
1987, while Denmark and Sweden had comparable standards of 
living, Denmark's level of FDI abroad was five times smaller 
than that of Sweden.(See Figure 2.12.)
Moreover, Ireland's geographic semi-peripheral location 
and the necessity for Irish industry to participate in the 
global marketplace forced the State to move from an 
isolationist stance to an internationalist one in order to 
develop its economy.With transatlantic cultural ties, 
the Irish summoned their New World families for assistance 
by appealing to U.S. industry to invest directly in Ireland.
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Figure 2.12
DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD AND DIRECT 
INWARD INVESTMENT, 1985 -1987 FOR SELECTED 
STATES (AS % OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION)
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Source: IMEDE and The World Economic Forum (1989)
The World Competitiveness Report: 154.156;
Department of Finance (1988) (Ireland) Economic Statistics, 
December.
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Realising the advantages that American industry could 
provide to the Irish economy, the State imposed a policy of 
openness coupled with investment incentives. However, as 
James Wickham properly explains, while Ireland began to 
industrialise after its protectionist period that ended in 
1958, the introduction of foreign-owned firms into the 
Republic signalled "a clear example of dependent 
industrialisation.
Indeed, throughout the 1980s Ireland's indigenous 
industrial structure was composed primarily of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, mainly in the agricultural field. 
Among these, many of Ireland's largest companies were State- 
owned (e.g., ESB, Telecom Eireann, Aer Lingus, Siuicre 
Eireann). Even the size of its largest companies, such as 
Jefferson Smurfit Group, Dunnes Stores, Guinness Ireland, 
and Waterford Glass, were extremely modest by international 
standards.With perhaps one exception (Jefferson 
Smurfit), none of Ireland's enterprises ranked among 
Europe's largest two hundred companies. Indeed, Ireland's 
GDP was the smallest in the OECD, one-fifth the size of 
Sweden and Switzerland and one-third the size of Denmark.
Moreover, while Sweden and Switzerland enjoyed relative 
economic success during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
international recession at the beginning of the 1980s had 
dire conseguences particularly for economy of Ireland, but 
also for Denmark, causing significant economic decline and 
reliance on outside sources of aid, most notably the EC.^ *
Since the inception of the EC in 1957 under the Treaty
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of Rome, Sweden and Switzerland have eschewed membership. 
While throughout the 1980s the Common Market offered unique 
trade policy options for member states, neither wished to 
risk their political autonomy (and neutrality) for these 
economic benefits, since both maintained stable economic and 
political systems without EC assistance. However in 1973 
both Denmark and Ireland (along with Britain) joined the EC 
to a large degree because of both state's dependence on the 
British market. (See Figures 2.5 and 2.6.) Danish and Irish 
policy-makers understood, nonetheless, that membership could 
limit their future economic independence and political 
autonomy.
Paradoxically, while Denmark hoped to capitalise on the 
apparent gains from EC status, including Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) benefits and foreign exchange stability as a 
member of the "snake,the sharp oil price increases in 
late 1973 caused a swift fifteen percent deterioration of 
Denmark's terms of trade. Competing in a larger market, 
Ireland's industry struggled economically from the increased 
competition, yet began to enjoy some of the same benefits of 
membership that Denmark was enjoying, such as agricultural 
subsidies granted through the CAP.^’ Moreover, joining the 
EC provided Ireland and Denmark with a means to attempt to 
reduce their unilateral dependence on their major trading 
partners, the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany 
respectively.
With Denmark and Ireland receiving such significant aid 
from the EC, and with little to contribute to other states
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within the Common Market, the Irish, and to a lesser extent
the Danes, developed a role of being the demandeur.
[This] strategy refers to the attempt to extract 
special concessions from the Community on the basis of 
Ireland's particular circumstances, namely the fact 
that it was poorer and economically less developed than 
other members of the EEC.^ °
To the average Irish and Danish farmer, the EC was a source
of funds; they perceived themselves as being worthy
recipients, but not patrons. As stated in an article in the
Irish Independent on the "Eurogravytrain," "Mention the EC
to the average punter and they will yawn ... unless you
mention EC money.
C. Summarising Differences in Small European State 
International Vulnerabilitv: Independence vs.
Dependence
In summary, the four case studies illustrate how small 
European states differed in the 1980s as to how they dealt 
with the vulnerability caused by their limited international 
political and economic influence. For Sweden and 
Switzerland, strong commitments to independence were 
preserved both through globally powerful multinational 
corporations and financial institutions that provided 
economic might, and relatively neutral foreign policies that 
avoided hostility from more economically and politically 
powerful states while at the same time preserving domestic 
political autonomy.
With unsatisfactory economic performance relative to 
Sweden and Switzerland, Denmark and Ireland remained highly 
dependent small European states, evidenced by both joining
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the European Community in 1973 and by their reliance on a 
single trading partner, namely Ireland with Britain and 
Denmark with West Germany. In Denmark, a relatively weak 
industrial structure and economic misfortune in the 1980s 
caused Danish policy-makers to view the EC as a means to 
overcome economic problems, illustrated by Danish dependence 
on the CAP. At the same time, unlike the other three states, 
which were relatively unburdened by defense issues and whose 
policy-makers focused primarily on economic performance, 
throughout the 1980s Denmark faced foreign policy pressures 
from western allies, as well as from within the Danish 
state, as to its defense posture and NATO commitment. In 
Ireland, a desire for economic development fostered an 
industrial structure that was dependent on both foreign- 
owned subsidiaries and the benefits accrued from EC 
membership.
2.3 Economic Performance: The Principal Internal
Condition Affecting Industrial Culture
For the most part, the single most important internal 
condition affecting any industrialised state's industrial 
culture is its level of economic performance. The oil 
crises in 1973-1974 and 1978-1989 ushered in the new decade 
with extreme external turbulence that resulted in an 
international recession throughout all European states, 
small and large. (See Figure 2.13.)
108
Figure 2.13
Growth in Large European States and USA f% Change per Annum)
1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1980 1981
ERG 4.5 2.2 3.6 2.1 -0.3
France 5.4 4.0 3.3 2.0 0.3
Italy 6.2 2.5 3.8 3.8 -0.2
Britain 2.5 2.1 1.3 -3.0 -2.2
USA 3.2 2.7 3.7 -0.1 2.0
Source: Stephen Wilks and Kenneth Dyson (1983) "The
Character and Context of Industrial Crises." in Dyson and 
Wilks, eds. Industrial Crisis: 10.
While some small European economies were less affected 
than others by the international shocks, the international 
economic instability at the beginning of the decade resulted 
in political upheaval and consequent regime change in most 
small European states. To varying degrees the four case 
study economies were negatively influenced by the 
international recession; when they did experience a 
significant decline in their level of international 
competitiveness, a regime change resulted.
The least affected of the four case studies from the 
international recession was the Swiss economy, which defied 
the Phillips Curve by avoiding unemployment problems in the 
1980s due to both the high levels of industrialism and 
entrepreneurialism, as well as the cultural bias against 
personal laziness. Unemployment remained at the lowest 
relative levels in the OECD; in a work force of about 3.1 
million, only some twenty to twenty five thousand persons 
per year were without jobs throughout the 1980s, due in part 
to migrant worker e m p l o y m e n t ( See Figure 2.14.)
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Figure 2.14
COMPARATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
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Moreover, as will be discussed later in this chapter, 
throughout the decade the inflation rate in Switzerland was 
the major priority of the Swiss State and was controlled 
through strict monetary means. (See Figure 2.15.) It has 
often been suggested that an increasing rate of inflation in 
Switzerland has an adverse effect on favourably passing 
governmental policies. Schneider, Pommerehne, and Frey 
determine in their article on "politico-economic
1 1 0
independence in Switzerland” that " ... the Swiss government 
undertakes a restrictive policy in order to combat inflation 
when it considers the level of the electorate's support for 
it to be too l o w . W h i l e  Switzerland experienced relative 
economic and political stability throughout the decade, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland were less economically, and 
therefore, politically stable. All three experienced 
government changes in the beginning of the 198 0s, much as a 
result of internal economic problems.
Figure 2.15
INFLATION IN SWITZE RLA ND  VS. OECD AVERAGE
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Between 1976 and 1982 Sweden was governed for the first 
time in several decades by a government not from the Social 
Democratic party (SAP), the reasons for which are discussed 
in detail in this chapter and particularly in Chapter Five. 
However, much as a result of international economic 
pressures resulting from the oil shocks during this period, 
Swedish economic performance declined. The recessionary 
problems others in the OECD experienced also occurred in 
Sweden. (See Figure 2.16.) Sweden had one of the highest 
budget deficits in the OECD, lower manufacturing output than 
it had ten years perviously, and among the highest tax rates 
in the world; public disaffection with declining Swedish 
international competitiveness allowed the SAP to regain 
power in 1982
Figure 2.16
Changes in Economic Growth. Sweden/OECD 1976-1982
OECD Annual Rate Sweden, Annual Rate of Change
Year of Change. GDP GDP/Industrial Production/Investment
1976 5.2 1.5/ —0.8/ 0.2
1977 3.7 -2.4/ -5.4/ -17.1
1978 3.9 1.3/ -1.7/ -21.7
1979 3.2 4.3/ 6.3/ 3.4
1980 1.3 1.9/ 0.4/ 19.2
1981 1.4 -0.9/ 3.6/ —8. 6
1982 -0.3 -0.1/ -0.1/ -17.0
Source: Andrew Martin (1987) "Wages, Profit, and
Investment in Sweden”in Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. 
Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic 
Stagnation: 43 0.
Throughout the rest of the decade, Sweden's economic 
performance was excellent, with growth remaining steady, 
unemployment at low levels, and the current account in
1 1 2
surplus. Only inflation inspired by wage drift and 
increasing consumer spending, remained a threat to overall 
economic stability. (See Figure 2.17.)
Figure 2.17
THE RELATION BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT. 1975-1987
IN SWEDEN
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Source: Medium Term Survey of the Swedish Economy, Ministry of Finance: 169; 
Global Analysis Systems. Country Risk Report • Sweden, October 1987
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In Denmark and Ireland, however, economic performance 
was relatively poor. In 1981 inflation in Denmark hovered 
around ten percent, while in Ireland it remained around 
sixteen percent. In the same year, unemployment was eight 
to nine percent in Denmark; in Ireland it ran as high as 
twenty p e r c e n t . ( See Figure 1.2.)
While the Danish standard of living remained relatively 
high, with its GDP per capita ($16,130) being greater than 
its Scandinavian neighbour Sweden, it continued to face a 
mammoth external debt. Since the mid-1970s Denmark's 
external debt climbed to forty percent of GDP (exactly as 
bad as Brazil's) and one-hundred and forty percent as a 
proportion of its ex p o r t s . I n  Ireland the standard of 
living remained significantly below the OECD average, and 
like Denmark, it too faced significant debt troubles. (See 
Figures 2.18 and 2.19.)
Figure 2.18 
Denmark's External Balance. 1975-1985 (% of GDP)
Year Trade Balance Net Foreign Debt
1975 -8.3 12.4
1976 -4.9 16.1
1977 -4.0 20.5
1978 -2.0 21.0
1979 -3.1 24.7
1980 -1.1 26.7
1981 -1.7 30.5
1982 -1.4 33.0
1983 0.4 36.0
1984 -0.4 38.9
1985 -1.3 40.0
Source: The Institute for Future Studies (1987) Growth
Policies in Nordic Perspective: 350.
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Figure 2.19
National Debt in Ireland. 1973-1985 fas % of GDP)
Year Total Debt Foreign Debt Debt Service
1973 60.0 6.2 5.6
1975 74.2 15.4 6.5
1979 88.5 20.9 8.4
1981 96.5 46.6 9.5
1983 120.1 65.9 12.5
1985 133.6 67.9 14.5
Source: Barry Brunt (1988) The Republic of Ireland: 8.
In both states, much as a result of declining levels of 
international competitiveness, regime changes occurred. In 
Denmark, a combination of factors, including the oft-debated 
EEC issue, the fragmentation of the political centre, the 
splitting of the old Left, and perhaps most important, 
weakened economic performance brought about a change of 
regime in 1982. The Social Democrats were removed by a 
coalition of conservatives in a distinctive system of 
proportional representation that meticulously divided party 
representation yet as a result brought extreme political 
fragmentation.^^ Nonetheless, during the period 1983-1985 
Denmark experienced decreased levels of inflation and 
unemployment, lower interest rates, and growth. This period 
was followed by extreme wage increases that overcame the 
significant progress achieved during the previous years.
In Ireland, poor economic performance in the beginning 
of the 1980s contributed to the downfall of the Fianna Fail 
government and the formation of a national coalition 
government headed by the Fine G a e l s . Nonetheless, with
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Ireland continuing to face declining levels of international 
competitiveness, the Fianna Fails garnered enough support 
under their Programme for National Recovery, an agreement 
that would attempt to spur Ireland's economy through wage 
moderation, budget spending cuts, and investment incentives, 
to reclaim enough power to lead a national coalition 
government.
In summary, this section has reviewed the level of 
economic performance in each of the four small European 
states. It has also illustrated the relationship that 
existed between national economic performance and regime 
change among small European states in the 1980s. In 
Switzerland, economic stability was coupled with political 
stability, even in the face of the international recession 
at the beginning of the decade. In Sweden, however, the oil 
shocks of the 1970s and their consequent deleterious effects 
on the Swedish economy allowed the SAP to remove the then- 
governing centre-right coalition in 1982. Throughout the 
remainder of the decade in Sweden, the economy flourished 
and the SAP maintained solid political support. In Denmark 
and Ireland, however, declining levels of international 
competitiveness at the beginning of the 1980s and throughout 
the decade spurred several elections and regime changes.
2.4 Societal Value Differences Among Small European States
While the former section examined state priorities, 
this section will analyze the effects of societal values on 
the industrial culture and subsequent policy development in
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the small European state during the 1980s. While values 
differ from the top industrialist down to the lowest paid 
worker in any society, pervasive community attitudes and 
values can either hinder or augment industrial development.
Because of the small state's limited international 
political and economic power relative to large states, as 
well as its high level of dependence on foreign markets, 
policy-makers in these countries during the 1980s expressed 
their favour of both openness and economic programmes based 
on laissez-faire principles. However, under extreme global 
economic pressures, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s and 
the consequent recession of the early part of the 1980s, the 
State in the four case countries reverted to defensive 
subsidies for declining industries. In addition, even with 
these self-characterisations of openness and economic 
liberalism, various government policies were introduced, 
developed, and implemented in each of the case countries. 
Interventionism, though different among small states, was a 
necessity because of international pressures, the state's 
position as a price taker, and the sustenance or 
revitalisation of the state's level of economic performance.
The study of cultural relativism, which presumes that 
differences in societal action can be explained from 
differences in culture, has fostered the growth of 
"industrial culture relativism," which presumes that State 
policies and programmes towards industry differ according to 
cultural values. For example, in assessing the attitudes of 
various societies in terms of State intervention, Dyson
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asserts that.
The Americans are disposed to a radical equation of 
'crisis intervention* with 'socialism*, the British are 
inhibited by a deep cultural aversion to 'interference* 
with the firm. In continental Europe, the State 
assumes the responsibility for managing industrial 
crises, either by direct and detailed intervention or 
by a public regulation of private sector management of 
crises.^
As the Dyson quotation illustrates, size similarity 
among states does not necessitate societal value unanimity, 
either among large states or among small ones. One need 
only return to the numerous internal and external factors 
described earlier to understand such deviations. For 
example, even though Japan and the United States are large 
states, in the early 1980s attitudes towards governmental 
intervention in these countries differed significantly, 
while the government in power enjoyed relatively high 
degrees of popularity. The political stability of Japan, 
evidenced by the perpetuation of political power by the 
hegemonic Liberal Democratic Party (who were given much 
credit for the growing Japanese economy) during the 1980s, 
illustrated a positive public attitude towards the 
government*s handling of economic programmes, which included 
a number of strait-jacket, highly interventionist industrial 
policies.On the other hand, the popular Reaganomics 
doctrine glamorised decreased intervention (though not a 
retreat from policy-making itself)
For the small European state, societal values can 
differ dramatically as well. For example, the **work ethic*' 
of a society, which directly affects its productivity, is
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defined as "a value or belief (or a set of values or 
beliefs) concerning the place of work in one's life that (a) 
either serves as a conscious guide to conduct or (b) is 
simply implied in manifested attitudes and behavior.
When workers are victims of complacency or selfishness as a 
result of an attitude of dependency and ill-fatedness, a 
trait often considered a cause of the problems of Denmark 
and Ireland, economic stagnation can e n s u e . O n  the other 
hand, when states actively seek to maintain autonomy and 
independence through economic might, as exemplified by the 
Swedish and Swiss cases, industrial productivity is often 
enhanced through labour diligence.
Beyond work ethic, other societal values and priorities 
in small European states might include "communitarianism" 
and the successful maintenance of a welfare state, such as 
in the Scandinavian countries; "individualism" and a 
cultural bias against welfare dependency and inter- 
generational poverty, such as in Switzerland; relatively 
liberal, non-restrictive social policies, particularly 
prevalent in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries; 
relatively restrictive social policies due to the 
significant influence of the church, such as in Belgium and 
Ireland; and relatively high levels of international 
independence, such as the reluctance of Sweden and 
Switzerland in joining the European Community. These values 
affect the way in which the State makes policy, the ability 
of finance and industry to work together, the method that 
labour employs to maintain a unified voice, and the emphasis
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private industry places on becoming more technologically 
advanced.
A. Societal Values and Priorities Among the Case 
Studies
Among the four case studies, Switzerland is the best 
example of a state determined to maintain independence 
despite an incomparable degree of national diversity, 
evidenced by four national languages - French, Italian, 
Romansh, and Swiss-German (Schwyzertusch); the two majority 
faiths, Protestantism and Catholicism, having roughly equal 
numbers; and significant cultural differences between those 
in the French, German, and Italian regions. Although the 
members of the confederation had little in common when 
Switzerland was originally formed, their determination to 
lead an independent life, aggressively averting the 
imposition of foreign laws and foreign taxes, overshadowed 
these differences. Even with linguistic, religious, and 
cultural differences, problems that have led to significant 
internal strife in other small European states such as 
Belgium and Ireland^^, such impediments to unity have been 
overlooked in the Swiss system of federalism, based on 
foedus, which means "treaty” under a confederation of 
territories. Internal unity among its cantons, driven by a 
socio-cultural aspiration to preserve an affluent and 
peaceful community, explains why some have justified the 
existence of the confederal structure as a marriage of 
convenience. Through Swiss confederalism, the power of the 
central government has remained limited.^
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Throughout the 1980s Swiss industrial culture was based 
on the nationally pervasive attitude that through market 
competition and personal entrepreneurialism, a society of 
strong individuals would foster national economic wealth. 
National prosperity was translated though the affluence of 
individuals; society itself may become affluent, but only 
through individual, not community, industrialism. (A 
poignant reminder of the Swiss commitment to economic 
success was the rejection of a referendum proposal in the 
latter part of the 1970s to reduce the working week from 
forty-two to forty hours.
The Swiss maintained that the State should have a 
limited role in both society and industry, having an almost 
passive position in aiding the welfare of both the 
individual and the enterprise. Because of the State's 
limited intervention in either providing welfare or 
industrial aid, "'old time religion' has dominated and still 
dominates Swiss fiscal policy: public accounts must be
balanced, and public monies should not be squandered.
With their intense belief in the individual and 
capitalism, during the 1980s the Swiss State provided 
limited aid to industry through direct intervention. The 
State only once provided significant defensive subsidies to 
an industry since the Second World War, notably the watch 
industry, and in comparison to the national power of the 
major banks and multinationals, it has a limited presence.
As Danthine and Lambelet explain, the Swiss commitment to 
limited intervention is not enough "to show that non-
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intruding policies are necessary for performing economic 
structure ... [however] 'nothing succeeds like success.'”^ ® 
Moreover, the overall lack of welfare benefits and a 
welfare system based on elimination of and cultural shame 
against welfare dependency and inter-generational poverty 
highlighted the societal value of individualism, or the 
preference for personal, as opposed to community, 
responsibility. Consequently, throughout the decade 
Switzerland was hardly a welfare state. There was no 
national health service, with most of the population being 
covered by voluntary health insurance, and there was not a 
central programme to provide a minimum guaranteed income for 
all of the population as in Denmark and Sweden.^*
With few natural resources, the Swiss economy evolved 
into one based on the tertiary sector, namely financial 
services and tourism. Through the influence of 
Switzerland's financial institutions, the Swiss economy 
continued to thrive on a highly successful, conservative 
course, in which annual growth remained unspectacular, but 
in which inflation, the capitalists' and financial 
institutions' greatest enemy, was avoided through strict 
monetary policy. As a result of the influence of successful 
monetary and financial policies and intimate finance- 
industry relations, financial institutions were the 
principal actor in Switzerland's achievement of high levels 
of international competitiveness. This is discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three.
Moreover, throughout most of the twentieth century in
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Switzerland, the slow-moving political process mirrored the 
economic process. The Swiss application of gradualism 
reduced the strain on its institutions by preserving 
moderation in all facets of its political-economic life.
(See Figure 2.20.) Even with the "tangled maze" of 
religious and cultural diversity, the "complex network of 
cross-cutting cleavages"^" did not destroy its true sense of 
stability, which was confirmed by a lack of polarisation of 
hostile parties, such as was found in the neighbouring small 
state Austria.*^
Figure 2.20
Average Yearlv Sector Change in Switzerland f% Growth)
Year (19 —  )
00/10 10/20 20/30 30/41 41/50 50/60 60/70 70/80 %Change
A -0.4 -0.1 — 0.5 0.1 —0. 6 —0.5 — 0.5 -0.1 -3.30
B 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 —0. 6 —5.00
C 0.3
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.7
-0.1
0.7
0.0
0.7
0.0
3.70
A = Agriculture 
B = Industry 
C = Service
Source: David E. Bohn (1986) "The Failure of the Radical
Left." Comparative Political Studies: 97.
According to The World Competitiveness Report, a major 
survey published by IMEDE and the World Economic Forum 
analyzing and ranking thirty-two countries through nearly 
three-hundred criteria based on findings in the 1980s, 
Switzerland ranked first out of twenty-two OECD countries in 
terms of socio-political stability.
Voting for seats in the bicameral parliament was on a
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proportional representation {proporz) basis, with the 
coalition of the four largest political parties, the so- 
called "magic formula," remaining in power for thirty years. 
These four parties accounted for more than eighty-five 
percent of all parliamentary seats; only fifteen percent of 
the vote was not directly represented in the government.
(See Figures 2.21 and 2.22.)
Figure 2.21
Nationalrat Partv Representationf% Bv Size of Canton)
Year (19._)
19 22 25 28 31 15 39 43 47 51 55 59 63 âl 71 75 79 83 87
FDP 63 58 59 58 52 48 51 47 52 51 50 51 51 49 49 47 51 54 51
CVP 41 44 42 46 44 42 43 43 44 48 47 47 48 45 44 46 44 42 42
SPS 41 43 49 50 49 50 45 56 48 49 53 51 53 51 46 55 51 47 41
SVP 41 35 30 31 30 21 22 23 21 23 22 23 22 21 23 21 23 23 25
LDU 25 0 0 0 0 7 9 5 9 10 10 10 10 16 13 11 11 12 12
LPS 9 10 7 6 6 7 6 8 7 5 5 5 6 6 9 9 8 8 9
Figure 2.22
Staenderat Partv Representation (Two Delegates per Canton)
Year (19__)
19 22 25 28 31 35 39 43 47 63 §1 71 75 79 83 87
FDP 23 23 21 20 19 15 14 12 11 12 12 13 13 14 15 15 11 14 12
CVP 17 17 18 18 18 19 18 19 18 18 17 17 18 18 17 17 18 18 15
SPS 0 1 2 0 2 3 3 5 5 4 5 4 3 2 4 5 9 6 2
SVP 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 5 5 5 5 4
LDU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
LPS 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 3 3 2
Source: Gesellschaft Zur Forderung Der Schweizerischen
Wirtschaft, 1987.
Throughout the decade most political battles were 
fought through the referendum process, not through 
competition between political parties; referenda were 
required when the government and the parliament proposed a
124
change in the constitution and were optional in the case of 
federal laws. While discrepancies among political parties 
were mediated through the direct democracy process, the 
ideologies of the major parties were generally similar.^
The strength of Switzerland's direct democracy as a 
stabilising force was unmistakable. In 1983-1987, the Swiss 
population voted during thirteen weekends on thirty-five 
issues, and twenty-nine of the thirty-five submitted were 
supported. The government's referendum "success rate" was 
around eighty-three percent.^
Throughout the 1980s Switzerland subsequently assumed 
the political process with a prudent eye on economics. 
Analogous to countries such as Japan where trading power 
was more important than military power, economics and 
security were intimately linked in Switzerland.^ In 
fashioning economic policies, informal puissance remained in 
many ways more meaningful than formal power. Ad hoc tete-a- 
tete and standard dialogue among peak industrial, banking, 
and labour associations relieved potential conflict, which 
uncovered the reasons for Swiss strike activity being the 
lowest in the industrialised world. In Switzerland, strike 
activity was so limited that annual strike statistics were 
counted in seconds per one thousand workers.
In developing economic policies, the Swiss framework 
for consultation included the gathering of interests from 
all facets of economic life including a process known as 
Konjunturfragen, in which the Ministries of Foreign Trade 
and Labour/Industry advised on economic policy matters and
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provided detailed economic forecasts and proposals/*
This was followed by Vernehmlassung (or procedure de 
consultation), meaning notification or promulgation, in 
which pluralistic peak association representation was framed 
into a "concerted"^’ package for interest articulation. The 
policy implementation aspect, referred to as Verflechtungen 
involved mixed administrative structures, "where a 
specialized sector of the state administration and the staff 
of a private association cooperate closely in order to 
tackle a specific economic or social problem."^°As 
Katzenstein contends, this lengthy process "strengthen[ed] 
Switzerland's compulsion to compromise.
Although the formal networking procedure was important 
for Switzerland to remain internationally competitive in the 
1980s, the Swiss themselves perceived corporatism as over­
formalising a naturally "Swiss" phenomenon. Much of this 
reticence can be attributed to corporatism's connotations in 
reference to Mussolini's symbolic interest articulation in 
fascist Italy. Others perceived corporatism as 
misrepresenting Switzerland's laissez-faire doctrine in all 
facets of its economic and political culture. But most 
Swiss concluded that manipulating the term corporatism on 
distinctly national characteristics was an example of 
assembly-line, quixotic, and circumlocutory terminology that 
misrepresented authentic Swiss industrial culture.What 
is truly "Swiss" has been their admiration and deference for 
consociational politics;^ the Swiss have truly believed 
that pluralistic compromise, not static uniformity, would
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lead to more competent and rational decision-making by 
integrating the contributions of all economic actors into 
the process. To frame this process in universal overtones 
may extract the meaningful, portentous, aspects of how 
Switzerland achieved its high level of international 
competitiveness during the 1980s.
In contrast to Switzerland, during the 1980s Sweden
upheld a unified societal value of political and economic
equality, marked by State programmes to assure "cradle to
grave" benefits for society. Based on such communitarian
principles, Swedish welfare state goals were achieved
through programmes with "universalistic and comprehensive
structures and criteria.Swedish policy-makers assumed
under communitarian principles that economic and social
policy would be synchronised, causing a noticeable reduction
of gross inequality and better quality of life for all. As
Lindberg explains,
[The Swedish welfare state values the] transformation 
of the social order through elimination of class/status 
distinctions and promotion of solidaristic ethic and 
promotion of social mobility."^
Sweden's industrial culture deviated rather
dramatically from that of Switzerland in terms of national
outlook. While Swiss prosperity was translated through the
affluence of individuals in society, in Sweden it was the
overall well-being of the community that remained the vital
goal. The affluence of the community, however, was achieved
in much the same way as that of the individual in
Switzerland, where the State played a relatively minor
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direct role in shaping industry throughout most of the 
1980s. The State targeted much of its attention, expertise, 
and money towards maintaining a strong welfare state, in 
which all members of society received social benefits.
While welfare and egalitarianism remained central 
precepts to the Swedish model of communitarianism, policy­
makers, industrialists, trade unionists, and scholars in 
Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s agreed that the most 
effective way to promote industrial progress was through the 
combination of providing egalitarian social benefits while 
maintaining a limited interventionist outlook for 
industry.Nonetheless, between 1976-1982 the centre-right 
coalition under extreme international economic pressures did 
impose significant subsidies to declining industries, most 
notably shipbuilding.f
Upon the gradual improvement of the Swedish economy 
following the recessionary period and the return of the SAP 
to power in 1982, the Swedish State continued its rhetoric 
of maintaining its primary economic objectives of full 
employment, welfare benefits, and industrial progress. The 
Swedish State maintained its commitment to limited 
intervention by explaining that, "The government's 
industrial policy ... is to create favourable conditions 
and readiness instead of regulating development in a 
predetermined w a y . I n d e e d ,  such rhetoric was more 
credible under positive international and domestic economic 
conditions.
Nonetheless, because full employment remained the
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central tenet to the Swedish communitarian ideology, the 
role of the Swedish trade union movement under a system of 
centralised bargaining and solidaristic wages, coupled with 
active labour market policies implemented by the State, 
remained the primary avenue through which Sweden remained 
internationally competitive during the 1980s. Consequently, 
labour was the principal actor in Sweden throughout the 
decade, and this is discussed in detail in Chapter Four. As 
Wilson strongly argues in terms of the power of labour, "To 
deny the Swedish ... unions a role in policy-making would be 
to invite severe trouble."^® In Sweden social equality and 
strong economic performance were not mutually exclusive; 
rather, Sweden's communitarian ideology acted as an 
ideological concomitant to increasing levels of 
international competitiveness.
Political stability has also been a historical 
trademark of Sweden. From the 1930s through the 1980s 
(other than the period 1976-1982 known as the bourgeois 
interregnum) the SAP was in power and used its strong 
working relationship with the trade unions to maintain its 
political strength.^ This relationship was indicative of 
Swedish policy-making, since the Swedish way was one of 
cautious but purposive policy-making involving a cultural 
bias towards communitarianism; the result was often 
effective, though not necessarily efficient (in terms of the 
amount of time it took legislation to pass through the 
process), policy implementation. As Heclo and Madsen 
assert.
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... [Swedish] politics is kind of a therapeutic 
exercise. Its mission is the slow, careful eradication 
of disease and the establishment of a regimen of good 
health in society. It is always to be done with a 
patient's consent, but also with the recognition that 
some unpleasant medicine and restrictions may need to 
be accepted because they are good for the people. This 
approach permeates Swedish life.®°
In a similar vein to Sweden, Denmark also attempted to 
maintain a welfare, or provident, state commitment 
throughout the 1980s. Grundwig, the great Danish statesman, 
philosopher, and theologian, is considered to be the father 
of social education (through his folkehojskoler, the first 
attempt at State-sponsored schooling). From his influence 
the Danes felt a special desire to preserve their welfare 
state based on egalitarian principles.
While Grundwig was the father of Danish 
communitarianism, Kierkegaard arose as the master of 
individualism. His direct and indirect influence in terms 
of the role of the State left an indelible mark on the 
country; throughout the 1980s Denmark's industrial 
preferences were similar to those in Sweden, where Danish 
policy-makers expressed a preference for industry to compete 
in the free marketplace with limited intervention of the 
State, illustrating what Sidenius has termed Denmark's 
"persistent liberalism".®^ Danish industry attempted to 
remain competitive with even less direct help from the 
State, particularly subsidies, than that in Sweden during 
the bourgeois interregnum, in which the centre-right 
government subsidised a number of ailing industries. 
Nonetheless, the Danish State did continue to subsidise its
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ailing shipbuilding industry, while the Swedish State 
discontinued shipbuilding subsidisation.
Danish industrial culture, however, deviated from 
Swedish industrial culture in terms of the distinct 
separation between social policy, influenced by the Grundwig 
doctrine, and its limited interventionist stand towards 
industry, based on the Kierkegaardian philosophy of 
individualism. While during the 1980s Denmark was plagued 
with the division, Sweden was better able to integrate its 
philosophies on society and industry. For instance,
Sweden's primary social objective of full employment was 
used as a tool to aid industrial competitiveness through a 
number of active labour market programmes, including both 
retraining and mobility policies.
According to The World Competitiveness Report, Denmark 
was ranked first out of twenty-two OECD countries in terms 
of "the extent to which the state's health care facilities 
are adequate for the individual worker and his family."®^ 
However, Denmark was ranked last in terms of "the extent to 
which taxation and social security systems encourage the 
will to w o r k . I n d e e d ,  while Sweden ranked among the top 
half countries in terms of health care facilities, it also 
ranked among the top five in terms of encouraging the will 
to work.
Consequently, a dependent attitude pervaded throughout 
Danish society because social policies virtually alleviated 
incentives for reemployment. "More and more often the 
subject [of Danish State aid was] not a citizen with rights
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and duties, but a client, a recipient of aid and services 
waiting to be told what to do rather than doing what he 
w a n t s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y  the Danish provident state was 
unable to integrate its social and economic philosophies 
into an overriding, comprehensive goal, as was the case in 
Sweden, much as a result of its poor economic performance 
since the mid-1970s.
With inflation, unemployment, and current account 
deficit problems, the Danish State imposed an austerity 
programme - the "Potato Diet" - in the early part of the 
1980s as a "major crisis s t e p . T h e  State levied a twenty 
percent tax on interest rate expenditures in an attempt to 
thwart borrowing for domestic consumption, promote savings, 
limit import consumption, and reduce the current account 
deficit.®^ Ironically, with personal taxes among the 
highest in the world to fund Denmark's social benefits 
schemes, the average Dane simply consumed by borrowing from 
the bank - but now even that was taxed.
While attempting to tackle its cross-current demands 
ranging from its giant welfare state commitment to 
maintaining a high standard of living (evidenced by the 
borrowing for personal consumption), as well as holding off 
inflation and import consumption, the Danish State had 
relatively few ideas as to how to increase industrial 
productivity. Denmark ranked last out of twenty-two OECD 
countries in the World Competitiveness Report in terms of 
"the importance of industrial production on its economy." 
From the 1960s until the mid-1980s the lines between social
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and economic policy remained clearly delineated in Denmark, 
even though it began to face a number of international 
economic pressures. Nonetheless, policy-makers were unclear 
as to what role the State should play in terms of industrial 
development, though they were certain that "some action 
needed to be taken."®® Most important, Denmark's industrial 
structure was composed principally of small- and medium­
sized enterprises, most of which were operating in niche 
areas.
More out of practice than reason, Denmark chose its 
"persistently liberal"®’ path of limited intervention 
without attempting to respond flexibly to changing external 
conditions. While policy was clearly oriented towards the 
demand side, the supply side was neglected as a result of 
liberal economic ideology. Indeed, with international 
pressures and the increasing vulnerability of the Danish 
economy, its international competitiveness waned, with 
Denmark becoming increasingly dependent on the EC for 
economic sustenance throughout the 1980s. Nevertheless, by 
the middle of the decade, the Danish State realized that an 
industrial policy needed to be formulated, and it began to 
work closely with industry and research institutions to 
bolster is technological competitiveness. As a result of 
such action, the State in Denmark became the principal actor 
in helping to augment the state's level of international 
competitiveness, and this is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Five.
While facing economic instability throughout the 1970s
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and 1980s, Denmark faced political instability as well.
Much of the reason for such economic policy fluctuation was 
the Danish approach to forming consensus politics. As in 
Sweden, Danish political was marked by constant 
negotiation^" between the major trade union (the 
Landsorganisationen- LO); the major peak industrial 
association similar to the Swiss Vorort, the Industrirardet; 
and various ministries. Moreover, because of the 
proportional representation system of voting, most Danish 
governments were minority-led, meaning that "various 
positions [were] openly announced and speculated upon.
By the mid-1970s under a new system of proportional 
representation, the new parliament had a far greater number 
of diverging political parties, including a rightist tax 
refusal party, which garnered an amazing sixteen percent of 
the vote. (See Figure 2.2 3.)
Fiaure 2.23 
Composition of Parliament fFolketino) bv Partv. 1988 Election
Party Number of Seats
Social Democrats 55
Conservatives 35
People's Socialists 24
Liberals 22
Progressive Party 16
Social Liberals 10
Centre Democrats 9
Christian Democrats 4
Greenland and Faroe Islands 4
Total
Source: OECD (1988) Denmark: 7.
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With these changes, significant political stalemates ensued, 
resulting in weak minority governments throughout the 1973- 
1980 period.^
After 1973, the Folketing became extremely fragmented 
with ten or eleven parties....the 1970s brought an 
alienation from traditional politics and the arrival of 
new political forces expressing and articulating these 
sentiments.^
In short, there [was] a considerable degree of 
transparency in the whole process.”’^ Similar to other 
negotiated political systems, like Sweden and Switzerland, 
Denmark's governmental process was characterised by 
"muddling through," which for Denmark has often led to 
static, stalemated policy-making.
With external shocks ushering in the 1980s, Ireland 
struggled with poor economic performances: the debt— to-GNP 
ratio remained around three times the average of European 
Community nations,’^ unemployment was near twenty percent, 
and growth was sluggish. Throughout the 1970s public 
expenditure grew rapidly; in 1974-1975 the coalition 
increased its deficit to attempt to revitalise the 
recession-struck economy, and the Fianna Fail government of 
1977-1981 increased government spending as part of job 
creation programmes.^ In addition, with seven different 
governments operating from 1970-1987,’^ policies were not 
developed out of long-term ideological consensus but rather 
out of an ad hoc and short-term necessity. As Hardiman 
maintains, "Irish parties ... tended to adopt a more ad hoc 
approach to policy-making and were constrained by other 
features of the political system from developing specific
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ideological profiles in sharper outline."’^
After the Irish government had introduced a coherent 
economic philosophy based on protectionism twenty years 
earlier, industrialists and policy-makers in Ireland during 
the 1970s understood the necessity to spur economic growth 
by (1) linking with the larger unit of Europe, which Ireland 
did by joining the EC in 1972; (2) dismantling trade 
barriers, which Ireland began to accomplish through the 
Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1966; and (3) spurring 
economic development by giving the State a larger role.’® 
However, with increased competition from abroad as a 
result of opened markets and membership in the EC, Irish
indigenous industry suffered net losses in market shares at
home without compensation from increases abroad.”
Indigenous industry made little progress in developing R & D
programmes to revitalise its stagnating industrial base, and
the State introduced few policies to spur development of 
Irish industry. Instead, Ireland became dependent on the 
EC; it remained a net beneficiary from transfer payments 
totalling six times its contribution. Seventy-four percent 
of these transfers were as a result of the CAP, and the EC 
also granted substantial Community loans for development of 
Ireland's industrial base and infrastructure.^®®
This attitude of dependency in its external relations 
was also manifested internally through the Irish welfare 
state. With income tax rates comparable to those in 
Scandinavia to cover its comprehensive welfare state 
programmes, including a major social insurance scheme.
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throughout the 1980s the Irish State continued to grant such 
benefits even in the face of a major budget deficit. Similar 
to Denmark, Irish society developed an attitude of 
dependency in which social policies virtually alleviated 
incentives for reemployment.
For the Irish, an attitude that the State has a moral 
responsibility to support the population pervaded through 
society as a result of the strong influence of the church. 
With a unique linkage between church and State in the Irish 
constitution, during the 1980s the Catholic Church remained 
the most powerful institution in Republican society. The 
church's role in state affairs, particularly social policy­
making, remained so influential that, "The Catholic Church 
attempt[ed] to enforce an idea that Irish ethics is the same 
thing as Catholic doctrine.Moreover, as Hogan contends.
The Church rarely finds it necessary to intervene in 
political affairs because politicians have found that 
it is rarely electorally profitable to take on the 
Church. Moreover, the entire apparatus of public 
affairs is 'conditioned to articulate and legislate 
what the Church wants without the Church having to 
lobby for it.'"^ °^
As a result of the influence of the church on the 
Irish, they remained staunchly conservative in their social 
views; abortion and divorce, for example, have been 
outlawed. Irish conservatism also pervaded into politics 
and economics. Edmund Burke, whose political writings on 
incrementalism and conservatism have greatly influenced 
political thinking, is one of the major figures in Ireland's 
most prestigious university. Trinity College, Dublin.
With the industrial revolution bypassing the country.
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except for the north in Belfast (particularly in 
shipbuilding and woolens),Ireland maintained a 
predominantly rural economy. Moreover, its industrial 
structure was composed of only small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. Without a significant industrial base, Ireland 
remained highly dependent on the EC, most importantly the 
British economy, to support its infrastructural problems and 
semi-peripheral location. With radical political problems 
gnawing at Irish society, Ireland's rural-based and 
traditional society could not sustain economic growth 
throughout the 1970s into the 1980s. Unemployment and 
inflation both ensued.
Moreover, tensions between the Republic and Britain as 
a result of the Northern Ireland situation continued to be 
one of the most powerful reminders of deep-rooted historical 
conflicts with political and sectarian o r i g i n s . O n e  must 
remember that "both the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland were created by a combination of military force and 
popular will."^^ Consequently, while there remained a 
virtual symbiotic economic relationship between Ireland and 
Britain (at least from the Irish perspective) throughout the 
1980s, feelings of dislike, distrust, and frustration 
towards the English pervaded Irish society. Beyond national 
differences, the Northern Ireland situation also brought to 
light the differences between Catholic Ireland and 
Protestant Ulster. While violence continued throughout the 
1980s, both Ireland and Britain remained in a stalemate over 
the issue.
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With an ideological reluctance for dramatic action,
Irish society began to develop an attitude of ill-fatedness
and powerlessness as a result of declining international
competitiveness, infrastructural problems, and internal
violence. As Ivor Kenny explains.
What we face now is a more generalised malaise defined 
as an economic crisis .... the symptoms of the disease 
are ... the human consequences of inflation (the 
destruction of wealth), of unemployment (the 
destruction of jobs), of a coarsening in the quality of 
Irish life, and of alienation .... we thrashed around 
laying blame: on the increase in oil prices, on the
international recession, on the Northern Ireland 
conflict. We slowly learned that laying blame would 
not cure our ills, but we were not yet ready to face 
the consequences, to take the medicine ....
Moreover, in a series of lectures by Ireland's most noted
economic scholars, which were compiled in a single book,
virtually all expressed the same tone:
The problems which we face are now of such a 
magnitude....
....we are now faced with enormous problems which have 
no easy answers....
....how can then we plot an escape route from the 
morass?^°®
As a result of poor economic performance and a weak 
industrial structure, coupled with societal attitudes of 
powerlessness, the Irish State remained highly dependent on 
external sources for economic development and modernisation. 
Its external dependency on the United States and the EC, 
most importantly the United Kingdom, resulted in overall 
reluctance to form comprehensive state goals; instead, Irish 
industry remained dependent on American industry, Irish 
farmers became dependent on CAP funds, and Irish policy­
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makers attempted to combat declining levels of international 
competitiveness with little agreement as to how to solve 
their economic problems. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s the 
State was able to attract foreign direct investment, 
continued to maintain a strong export orientation, and 
commenced a programme to limit wage increases. As a result, 
the State was the principal actor in Ireland's effort to 
augment is level of international competitiveness.
2.5. Summarising State Priorities and Societal Values 
in the Case Studies
By distinguishing state external priorities (e.g., 
international independence) and state internal priorities 
(e.g., political and economic stability, economic growth), 
as well as identifying differences in societal values, this 
chapter has presented the circumstances and conditions 
underlying differences in practice among important economic 
actors in the small European state and their consequent 
effects on each state's international competitiveness. 
Subsequent chapters will elaborate on these practices and 
actor interaction.
The following three chapters examine relations between 
the fundamental actors - financial institutions, labour, 
industry, and the State - that support and augment 
international competitiveness. Chapter Three analyzes the 
role of financial institutions in the small European state, 
specifically examining the small European state's monetary 
environment and the relations between financial institutions
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and industry. Chapter Four investigates the cooperative or 
detached nature of trade union-industry relations and the 
use (or lack of) labour market policies. And Chapter Five 
analyzes State-industry relations, examining the use of 
industrial policy-making in each of the four case studies.
Because of limited international economic power status 
as price takers, the four small states used various forms of 
intervention to sustain and/or increase their levels of 
international competitiveness during the 1980s. However, 
applications of intervention differed among the four case 
studies. While Sweden and Switzerland developed policy 
strategies cultivated as a result of their industrial 
cultures, confused objectives and conflicting beliefs in 
Denmark and Ireland hampered the development of policy 
strategies to combat declining levels of international 
competitiveness.
Throughout the 1980s in both Sweden and Switzerland, 
state priorities and societal values remained relatively 
coordinated within each country. In both states 
independence remained a major priority and was achieved 
through foreign policies based on neutrality, powerful 
industrial structures, and strong economic performances. 
Internally, however, Swedish society preferred mixed economy 
values, allowing an integration of its philosophies on 
society and industry. Because of the Swiss desire to 
maintain a prosperous community based on individual economic 
achievement, welfare state goals were overlooked and 
personal entrepreneurialism advocated.
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In Denmark and Ireland, however, their industrial 
cultures were marked by external state dependence and 
internal State and societal confusion as to the way to 
engender higher levels of international competitiveness.
For the Danes, the liberal path of non-intervention in 
industry, even in times when international pressures may 
have called for State action, produced attitudes that some 
action needed to be taken, though the State was unsure what 
should be done. Indeed, the choice of Danish policy-makers 
was to attack the demand side of the problem while 
neglecting the supply side. Paradoxically, while Danish 
society enjoyed a high standard of living comparable to that 
of Sweden and Switzerland, its industrial structure was 
significantly weaker. With poor economic performance 
throughout much of the 1980s, by the end of the decade 
Danish policy-making focused on efforts to make Danish 
enterprises more competitive in foreign markets.
During the 1980s Ireland's semi-peripheral location, 
infrastructural inadequacies, weak indigenous industrial 
structure, and domestic political tensions caused extreme 
divisiveness as to how to solve numerous political and 
economic problems. With a stated belief in the free 
marketplace and a high degree of dependence on the EC, Irish 
policy-making throughout much of the decade was 
characterised by inaction coupled with international 
dependency. Similar to Denmark, only by the end of the 
decade did policy-makers initiate attempts to promote 
Ireland's level of international competitiveness.
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Understanding these background factors, this thesis 
will examine the practices of interaction between financial 
institutions, trade unions, and the State. The following 
three chapters will functionally compare the four small 
European states by analyzing these tripartite relations; 
this form of functional comparison will attempt to clearly 
illustrate why some small European states were more 
internationally competitive than others during the 1980s.
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Chapter Three
Finance-Industry Relations:
Monetary Policies and Financial Practices
3.1 The Relationship Between Monetary Policy-Making 
and Finance-Industrv Relations
The focus of this chapter is on how particular small 
European state financial systems in the 1980s either 
encouraged or discouraged productive activities that helped 
the small European state remain internationally competitive. 
Most importantly, while there exists a vast literature in 
political economy in the area of corporatism and 
concertation between the community, market, and State as a 
means for states to achieve international competitiveness, 
there are significantly fewer works by political economists 
on finance-industry relations.^ For example, Lindblom's 
path-breaking Politics and Markets, which analyzes the 
relationship between government and business, virtually 
excludes any mention of the role of financial intermediaries 
in augmenting business' "privileged position."^ Other 
notable scholars of networks, policy concertation, and 
collective action have also excluded the role of financial 
institutions in their definition of corporatism, tacitly 
favouring the examination of tripartite negotiations between 
government, business, and labour.^
Moreover, while authors like Zysman have analyzed 
"financial systems and the politics of industrial change" 
and authors such as Katzenstein have examined "small state 
industrial policies," relatively few scholars have examined
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finance-industry relations in the small state and the 
effects of these relations on the state's level of 
international competitiveness. This form of collective 
action for the small European state has remained as 
important, perhaps even more so, than labour- or State- 
industry relations.
Monetary policy is a government's response to private 
sector requirements. Its purpose is to promote economic 
stability and enhance communication among three critical 
actors involved in promoting international competitiveness - 
the State, industry, and finance. This chapter will examine 
the effects of the international monetary and financial 
environment from the latter part of the 1970s through the 
1980s on the consequent domestic environments of each of the 
four small European states. It will analyze the monetary 
and policy responses to that environment in each of the case 
states, demonstrating the importance of communication 
between the private sector actors. The key points of 
discussion within this chapter are summarised in the chart 
on the following page. (See Figure 3.1.)
Figure 3.1
FINANCE - INDUSTRY RELATIONS: THE CASE STUDIES COMPARED
DENMARK IRELAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
Monetary policy emphasis during the 
1980s
Austerity policy to control wage- 
inspired inflation
Passive poiicy highly reliant on 
EMS
High growth through devaluation 
and low interest rates
Control of inflation through 
monetary aggregates
Monetary environment during the 1980s Inflation, high real interest rates, 
debt, low savings rate, moderate 
growth
Inflation, high real interest rates, 
debt, low savings rate, low growth
High growth, moderate real interest 
rates, some inflation
Low level of inflation, low real 
interest rates, high savings rate, 
moderate growth
Role of the Central Bank In the 1980s Active role in fighting inflation Prudential role Active role in stimulating growth Highly active role in controlling 
inflation and interest rates (the 
principal policy-making authority in 
Switzerland)
Bank ownership of Industry Up to 20 - 25% bank ownership of 
firms
Negligible Sphere structure ensures bank 
ownership of industry
Up to 20 - 25% bank ownership of 
industry
Board directorships between banks and 
Industry
Some cross-directorships Few cross-directorships Many cross-directorships Many cross-directorships
Relative level of Indigenous Industry 
debt-equlty ratios
High Low Very high High
Relations between banks and Industry 
during the 1980s
Close relations, though hampered by 
poor monetary environment
Relatively distant in comparison to 
other smali European states
Close relations Very dose principal bank relations
Size of financial sector Moderate; three major domestic 
banks with moderate presence in 
Scandinavia
Small; presence of two major 
domestic banks
Moderately large; three major 
domestic banks with powerful 
presence in Scandinavia, moderate 
presence worldwide
Large; three major domestic banks 
with significant presence worldwide; 
large banking (and insurance) 
sector ensured Switzerland as an 
international financial centre
Cooperative or detached financial 
Instltution-lndustry relations
Relatively cooperative Detached Cooperative Cooperative
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The first half of the chapter will concentrate on the 
role of central banks and regulators and their impact on the 
domestic monetary environment of the state, while the second 
half of the chapter will examine the role of private 
financial intermediaries, commercial banks, merchant banks, 
and insurance companies as sources of private finance.
Public sources of financing as a form of industrial policy 
are touched upon in Chapter Five.
In terms of monetary policy, some small states have 
preferred to focus on interest rates, while others have 
focused on monetary aggregates to foster internal economic 
stability. Switzerland, for example, is a classic example 
of a small state able to control inflation by closely 
monitoring the growth of the money supply. With regard to 
the small European state's external stability, a stable 
foreign exchange rate is vital because of the small states 
significant dependence on foreign trade. Consequently, 
small European states attempted to maintain exchange rate 
stability by pegging their currencies to those of their main 
larger state trading partners.* (See Figure 3.2.)
In most small European states a few large players 
established the finance-industry communication environment 
of the 1980s. In Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland - one to three big banks 
controlled most of the credit markets within the country.
In some cases, the monocephalic communication advantage 
afforded to the small European state engendered close
Figure 3.2
SMALL EUROPEAN STATE CENTRAL BANK MONETARY POLICY TRADE-OFFS 
AND THEIR POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON GROWTH
MONETARY SUPPLY GROWTH
zx
INTEREST RATES
RESTRICTIVE POLICY 
EFFECTS:
1) Possible Stagnation
2) Anti-Inflation Measure
3) High Interest Rates
EXPANSIONARY POLICY
EFFECTS:
1) Possible Growth
2) Possible Inflation
3) Low Interest Rates
zx
RAISE INTEREST RATES LOWER INTEREST RATES
EFFECTS: EFFECTS:
1) Antl-lnflatlon Measure 1) Possible Inflation
2) Slower Growth 2) Spurred Growth
3) Increased Exchange Rate 3) Lower Exchange Rate
HIGHER LENDING RATES TO 
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
EFFECTS:
1) Higher Financing Costs for 
Investment/Projects
2) Competitive Threat for Domestic Fi­
nancial Institutions from Foreign 
Competitors. Movement of Domestic 
Industry to “Transactional" Banking
3) Possible Infusion of Foreign Capital
LOWER LENDING RATES TO 
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
EFFECTS:
1) Lower Financing Costs for 
Investment/Projects
2) Greater Opportunities for 
Maintenance of Domestic Banking 
Relationship
HIGHER EXCHANGE RATE 
RESULTING FROM INTEREST RATE 
RISE
EFFECTS:
1) Foreign Consumers Dissuaded to 
Buy Exports
2) Domestic Consumers inspired to 
Buy Imports
3) Anti inflationary Measure that can 
Breed Stagnation
(Example: Particuiarly Ireland In the early 
part of the 1900s, but also Denmark)
(Example: To a great extent Switzer­
land and to a lesser extent Sweden; 
Denmark and Ireland maintain 
“relationships", though, to a lesser 
extent than Switzerland and Sweden)
EXCHANGE RATES
INTEREST RATE CHANGES 
AND THEIR IMPLICATION 
FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
PEGGING 
EFFECTS.
1) Foreign Exchange Stability
2) Possible Loss of Monetary 
Autonomy
(Example: Swiss monetary 
policy is guided by monetary 
base growth targets)
(Example: Denmark and 
Ireland are members of tfie 
EMS; the Swiss Franc Is 
pegged to the Deutschemark; 
the Swedish Krona Is pegged 
to a “currency basket")
X
DIRECT INTERVENTION
EFFECT.
Typically a Devaluation to 
Spur Export Growth
(Example: All four countries 
have eltfier multilateral ty or 
unilaterally devalued their 
currency In the 1980s)
LOWER EXCHANGE RATE 
RESULTING FROM INTEREST RATE 
DECLINE
EFFECTS:
1) Foreign Consumers Inspired to Buy 
Exports
2) Domestic Consumers Dissuaded to 
Buy Imports
3) Growth Measure that can Breed 
Inflation
Ln
Ui
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financial institution-industry relationships. In others, 
close finance-industry relations did not prevail throughout 
the 1980s.
When strong banking relationships in particular small 
European states produced lower real costs of capital for 
domestic industries relative to that which their 
international competition paid to their industries, a 
competitive advantage resulted. Augmented by close finance- 
industry affiliation through directorships and in some 
cases significant bank ownership of industry, some small 
European financial systems, notably the Swiss and the 
Swedish, were capable of providing the necessary funds for 
growth that allowed their industries to remain 
internationally competitive.
However, some relationships between financial 
institutions and industry, such as in Denmark and Ireland, 
were stifled in the 1980s. This stagnation came as a result 
of both relatively ineffective monetary policies, which 
increased real interest rates and adversely affected lending 
and exchange rates, as well as financial institution- 
industry relations that were less intimate than in other 
small European states. Under this scenario, the small 
European state lost the advantages against other states 
produced by its monocephalic concentration of industrial and 
financial institutions, a loss felt particularly in relation 
to large states such as the U.S. and the U.K.
In large states such as these, relations between banks 
and industry were based primarily on the capital markets and
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transactional banking. Defined by Yao-Su Hu as separatist 
systems, "government authorities, the managers of finance, 
and the managers of industry pursue their interests 
separately and go their separate ways.... the relations 
between the three are of an arm's length, often adversarial 
nature."^ For the small state in the 1980s, adversarialism 
in finance was a liability; monetary policies and financial 
practices needed to be coordinated to yield enough latitude 
for both public and private financial institutions to offer 
domestic industries a competitive cost of capital, a 
necessary staple to support economic growth and 
international competitiveness.
3.2 The International Monetarv and Financial Environment
With American inflationary pressures spreading 
worldwide during the 1970s as a consequence of its "benign 
neglect" policy and the two oil price increases, inflation 
became a worldwide phenomenon affecting all the small 
European states. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates ended in 1973, and with the inception of floating 
rates, a new period of international financial and monetary 
turbulence ensued under a monetary system characterised by 
economic interdependence and hegemonic leadership by the 
U.S.
As a result of its significant export dependence, the 
small European state remained highly reliant on favourable 
and stable foreign exchange rates; however, the movement to 
flexible rates in 1973 resulted in worldwide monetary
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instability.® In 1978 the European Monetary System (EMS) 
was launched as a vehicle to strengthen the alignment of the 
European currencies.^ This action was taken because of (a) 
European concern over the handling of the international 
monetary system by the U.S., (b) the polarisation of 
European currencies into the "strong" and "weak" according 
more to states' ability to control inflation rates than to 
their current account balances,® and (c) the desire to 
establish some degree of autonomy.®
The inflationary pressures of the 1970s, engendered for 
the most part by the oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980, 
initiated a period of American deflationary policy-making.
As the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates, 
interest rates all over Europe concurrently escalated 
because of Europeans' fear of capital flight. Furthermore, 
with European interest rates rising, the effects on their 
exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar were similar, making 
European exports to the U.S. less competitive.
By the beginning of the 1980s nearly all of the small 
European states experienced industrial decline and a 
deterioration in their terms of trade, yet they did not have 
the international monetary and economic power of large 
states to circumvent or overcome the situation. Despite 
trade and budget deficits under the Reagan Administration, 
the U.S. experienced significant economic growth through a 
strong dollar, a low inflation rate, and comparatively high 
real interest rates. Within this environment capital 
investment in the U.S. increased and business prospered.
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However, many of the small European states faced
difficulties in reflating their economies because their own
depreciated currencies increased the prices for imported raw
materials, which were for the most part factored in
dollars.^ As Robert Keohane explains.
By 1973 and 1982, however, the terms of trade for these 
countries worsened by about twenty percent. This 
dramatic shift, caused largely by the huge oil price 
increases of that period, reflected the[ir] inability 
... to force the costs of adjustment to higher oil 
prices on to others .... ^^
Accordingly, the option for the small European state 
was to adapt to the situation through flexible policy­
making. For most small European states, reflation to 
overcome declining export competitiveness was through 
devaluation in 1981-1982; the best example of this tactic's 
use was the Swedish case.
This unstable international monetary system of the 
1980s was complicated by the volatile international 
financial system. With the U.S. experiencing an economic 
boom during the Reagan years (1980-1988), deregulation of 
financial markets accompanied the anti-inflationary high 
growth monetary programme. As a result of these 
deregulation effects, other domestic financial systems, 
including those in the small European states, followed the 
financial deregulation band-wagon, though to varying degrees 
and extents. Moreover, the continuing internationalisation 
of the financial markets began to outgrow the national 
systems. The advent of the Euromarkets and international 
syndicates of financial institutions providing
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securitisation for transnational industry became 
commonplace.
In sum, with the international monetary and financial 
instability that ushered in and pervaded the 1980s, the 
internationally vulnerable small European state was forced 
to decide how to allocate the costs of adjustment between 
capital and labour and between inflation and unemployment.
As a result of varying monetary and financial policy 
choices, the monetary and financial environments of each 
small European state differed.
3.3 The Monetarv and Financial Environments in the Four 
Case Studies
A. Switzerland
Swiss monetary policy remained the pivotal point on 
which the economy rested during the 1980s, and the principal 
aim of Swiss monetary policy was achieving and maintaining a 
stable price level.Consequently, throughout the decade 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) acted as the tight-fisted 
national banker, autonomous from the government and 
maintaining virtual control over the money supply. It 
preserved a policy in which almost all restrictive financial 
regulations were eliminated, and its quantitative approach 
to monetary policy, trying not to influence directly the 
formation of interest rates or exchange rates, allowed Swiss 
banks to decide on the level of these r a t e s . A s  Georg 
Rich asserts,
The SNB has always regarded price stability as the
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ultimate objective of monetary policy. The SNB's focus 
on price stability reflects a firm political consensus 
in Switzerland as to the ultimate objectives of 
monetary policy.^®
As a result of Switzerland's stable monetary policy, 
Swiss firms held a monetary advantage over their 
international competitors. Real interest rates were lower 
for Swiss firms working with Swiss banks, price stability 
assured that the domestic economy did not starve production 
or consumption, exchange rates remained stable (though 
relatively high), and a high savings rate assured liquidity 
in the system. As one banker stated, "The Swiss 'industrial 
policy' is made in part by the National Bank with its 
monetary policy.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Swiss monetary 
policy was that the SNB was the only central bank in the 
industrialised world during the 1980s that relied on the 
monetary base as a target variable and successfully achieved 
targeted r a t e s . ( See Figure 3.3.) Further, the SNB's 
ability to maintain a tight linking between money supply and 
income expansion maintained price stability throughout the 
1 9 8 0 s . ( See Figure 3.4.)
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Figure 3.3 
Target and Actual Growth Rates of Ml 
and Monetarv Base in Switzerland. 1975-1986 
(Target and Actual Change)
Year Target Variable
1975 Ml
1976 Ml
1977 Ml
1978 Ml
1979 Adjusted Monetary Base
1980 Adjusted Monetary Base
1981 Adjusted Monetary Base
1982 Adjusted Monetary Base
1983 Adjusted Monetary Base
1984 Adjusted Monetary Base
1985 Adjusted Monetary Base
1986 Adjusted Monetary Base
Target Change % 
6 
6 
5 
5
Actual Change
4.4
7.7
5.5 
16.2
—  0.6 
—  0.5
2.6
3.6
2.6 
2.2
1.8
Sources: George Rich and Jean-Pierre Beguelin (1982) "Swiss
Monetary Policy in the 1970s and 1980s"; Georg Rich (1984) 
"Is Swiss Monetary Policy Really Monetarist?" Lugano 
Monetary Conference; OECD (1987) Economic Surveys: 
Switzerland: 33.
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Figure 3.4 
GROWTH IN MONETARY BASE AND INFLATION RATE 
IN SWITZERLAND, 1 980 -19 84  
( P e r c e n ta g e  C h a n g e  O v e r  P re c e d in g  Y e a r )
A d justed  m onetary base Inflation rate
«0 —
6 0 - 10
4 0  —
Inflation ra te
(consumer prices)
8 0  —
20 —
10  —
/ k j
 ^ Ad justed monetary tMse
-10 —
-20 —
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
SOURCE: Georg Rich (1064) * Is Sw iss Monetary Policy ResKy M onetarist. * 
U gano  Monetary Conlsrsnos ; OECD (1966 ) Economic Survsys.
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The SNB's quantitative approach to monetary policy attempted 
to avoid directly influencing the formation of nominal 
interest rates. Though industrial growth was slowed 
primarily because of relatively high exchange rates that 
adversely affected export growth, sustaining full employment 
in Switzerland required relatively less monetary stimulation 
than in other small European states as a result of 
Switzerland's greater economic strength. Nevertheless, real 
interest rates in Switzerland remained among the lowest in 
the OECD as a result of its anti-inflationary monetary 
policy, thus helping Swiss financial institutions provide 
low rates of lending to their industries. Accordingly, real 
lending rates in Switzerland ranged from two to three 
percent during the 198O s . (See Figure 3.5.)
Lona-Term Interest Rates
Fiaure 3.5
in Switzerland and Other Countries
(Nominal and Real , %)
Nominal/(Real)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
A 7.7{ 6.0} 7.2(5.4} 6.8(4.2} 6.7(5.3} 5.3(4.8}
B 4.2(-1.3} 4.2(2.1} 4.6(1.7} 4.4(1.2} 4.2(3.6}
C 7.8( 3.2} 8.3(5.7} 7.0(5.0} 6.6(4.8} 5.6(6.0}
D 11.3( 5.9} 10.4(5.0} 10.5(5.9} 10.5(4.8} 10.0(7.0}
E 11.8( 8.0} 12.6(8.8} 12.1(8.2} 10.2(6.4} 8.9(7.1}
A= Japan, B= Switzerland, C= Federal Republic of Germany, D=
U.K. , E= U.S.A.
Source; OECD (1987) Economic Surveys Switzerland: 37.
Beyond monetary targets to control inflation, a major 
aim of Swiss monetary policy throughout the decade was 
maintaining a strong, stable foreign exchange rate.
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During the 1980s the SNB followed a "pragmatic" approach, in 
which it remained "prepared to deviate from - or even to 
give up temporarily -its money stock target if unexpected 
developments on the foreign exchange market call for such a 
course of a c t i o n . I t ,  therefore, pegged the Swiss Franc 
to the German Mark, since the Federal Republic of Germany 
continued to be Switzerland's largest trading partner.
Throughout the 1980s the value of the Swiss France 
remained relatively high in comparison to the currencies of 
its major trading partners. As was asserted in a Lombard 
Odier and Cie publication, "Not a single currency has 
outperformed the Swiss Franc [in the] seventeen years since 
the Bretton Woods Agreement came to an end in 1 9 7 1 . With 
a high relative value but slow, stable appreciation, the 
lack of volatility of the Swiss Franc helped to improve the 
state's terms of trade without damaging domestic commerce. 
(See Fiaure 3.6.)
Real Effective
Fiaure 3.6 
Exchanae Rate Index. 1980-1987
Denmark, Ireland. Sweden. and Switzerland
(1980=100)
Year Denmark Ireland Sweden Switzerland
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 99.1 97.1 98.9 98.1
1982 98.4 100.3 93.2 102.7
1983 99.7 98.8 88.0 104.5
1984 99.1 97.3 95.3 101.3
1985 99.6 98.0 94.6 98.8
1986 101.7 103.4 94.8 107.5
1987 105.3 102.1 95.3 111.5
Source: International Monetary Fund (1988) International
Financial Statistics: 111.
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Moreover, with the financial services sector playing a vital
role, the strong, stable Swiss Franc induced international
investment in Switzerland throughout the 1980s. As
Katzenstein contends.
The role of the National Bank has been greatly enhanced 
by the system of floating exchange rates - to the point 
where its management of the Swiss Franc in 
international money markets is more important than any 
business cycle policy which the government might 
devise/"
Not only did the relatively high exchange rate induce 
investment in Switzerland, but the high savings rate in 
Switzerland, second only to Japan in the industrialised 
world, was a vital factor in the state's financial 
stability. (See Figures 3.7 and 3.8.)
Fiaure 3.7
Gross Savinas Ratios of Selected Countries. 1980-1986
A B Ç D 1 F
1980 14.4 19.8 17.3 26.7 30.7 18.3
1981 12.3 22.3 16.0 28.7 31.9 18.9
1984 15.8 17.5 17.5 28.6 31.6 17.0
1985 14.9 16.3 17.8 30.0 31.4 16.5
1986 16.4 17.1 18.3 31.1 32.1 15.0
A= Denmark, B= Ireland, C= Sweden, D= Switzerland,
E= Japan, F= United States
Gross savings ratio = Gross national disposable income minus
private and government consumption
Source: OECD (1981-1987) Statistiques de Bases:
Comparisons Internationales.
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Figure 3.8
Total Official Reserves of Selected Countries. 1984-1986 
(Ratio of Average Monthly Imports of Goods)
A B Ç D E F
1984 2.3 3.1 1.9 7.8 2.5 1.3
1985 3.3 3.3 1.5 7.7 2.3 1.4
1986 2.5 3.2 2.4 7.1 3.9 1.5
1987 2.5 2.9 3.0 7.3 3.4 1.5
A= Denmark, B= Ireland, C= Sweden, D= Switzerland,
E= Japan, F= United States
Source: OECD (1981-1987) Statistiques de Base: Comparisons
Internationales; IMF (1988) International Financial 
Statistics.
The Swiss propensity to save had a number of positive 
effects.
1. It helped dampen inflationary pressures as a result 
of Swiss investment over consumption.
2. It helped avoid current account imbalances.
3. It helped to avoid interest rate appreciation to 
overcome large capital supply reduction, which could 
result because of the low real interest rates in 
Switzerland.
4. It increased the opportunity for its financial 
institutions to accumulate liquid reserves for 
future investment capital.^
Furthermore, in terms of financial institution 
regulations, Switzerland remained one of the most 
financially deregulated countries in the world. During the 
1980s Swiss banks were able to define their own range of 
operations because of the universal character of the banking 
system, and they were free to fix their own terms and 
conditions. For example there was no interest rate
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legislation except for a symbolic national maximum rate of 
eighteen percent. The securities markets were relatively 
free from regulation, and there was relative freedom of 
capital movement.Capital requirements were weighted 
according to the risk associated with various assets, and 
consolidated balance sheets for capital requirements were 
introduced in 1980 for banks and subsidiaries. Banks were 
allowed to create hidden reserves, which remained a unique 
practise among small European states.
In sum, despite relatively slow growth,Switzerland's 
monetary environment remained highly secure, with an 
inflation rate remaining among the lowest in the OECD and 
exchange rates staying stable. Under strict monetary and 
deregulated financial conditions, coupled with such strong 
economic fundamentals as an extremely low level of 
unemployment, a steady current account balance, and socio­
political stability, Switzerland maintained its position as 
an international financial centre. That strategy also paved 
the way for intimate financial institution-industry 
relations.
B. Sweden
While Switzerland favoured a strict monetary policy 
focused on fighting inflation, Sweden's commitment to full 
employment led to a monetary policy geared to economic 
growth. As a result, Sweden maintained a monetary 
environment in which relatively high inflation rates were 
overlooked so long as growth rates remained high.
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Since 1977 the Swedish Krona has been weighted against 
an average of foreign currencies in a so-called currency- 
basket, which included the U.S. dollar and the Pound 
Sterling, several Scandinavian currencies, and most of the 
European currencies. As a result, Sweden maintained a 
relatively stable, pegged rate to all of its major trading 
partners;^® from 1977-1986 Kronor deviations from the 
currency basket did not exceed two percent.^®
From 1979-1983 with the explicit goal of improving its 
current account balance and government budget, the State 
imposed higher interest rates to inspire private capital 
inflow. At the same time, in 1981 and 1982, the Swedish 
Rikshank devalued the Swedish Kronor, which helped to 
increase profitability and counteract stagnation in the 
industrial sector. As a result, by 1984 production and 
investment had significantly increased. (See Fiaure 3.9.)
Fiaure 3.9
Gross Domestic Product Growth, 1980-1987 
Denmark. Ireland. Sweden, and Switzerland
Year Denmark Ireland Sweden Switzerland
1980 -1% 3% 2% 5%
1981 -1 3 0 1
1982 3 3 1 0
1983 3 2 2 1
1984 4 -1 4 2
1985 4 4 2 4
1986 0 1 2 3
1987 -1 -1 3 2
♦Calculated from constant 1980 prices of GDP.
Source: International Monetary Fund (1988) Internation,
Financial Statistics: 321, 429, 667, 671.
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With near full employment and dramatic growth in 
production, the concern was that inflation would become a 
problem, and indeed it did become so because of wage 
increases, despite attempts by labour to control wage costs 
through a disinflation model.^ With high consumption from 
the mid-1980s onwards as a result of the domestic economic 
boom, gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP in 
Sweden fell in 1987 to just over seventeen percent, the 
fourth worst in the OECD (just ahead of the U.K., U.S., 
Denmark, and G r e e c e ) W i t h  less liquidity in the system 
and higher inflation spurred on by increased consumption and 
wage drift, inflationary fears persisted, although less 
austere measures were taken in Sweden than in other 
countries such as Denmark.
As Sweden experienced significant growth after the 1981 
and 1982 devaluations, the domestic monetary environment 
changed dramatically from that of the former interventionist 
decade. With a previous interest rate system, rates were 
regulated through a penalty system that put an upper limit 
on credit market interest rates such as treasury bills. This 
system was dismantled by 1983 into a central bank interest 
rate ladder, which "stepwise increased costs as borrowing 
g r e w . U n d e r  this market-oriented monetary policy, both 
asset and liability management were determined on the basis 
of credit demand, funding costs, and interest rate 
developments. Moreover, the Riksbank removed foreign 
exchange controls,^ recognising the reduced effectiveness 
of these restrictions in a world of MNCs and sophisticated
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international capital markets.
In sum, the monetary and financial environment in 
Sweden was based on the principles of high growth and 
financial liberalisation. Different from Switzerland, 
Swedish authorities were less concerned about inflation (as 
well as savings) and more attentive to fostering growth.
Such high growth was significantly augmented through the 
devaluations of 1981 and 1982, and the ensuing monetary 
environment became more market-oriented than in previous 
decades.
C. Denmark
Throughout the 1980s Denmark's current account deficit, 
financed through the most part by foreign borrowing, 
hampered its level of international competitiveness, because 
not only were Danes consummate consumers but also because 
Danish industry lagged behind other European industrials in 
terms of export competitiveness. The persistent current 
account deficit and national debt implied a decrease in the 
monetary base that by the middle of the 1980s put upward 
pressure on the domestic interest rate. This pressure in 
turn stimulated private capital inflow, which caused the 
exchange rate to increase and precipitated a reduction of 
overall international competitiveness of its industry.
At the onset of the decade Denmark experienced extreme 
inflation and unemployment (both ranging from ten to 
fourteen percent), interest rates at twenty percent, and low 
productivity. After this period, the Danish economy did
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experience growth from 1983-1985, with inflation only around 
three to four percent as a result of relatively limited wage 
increases. Interest and mortgage rates were reduced under a 
system of fixed rates. Indeed, the Nationalbank faced a 
difficult situation in managing the monetary supply to 
control inflation; hence, a short-term "fixed" interest rate 
scheme was devised to help control inflation.
As a member of the EMS since 1979, the Danish Kronor 
was kept within a constant average (i.e., the "snake") with 
its major trading partners, notably West Germany, but also 
many other countries within the EC. Unlike Sweden, whose 
currency was linked to the dollar as a result of its 
currency basket, Denmark's policy-makers preferred small, 
infrequent adjustments through short-term interest rate 
changes (as opposed to the strict use of monetary targets as 
in Switzerland) rather than exchange rate tinkering, 
though in 1981-1982 Denmark followed Sweden in devaluing its 
currency. However, as Anders Mol1er Christensen of the 
Danish Nationalbank asserted, "In the early part of the 
eighties interest and mortgage rates were sky-high, but in 
1982 after the devaluation and rates became fixed, interest 
rates declined steadily through 1986. And the Kronor was 
also stable ... kept within a constant average. What 
finally destroyed us in 1986 were rising wages.
As will be discussed in Chapter Four, Denmark 
experienced significant wage drift that severely strained 
its ability to control inflation and interest rates. While 
attempting to maintain control, yet facing increasing wage
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demands, not only was inflation rising, but growth actually 
decreased by 0.7% in 1987, marking a period of economic 
stagflation in Denmark. Real lending rates rose to over 
eight percent by 1 9 8 6 , and the Krona appreciated by 4.6% 
in 1986, and 3.0% in 1987. Manufacturing cost appreciation 
ensued, as Denmark's "cost competitiveness" deteriorated by 
eight percent in 1987.^ °
The Danish government attempted, using the Potato Diet, 
to reduce its debt obligations and the major current account 
deficit through a fiscal policy designed to dissuade 
consumption and promote savings; nonetheless, private sector 
savings throughout the 1980s remained low because of the 
high Danish standard of living coupled with the highest 
personal taxation system within the OECD leaving 
insufficient household funds for savings.In 1987, Denmark 
ranked twentieth out of twenty-two OECD countries in terms 
of gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP.*^ While 
Danish financial institutions had historically suffered from 
low levels of liquidity as a result of the Dane's propensity 
to consume rather than save, private sector savings worsened 
over the period, decreasing by over four percent in 1986 and 
remaining at relatively low levels thereafter.
In its attempt to bolster the state's financial 
position, the Danish government introduced a number of 
measures to liberalise financial markets, which included the 
abolition of lending ceilings, price formation on bond 
markets, lending rate agreements, and many foreign exchange 
controls.** While both inward and outward transfers of
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capital and all borrowing and lending were subject to 
restrictive exchange controls, by 1983 the experience of 
Denmark illustrates the ability of monetary authorities to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate and thereby aid in aligning 
interest rates with those of its competitors.*^
In sum, the Danish economy continued on a course to 
liberalise its financial markets and to impose austerity 
measures to eliminate the current account deficit. However, 
the ability to slow inflation and dampen consumer demand of 
imports was overshadowed by significant wage drift; the 
combination of a tight-fisted monetary policy coupled with 
wage-inspired inflation resulted in stagflation and high 
levels of unemployment by the mid-1980s.*® (See Figure 
3.9.) While foreign exchange reserves increased because of 
high exchange and interest rates that helped liquidity, the 
deficit in the current account prevented a loosening of 
monetary policy.*^ As Governor of the Danish Central Bank 
Erik Hoffmeyer stated in a speech, "It can be said that we 
are in a tight spot between a level of domestic costs which 
is too high and poor sales opportunities outside Denmark 
.... We need a lower level of interest rates ... created in 
future fiscal policy and cost trend decisions."*®
D. Ireland
With significant economic problems thwarting Ireland's 
ability to foster industrial development, the monetary 
environment in the Irish Republic during the 1980s was less 
favourable than in the other three small European states for
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the promotion of finance-industry relations. During the 
decade, Ireland faced a large current account deficit in 
which the State maintained total foreign and central 
government debt burdens that were among the worst in the 
OECD; as a result, Ireland's credit rating was particularly 
poor. With a high taxation rate as a result of a 
relatively demanding personal taxation system, Ireland also 
had a poor level of savings. (See Figure 3.7.) Along with 
such problems, during the 1980s it faced high levels of 
unemployment and inflation.
With the international recession of the early part of 
the 1980s, Ireland stagflated longer than the other three 
countries not only because of the high domestic interest 
rates, which mirrored international rates, but also because 
of its lower level of development and the wage-price spiral 
that ensued and lasted through 1987.
As a member of the EMS since 1979, the Irish Pound was 
kept within a constant average with its major European 
trading partners through the "snake." However, unlike in 
Sweden, whose currency was linked to the Dollar and British 
Sterling as a result of its currency basket, in Ireland 
fluctuations in the Dollar and the Pound Sterling, both 
important trading partners outside the EMS, caused exchange 
and consequent interest rate problems for Irish policy­
makers.
Nonetheless, most of Irish monetary policy was based on 
a market-oriented approach to monetary control. Monetary 
targets were not used, and the primary influence on interest
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rates was the trend in international rates. As Tomas
Cofaigh, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland explained,
[Irish monetary policy is] geared towards concentrating 
on the external value of the currency, seeking to keep 
it within a tolerable range .... As is widely 
appreciated, the dominant influence on Irish rates is 
the trend in international rates. In an economy as 
small and as open as ours, it would be unwise ... to 
pursue an interest-rate policy which did not have due 
regard to the level of external rates.
As a consequence, international inflationary pressures
and their deleterious effects on the Irish economy caused a
significant tightening of domestic credit. At the same
time, inflation was spurred through significant wage
increases, the details of which are explained in Chapter
Four.
With Ireland a member of the EMS in 1979, policy-makers 
in the government debated how to maintain its important 
agricultural sector, either by lowering inflation to EMS 
levels, or in the alternative, devaluing the currency. With 
the inflation rate not falling at the beginning of the 1980s 
and with policy-makers against devaluation, farmers faced a 
severe price-cost problem due to modest EC price increases 
coupled with inflationary Irish costs. Contends S.J.
Sheehy:
There is no doubt, therefore, that the greatest tragedy 
of EC membership to-date is the manner in which 
exchange rates operated to the detriment of Irish 
agriculture after joining the EMS. If Ireland's price 
experience had been that of the average, prices now 
would be twenty-six percent higher than they are 
[1988], and as a consequence farm income would be some 
fifty percent greater and agricultural exports would be 
worth some four hundred million pounds extra.^
As a result of this relatively passive monetary policy.
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between 1978-1986, real prices received by farmers fell two 
times over the average fall for the EC.^
Moreover, the Central Bank of Ireland maintained a 
relatively strong hold over financial institutions through 
an interest rate grid system that tightly regulated the 
ability of financial intermediaries to raise the prices of 
their products as well as the regulation of liquidity 
through strict ratios that ensured reserve adequacy.“ 
Financial liberalisation began by the mid-to-latter part of
the 1980s.
Only as a result of bargaining during the mid-1980s 
between the so-called "social partners," including the 
minority Fianna Fail party, the Confederation of Irish 
Industries (CII), Federated Union of Employers (FUE), and 
the Irish Confederation of Trade Unions (ICTU), a Programme 
for National Recovery was developed in order to invigorate 
the listless Irish economy. While subsequent chapters will 
discuss the more major components of the programme, mot 
notably wage reductions and industrial policy changes, 
economic stagnation was viewed as a consequence of high 
nominal and real interest rates, which thwarted investment. 
Consequently, one major aspect of the programme was an 
emphasis on reducing Ireland's inflation rate, and "Monetary 
policy will be determined by the need to bring about the 
lowest possible interest rates...
In sum, throughout the 1980s Ireland was faced with 
wage drift, foreign debt, and current account deficits that 
adversely affected its domestic monetary environment. While
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small European states such as Denmark with similar problems 
actively pursued a policy of austerity, Ireland maintained a 
relatively passive monetary policy in which its primary goal 
was to maintain reserves adequacy and protect the exchange 
rate. Only by the end of the decade did Irish policy-makers 
attempt to spur growth through a monetary policy geared to 
reduced real interest rates which would consequently foster 
closer finance-industry relations.
3.4 Finance-Industrv Relations in the Small European State
This section will examine what Lash and Urry refer to as 
"finance capital"^® and what Yao-Su Hu alludes to as 
"industrial banking." In more concrete terms, finance 
capital or industrial banking can be characterised by:
1) the provision of long-term finance (long and 
medium-term debt, or such debt plus equity) to 
enterprises and entrepreneurs in the industrial and 
commercial sectors....
2) a sense of purpose, a perceived role or mission, an 
institutional culture or a set of attitudes, which is 
reflected in (a) a readiness to promote, encourage, and 
support industry, (b) a willingness to accept a measure 
of responsibility for the performance of industry..., 
and (c) an ability to understand the problems of 
industry due to close relations ....^
Finance-industry relations in the industrialised world 
have been patterned in one of two ways: a capital market
based system, such as that in the United Kingdom and the 
United States; or, a credit based system, such as that in 
Japan and West Germany.®® In the former case, resources are 
allocated through competitively established prices, and 
relations between government and industry are at an arm's
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length. In the latter case, prices can be administered by
the government, which encourages State intervention in
industrial affairs, or on the other hand, financial
institutions in a country may be so powerful that they have
a profound influence on industry. Yao-Su Hu refers to these
financial systems as "integrationist." He explains that,
...governments in the U.K. and the U.S. from time to 
time exhort businessmen to export more, to invest more, 
to innovate more .... in the integrationist systems ... 
finance is channelled on a continuous basis on a 
sizable scale, with minimal fuss and fanfare, towards 
national priorities.^
In terms of credit-based financial systems, the role of 
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) serves as an illustration of the 
role government may play in monetary policy-making 
(providing a financial environment that can breed industrial 
growth without inflation) and in providing lending 
direction. The BOJ controls interest rates and rediscounts 
in order to provide private banks with adequate reserves; 
it also uses credit rationing and "window guidance" to 
"direct lending to favored u s e s . T h e  BOJ has been 
"guarantor of the system;" it has complete and detailed 
control over the "private banks".
The other form of credit based financial system, 
referred to by Hu as "integrationist,"^ is that where 
financial institutions do play a preeminent role in the 
economy, but the government does not intervene in credit 
allocation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for 
example, banks not only have significant economic power, 
they also have the legal right to own a substantial amount
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of equity in German corporations, making them not only 
sources of financing but also "prefects" of management.®^ 
Known as hausbanken, the major German banks, such as 
Deutschebank and Dresdner, have particular corporations 
which they help finance as well as own a twenty-five to 
thirty percent equity share.®® Deutschebank, for example, 
maintained 28.5% ownership of Daimler Benz in the 1980s.®^ 
(See Figure 3.10.)
Figure 3.10
Financial Svstems and the Adjustment Process
Countrv
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W. Germany
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price-administered
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capital market-based
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State-led
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unclear (U.K.) 
company-led (U.S.)
Source: John Zysman (1983) Governments, Markets, and
Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial 
Change: 94.
What makes the Japanese and German cases so special is 
that their financial systems are illustrative of the role 
financial institutions can play in helping to advance 
national industry. Both countries, for example, have been 
able to control inflation while maintaining relatively low 
interest rate levels. Therefore, while the average 
debt/equity ratio in the United Kingdom and the United 
States has been about 1:1.5, Japanese and German ratios have 
been as high as 4:1,®® meaning Japanese and German industry
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maintain an advantage of holding greater debt over equity. 
These ratios suggest that industries prefer to utilise debt 
instruments through lending and bond issues, as opposed to 
equity instruments such as the issue of common stock, in 
their gross capital formation.®®
With the recognition that finance could be a major tool 
for industrial growth, finance-industry relations in the 
small European state afforded industry the ability to 
maintain high levels of investment, which helped small state 
industries preserve their levels of development and 
competitiveness. Notably similar to the German financial 
system, banks remained preeminent among financial 
institutions to widely varying degrees in all of the four 
small European states analyzed in the thesis. In a similar 
vein to what Zysman contends in regard to the German 
financial system, "All routes to corporate external 
finance - loans, bonds, and equity - [led] back to the banks 
[in the 1980s].Hence, it is asserted in this thesis 
that in each of the four small European states, the 
financial systems were in the terminology of Yao-Su Hu 
"integrationist" and in the terminology of John Zysman, 
credit-based and, to different extents, institution- 
dominated throughout the 1980s.
For the small European state, the monocephalic 
communication advantage would suggest that in most small 
European states finance-industry relations would appear to 
be relatively close. Indeed, with only a few large players 
on both the financial and industrial fronts, intimate
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banking relations could augment a small European state's 
industries' international competitiveness. For example, 
throughout the 1980s Swiss firms such as Nestle maintained 
close banking ties with the large Swiss bank Credit Suisse; 
Swedish companies such as Atlas Copco sought financing 
mainly from the largest Swedish bank, Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken ('SE Banken) ; Danish firms such as Carlsberg banked 
with Den Danske Bank; and Irish companies such as Guinness 
maintained financial relations with the Bank of Ireland.
Similar to the German hausbanken, many small European 
financial institutions in the 1980s were not only involved 
in the financing of industry but also in ownership and 
management. Such structures were prevalent in small 
European states such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. Moreover, under such credit-based 
systems with companies being highly leveraged, small 
European state banks held significant power in particular 
industries because of their ability to control debt.
The following section will analyze and compare just how 
close finance-industry relationships were in each case 
country in the 1980s. In Switzerland in particular, but 
also in Sweden, finance-industry relations were 
characterised by close associations. With a seemingly 
competitive advantage as a result of the small European 
state's small size, economic pressures coupled with 
relatively distant finance-industry relations stifled 
economic progress and international competitiveness in 
Denmark and Ireland.
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3.5 Finance-Industrv Relations in the Case Studies
A. Switzerland
As a result of its low inflation rate, high savings 
rate, high degree of political and economic stability, and 
deregulated and non-restrictive banking regulations, 
financial institutions played the pivotal role in 
maintaining and augmenting Switzerland's relatively high 
level of international competitiveness in the 1980s. From 
an international perspective, throughout the decade 
Switzerland remained one of the five largest financial 
communities in the world (the other four being Japan, West 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The 
importance of the tertiary sector (including finance) in 
Switzerland is evidenced by its employment throughout the 
1980s. (See Figure 3.11) Asserts the OECD in a report on 
Switzerland,
The financial system is among the most valuable assets 
of the Swiss economy. Its importance in world 
financial markets far exceeds the relative size of the 
country's economy; it affects her macroeconomic 
performance, through the direct contribution to GNP, 
the net exports of financial services, and its 
intermediation role between surplus and deficit 
units.
As illustrated earlier by Switzerland's high rate of 
savings, Swiss financial institutions evolved from the Swiss 
propensity to save as opposed to spend, which provided these 
institutions high levels of liquidity for international and 
domestic lending as well as dampening consumption, which 
kept inflation levels low. With such liquidity in the
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system, banking became a Swiss priority in the eighteenth
century, with Geneva private banks dominating the field and
providing special services. Explains Nicholas Faith,
So they were - and remain - partnerships dependent on a 
personal relationship for their business. They were 
discreet.... So the banks pioneered the methods that 
were to become routine in the Swiss banking community: 
letters from the banks to their clients were not posted 
in Switzerland .... and to this day Swiss bankers to 
not have 'banker' marked in their passports. Rather 
they are 'lawyers' or 'businessmen.'^^
Figure 3.11
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From the 1800's onwards the Swiss banking system was 
comprised of both public and private banks, the public ones 
being cantonal banks and savings and loan associations that 
accounted for sixteen percent of the total assets of Swiss 
banks by the end of the 1 9 7 0 s B y  the 1980s banking was 
dominated by the three big banks, Union Bank of Switzerland. 
Credit Suisse, and Swiss Bank Corporation. (See Figures 
3.12 and 3.13.)
Figure 3.12^^
Reported Net Profit. Credit Suisse 1978-1986 
(Million S.Fr.)
Year Net Profit
1980 281.0
1981 275.8
1982 303.0
1983 351.6
1984 417.4
1985 507.0
1986 566.3
Source: Credit Suisse (1987) 130th Annual Report: 45
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The attractiveness of Swiss banking during the 1980s 
can be attributed to:
1) its "universal banking system" created the 
advantage over other countries where banking was 
more specialised (e.g. in Switzerland, there was 
no delineation between merchant and commercial 
banking)
2) a stable political environment based on laissez- 
faire principles in which international investors 
were not subjected to various political risks;
3) a stable, strong Swiss Franc in which there was 
little exchange risk;
4) confidence in Switzerland's monetary policies, 
which engendered stable currency valuation, low 
interest rates, and low levels of inflation;
5) banking secrecy that was more protective in 
Switzerland than in any other country.
With this monetary power, Swiss banks in the 1980s were 
able to exercise meaningful financial influence both through 
their power as a vital industrial sector, as illustrated 
above, and by aiding Swiss industry through relationships 
among the SNB, the Swiss Bankers' Association, and industry.
Throughout the 1980s the National Bank, which remained 
autonomous and kept a high degree of independence, reported 
to the Federal Council; the official link was through the 
Ministry of Finance.^® The SBA, which represented the 
banks, also maintained a constant dialogue with the SNB. 
Indeed, there were also direct relations between industry 
and the central b a n k . I n  1977 the Chairman of Nestle took 
a seat on the Banking Council (Bankrat), which (at least 
nominally) supervised the National Bank. He was also 
appointed by the Federal Council as a member of the Swiss 
Commission for Foreign Trade Policy.®® Moreover, the three
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major banks maintained a firm stance in favour of preserving 
low real interest rates partly to protect smaller banks (via 
"local conventions") that remained vital for the maintenance 
of the Swiss economy. Real interest rates were maintained 
at exceptionally low levels.
In addition, debt-equity ratios of Swiss indigenous 
industry were particularly high, which further reduced Swiss 
industries' cost of capital, increased return to equity, and 
therefore induced equity investments in the firms. Most 
importantly, with the real cost of funds being cheaper for 
Swiss firms, they could act more aggressively in the 
international marketplace against foreign competitors who 
were required to pay more for long-term development and 
growth. (See Figures 3.14 and 3.15.)
Figure 3.14
Debt-Eauitv Ratios. Non-Financial Enterprises 
Switzerland and other Selected Countries 
(Fixed Assets, Historic and Replacement Costs)
Fixed Assets Fixed Assets
(Historic Cost) (Replacement Costs)
Switzerland 2.1 1.3
Germany 2.3 1.3
Japan - 1.3
United Kingdom 1.1 0.6
United States 1.1 0.6
Source: OECD (1987) Economic Surveys: Switzerland: 58.
189
Figure 3.15
Debt-Eauitv Ratios; A Sampling of Swiss Enterprises 
(Non-financial enterprises)
Sample size (total number of companies) 
Average (mean) debt-equity ratio 
Average (median) debt-equity ratio 
Highest debt-equity ratio 
Lowest debt-equity ratio
85
1.50
1.18
5.46
0.60
Debt-equity ratios of notable companies
Ciba Geigy 
Jacobs Suchard 
Nestle 
Sandoz 
Swissair
0.60
1.11
1.37
0.61
2.97
Source: Morgan Stanley (1989) Capital International
Perspective. (October).
Throughout the decade industry was also at a prime 
advantage because of the principal bank structure,®^ even 
though the issue of shares and equity securities as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation averaged only 
1.9% between 1983-1985, indicating Swiss industrials' 
preference for debt financing as opposed to owning 
capital.^ Historically, bank-industry relations included 
those between the Swiss Bank Corporation with the chemical 
industry, mainly because both were based in the Basel area, 
and Credit Suisse with the machine tools industry (such as 
Brown Boveri). Also, each of the three big banks had 
members on the boards of directors of the major Swiss 
industrials.®®
In Switzerland throughout the 1980s ownership of 
industry, like in Sweden, was very much based on family
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business. The Abbegg family owned fifty percent of Nestle,
while Ciba-Geigy was five percent owned by the Phlanta,
Geigy, and Iselin families. As Pierre Grou asserts,
... Switzerland is the one country in which the 
technocratic reorganisation of the dominant class does 
not yet seem to have led to changes in the capital 
structure of the multinational corporations. A family 
oligarchy reigns, through capital ownership, over the 
'Swiss Empire* **
Like the Swedish sphere structure, which will be discussed
in the following section, the major Swiss MNCs such as
Sandoz, Ciba-Geigy, Alusuisse, Nestle, Sulzer Brothers, and
Brown Boveri were tied during the 1980s into families like
the Iselins, Sulzers, Schmidheimys, Schwarzenbachs, and
Haefners - all of whom were linked through capital ownership
with the Big Three banks.
Although Switzerland's bank-industry relations were not
quite as extensive as those in West Germany under the
hausbanken structure, primarily because of the differences
in bank ownership of industry is higher in Germany (twenty-
five percent) than in Switzerland; however, the principal
bank relationship did extend as far as twenty percent
ownership of industry by a particular bank.®^
The best historical example of this relationship
occurred with the near demise of the watch industry and the
intervention of the banks. The Société Suisse Pour
L'Industrie Horlogere (SSIH, or Swiss Watch Corporation), a
holding company with twenty-seven subsidiaries including its
two flagships Omega and Tissot, went bankrupt in 1980-1981
due to:
1) the problems associated with an undervalued franc
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and an overvalued dollar;
2) Omega continuing to produce thicker watches than 
what the market called for, thus bringing a sharp 
drop in sales and rapidly increasing inventories; 
and
3) significant competition from electronic watch 
makers, particularly Japan.®®
In 1980 the SSIH could not comply with the instruction of an
industry-wide arbitration decision to pay cost of living
bonuses to its workers totalling $3.6 million, and it was at
this point that the banks intervened. In essence, they did
the following:
1) stocks previously valued at $35 million were 
written down to $175,000, five percent of the 
previous value;
2) through converting $49 million of their credits to 
long-term capital, six banks increased the new 
capital base to $51 million;
3) the six banks agreed to write off credits 
totalling over $51 million;
4) the banks directed the merger of SSIH and ASUAG 
(another watchmaking company which had huge losses 
in 1982) and infused $300 million in new 
capital.®^
This episode highlights the significant power that the
big banks held in Switzerland throughout the 1980s and their
ability to influence directly the economy - more than the
State itself, which ironically approached the banks to
coordinate the watch industry bailout.®® Certainly the
social and political consequences of such bank decisions in
Switzerland were distinctly similar to those decisions
States themselves usually make. As Katzenstein explains in
regard to such strategies.
One is a financial strategy intent on maximizing bank 
profits (or minimizing losses) irrespective of the 
consequences for employment, regional development, and 
the industry's long-term growth. The other is an 
industrial strategy that seeks to strengthen the 
technological and market strength of the company and 
takes a long-term attitude that includes industry-wide
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concern and, almost inevitably, further substantial
infusion of capital.®®
Throughout the 1980s credits to Swiss debtors accounted 
for thirty percent of the activity of Swiss big banks. In 
addition, the balance sheet of domestic banks (the cantonal 
banks, regional/savings banks, loan associations, and 
others), which accounted for one-third of the overall total 
in the banking industry, showed only seven percent of their 
business overseas. Moreover, Swiss banks had a much 
smaller part of their assets abroad (around fifty percent) 
as compared to foreign banks in Switzerland, who averaged 
around seventy percent. Thus, Swiss banks were prudent with 
their assets, infusing capital into Swiss industry (where 
they have significant control over the outcome) and limiting 
their credits mainly to OECD countries.
The SBA worked primarily with the three largest banks, 
maintaining a dialogue principally concerned with 
maintaining ethical standards, an issue that was complicated 
by Switzerland's famous secrecy laws.®® The formal 
agreement among banks, and regulated by the SBA, included 
the prohibition against the active assistance of capital 
flight and tax evasion.®^ Perhaps most importantly, the SBA 
acted as an overall press agent to quell possible negative 
publicity about the banking sector, a necessary duty to 
preserve international confidence in its banking sector.
The economic record of Switzerland concomitantly with 
socio-political stability allayed investor fears of possible 
political risks, resulting in an inevitable inflow of
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financial resources from the rest of the world throughout 
the 1 9 8 0 s . T h e  factors listed earlier contributed to the 
international confidence necessary for Switzerland to 
maintain its strategy of being an international financial 
centre. They also explain why the Big Three banks remained 
among the most powerful financial institutions in the world. 
fSee Figure 3.16.)
Figure 3.16 
Europe's Ten Largest Banks. 1987 
(By Proportion of Equity to Assets and Return on Assets)
Bank Eouitv/Asset Percentage
Credit Suisse (Switzerland) 6.23%
Union Bank of Switzerland (Switzerland) 6.14
Swiss Bank Corporation (Switzerland) 6.06
Rabobank (Netherlands) 5.79
National Westminster (United Kingdom) 5.70
Midland (United Kingdom) 5.54
Lloyds (United Kingdom) 5.3 3
Paribas (France) 5.25
Barclays (United Kingdom) 4.98
Deutsche (Federal Republic of Germany) 4.22
Bank Return on Asset Percentage
Credit Suisse (Switzerland) .53%
Paribas (France) .53
National Westminster (United Kingdom) .52
Union Bank of Switzerland (Switzerland) .49
Swiss Bank Corporation (Switzerland) .49
Rabobank (Netherlands) .49
Algemene (Netherlands) .35
Amro (Netherlands) .34
Société Generale (France) .34
BNP (France) .32
Source; "Which Are Europe's Twenty-Five Top Banks?" (1989) 
Euromoney, (January): 32.
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From 1975 to 1985 Switzerland's share in international 
banking covered a range of ten to fifteen percent of the 
world market/" While Swiss exports accounted for only 1.5% 
of total world exports from 1980 to 1985, Swiss banks held 
about seven percent of global foreign assets, putting them 
in third place after US and Japanese b a n k s . W i t h  a major 
presence in the north American market, new issues of 
securities, both shares and bonds, were typically sponsored 
by one of the major Swiss banks, which joined major 
underwriting syndicates with other large financial 
intermediaries, who were often Swiss as well. Throughout 
the decade the Big Three "banks perform[ed] all of the chief 
functions associated with securities issuance, from 
underwriting and distribution to the actual investing on 
behalf of clients, both fiduciary and retail.
Much of the reason for their international success 
throughout much of the 1980s (at least up to the crash of 
1987) was due to their ability of the Big Three banks to 
work together, posting similar changes in their profits and 
dividends and working within pre-arranged syndicates. "In 
no small part ... this dominant position has been achieved 
by their sticking together in an often cozy arrangement 
based on mutual benefit."®® However, by the end of the 
decade, the three big banks began to formulate separate 
strategies as a result of post-crash international economic 
turbulences and stated anti-trust restrictions by the Swiss 
Cartel Commission to loosen price-fixing arrangements.®^
Ironically, at least in terms of Swiss Franc public
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issues, such restrictive language imposed by the Cartel 
Commission remained only rhetoric. The Big Three Swiss banks 
remained in a permanent and exclusive syndicate with their 
smaller affiliates by forming an adjoining ad hoc syndicate; 
the entire syndicate would only participate in a public 
Swiss Franc offering if it was sponsored by a party within 
the syndicate, which would typically take twenty percent of 
the issue.®®
In evaluating financial dynamism. The World 
Competitiveness Report weighted both "factual" statistical 
data and "perceived" survey analyses in categories ranging 
from interest and savings rates to the role of banks and 
finance; Switzerland ranked first among twenty-two OECD 
countries. In standard deviation values, Switzerland scored 
0.90, compared with Japan's 0.87, Germany's 0.47, and the 
U.S.' 0.36.®®
B. Sweden
While Switzerland was the best example of a small 
European state with strong bank-industry relations in the 
1980s, Sweden also maintained a credit-based system of 
corporate finance.^®® Indeed, Sweden remains one of the best 
examples of a country whose financial institutions played a 
vital role in its industrialisation by providing banking 
capital for its developing industries from the 1890s 
onwards.While the major Swedish commercial banks, SE 
Banken, Svenska Handelshank and State-owned PK Banken have 
not been as globally oriented as the Big Three banks of
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Switzerland, these banks have been important financing 
sources for Swedish industry during the decade.
In 1987 there were fourteen commercial banks, nearly 
one hundred and sixty savings banks and twelve cooperative 
banks; the commercial banks held sixty-six percent of total 
deposits. Throughout the 1970s the Riksbank (the Swedish 
central bank) and the Banking Inspection attempted to 
maintain a tight grip on domestic banking, the one major 
objective being to make financial institutions safe for 
depositors.While the Banking Inspection verified private 
banks' capital adequacy requirements (since there is no 
institution in Sweden such as the FDIC in the U.S.), the 
Riksbank continued to impose a so-called "penalty rate," 
which placed an upper limit on other credit market interest 
rates such as treasury bills. Because of this policy, the 
Riksbank was able to keep the credit market tight enough to 
force banks to have positive amounts of borrowed reserves. 
Short-term interest rates were determined by the penalty 
rate, and the banks were not allowed to go any lower than 
this rate, because doing so could depreciate their borrowed 
reserves.
In the 1980s, however, the Riksbank loosened its grip. 
While still firmly believing in "prudent banking," including 
major banking provisions against lending to the Third World, 
the Riksbank eased its control over banks in terms of 
capital adequacy requirements and interest rate controls. 
Moreover, while foreigners were not allowed to own shares in 
Swedish banks, in 1986 foreign banks were allowed to perform
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normal banking activities in Sweden. At the end of 1986 
thirteen foreign banks had applied for licences to undertake 
banking activities in Sweden, the major players being the 
U.S. and French banks. There were no applications from 
either British or German banks.
Fifty percent of Swedish bank lending was to the 
corporate s e c t o r . T h e  most influential of the Swedish 
banks was SE Banken, formed in 1972 in a merger headed by 
the powerful Wallenberg family. SE Banken was credited as 
being Sweden's first modern commercial bank, playing a vital 
role in Sweden's transformation from an agrarian to an 
industrial society. Building "spheres" from their wealth, 
the historical importance of the Wallenbergs can be traced 
back to their rescue of Ericsson and Swedish Match, and to 
their significant contribution to the creation of 
Scandinavian Airline Systems (SAS). Through key holdings 
held through investment companies and family trusts, the 
Wallenberg empire throughout the 1980s included most of the 
country's blue-chip companies: ASEA, Stora, Electrolux,
Ericsson, Atlas Copco, Alfa Laval, Saab Scania, SKF, Esab, 
Incentive, and Astra.
Throughout the decade the head of the Wallenberg 
empire, Peter, who started his career at Atlas Copco and in 
1974 became Chairman of the Board, maintained his family 
influence through his seats on various boards, friendships 
with directors and executives of other Swedish companies, 
and through his (minority) investment influence in the 
Wallenberg Foundation corporate holdings. Such fund-
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management foundations, "allowed the old banking centre of 
Swedish industrial growth to be maintained. In the
1980s the Wallenberg Foundation had minority interests in 
the Skandia Enskilda Bank, the Providential Insurance, and 
in Investor.
Insofar as the foundation's relations with particular 
firms throughout the 1980s were concerned, Peter was not 
only the First Vice-Chairman of SE Banken, but also of ASEA, 
Electrolux, Telefon AB, Ericsson, and SKF.^ °® Such ties 
between corporate and bank leaders in Sweden remained 
commonplace during the 1980s. For example, Volvo, Sweden's 
largest company, acquired a twenty percent stake in two of 
Wallenberg's holdings. Atlas Copco and Stora. The result 
was that Pehr Gyllenhammer, the Director of Volvo and board 
member of SE Banken was slated to take over SE Banken 
from the dying Marcus Wallenberg, Peter's father (the famous 
Raoul's cousin) and Chairman of the Bank. While Peter 
quickly stopped the Volvo investment in the two Wallenberg 
holdings by making a bargaining-chip investment of his own 
in Volvo that resulted in a coordinated disinvestment by 
both parties, neither of the two received the chairmanship. 
Instead, a compromise candidate Curt Olsson was selected, 
and his ties to major Swedish industry through board 
memberships include: Esselte AB, the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, Atlas Copco, and Svenska Dagbladets.^^
The sphere structure provided Swedish industry with a 
dependable source of financing throughout the 1980s, since 
investment interests and management decisions were mixed
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between finance and industry. (See Figure 3.17.)
Figure 3.17 
Selected Swedish Bank and Industry 
Board Directorships. 1987
Board
Membership
Banks 
SE Banken 
SE Banken 
SE Banken 
SE Banken 
SE Banken 
Sv.Handelsbank 
Sv.Handelsbank 
Sv.Handelsbank
Industry 
Atlas Copco
ASEA
Nobel
Perstorp
Procordia
SKF
Sv. Dagbladets
Name
Curt Nicolin 
Gosta Bystedt 
Ernst Herslow 
Karl-Erik Sahlberg 
Pehr Gyllenhammer 
Sven Agrup 
Lars Hakanson 
Tore Browoldh
Curt Olsson 
Peter Wallenberg 
Peter Wallenberg 
Lars Thunholm 
Alf Akerman 
Bertil Danielson 
Lennart Johansson 
Peter Wallenberg 
Curt Olsson
Position
Chairman, Swedish Match 
Dep. Chrmn., Electrolux 
Chairman, Euroc 
Chairman, Perstorp 
Chairman, Volvo 
Chairman, Agrup 
Pres ident, Skanska 
Chairman, SCA Group
Chairman,
Vice-Chmn.
Vice-Chmn.
Fmr. Chmn.
Fmr. CEO,
President,
Vice-Chmn.
Vice-Chmn.
Chairman,
SE Banken 
, SE Banken 
, SE Banken 
, SE Banken 
SE Banken 
PK Banken 
, SE Banken 
, SE Banken 
SE Banken
Source: Annual reports (1987) from the following 
corporations: AGA, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Euroc, Nobel
Industries, Perstorp, Procordia, SCA, Skanska, SKF, Swedish 
Match, Volvo. Also, International Who's Who (1988): 1133,
1578.
With Swedish companies becoming increasingly large, the 
sphere structure was in danger as a result of Swedish 
investors like Peter Wallenberg being unable to maintain an 
equity linking. Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s Swedish 
banks continued to maintain much of the responsibility for 
corporate debt and were "able to call many of the shots""^ 
in terms of management decisions because of relatively high 
debt-equity r a t i o s . A s  Pontusson explains.
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The big private banks have continued to exercise 
considerable leverage through the ownership of equity 
capital by their board members and retirement funds, 
and by investment companies closely linked to the 
banks. The supply of long-term credit has also 
remained an important source of influence. Though 
formally of limited duration, much of the business 
lending has been of a de facto long-term character. 
Furthermore, the commercial banks have come to mediate 
corporate access to other forms of long-term credit. 
Most notably, private corporations can only issue bonds 
through a bank.
As illustrated below, debt-equity ratios of major Swedish
industrial remained even higher than Swiss enterprises.
(See Figure 3.18.)
Figure 3.18
Debt-Eouitv Ratios; A Sampling of Swedish Enterprises 
(Non-financial enterprises)
Sample size (total number of companies) 
Average (mean) debt-equity ratio 
Average (median) debt-equity ratio 
Highest debt-equity ratio 
Lowest debt-equity ratio
62
2.25 
1.77 
6. 54 
0.41
Debt-equity ratios of notable companies
Asea (Brown Hoveri)
Electrolux
Ericsson
Saab-Scania
Volvo
5. 67 
2 .99 
1.68 
1.53 
1.61
Source; Morgan Stanley (1989) Capital International 
Perspective, (October).
Labour has played an important role in Swedish 
enterprises' collective capital formation. With a cradle- 
to-grave attitude among Swedes, Sweden's giant 
"supplementary-pension" (ATP) funds provided significant 
investment in Sweden's largest companies, providing between
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twelve and fifteen percent of the entire credit market in 
Sweden. Around twenty-five percent of net lending by the 
ATP funds was directed to the corporate sector between 1978- 
1983.^ ®^ By the end of the bourgeois interregnum in 1982, 
the fourth ATP fund, which allowed for limited equity 
ownership, was the fourth largest single owner of shares 
listed on the Stockholm exchange, though it accounted for 
less than one percent of the total assets of the ATP 
funds.Nonetheless, the influence was such that nearly 
ten percent of Volvo's assets were held by the pension funds 
throughout the 1980s.
Moreover, in the 1980s the private financial sector in 
Sweden employed factoring as a vital means of financing, 
notably in the export area. Factoring was an important 
financial mechanism designed to eliminate payments risk in 
overseas sales (and to ensure that the seller received 
prompt settlement) as well as a system applied to the 
purchasing of invoices from businesses at a percentage 
discount. Factoring agreements improved the cash flow of the 
businesses concerned by enjoying a prompt release of cash, 
while the factor for a prescribed percentage charge took on, 
in effect, the function of collecting receivables. Hence, in 
Sweden with exports accounting for over thirty-five percent 
of GDP, international factoring remained a vital means to 
foster capital availability in Sweden's export sector and to 
stimulate its significant export orientation."^
Since the Swedish government in 1985 changed regulations 
and allowed foreign banks to establish operations in Sweden,
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the competitive environment for Swedish banks changed.
"In the 1970s all companies in the Wallenberg group only 
banked with SE Banken - period. Today it is completely 
different. As one executive from competing Svenska 
Handelsbank stated, "There is a sphere relationship, 
particularly on the board level. The thing that changed 
between banks and industry is that of packaging of 
financing. Those who are the most helpful win. [In 
addition] relationship banking is becoming less and less of 
a phenomenon. Our [Sweden's] largest companies are becoming 
financial institutions in and of themselves.
By the latter part of the 1980s, while relationship 
banking continued to be important in terms of new stock 
issues, takeovers, and corporate finance,foreign banks 
were able to penetrate into the Swedish market through 
measures of financial liberalisation and deregulation,^* 
though with much difficulty and with little success. Stated 
one official of a foreign bank entering the Swedish market, 
"'It is a difficult market and the picture is not that rosy, 
but we have good reasons to stay. ' At the same time,
with impressive levels of profitability, minimal Third World 
exposure, and a Moody's Investor Service top Rating of Aaa, 
Sweden's largest banks attempted in the latter part of the 
1980s to attract foreign investors to acquire up to twenty 
percent of their stock and ten percent of their notes. 
Sweden's largest bank SE Banken also teamed up with some of 
the other larger Scandinavian banks, such as Privatbanken of 
Denmark, to form Scandinavian Banking Partners (SBP), and
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thereby to creat a more visible presence in the 
international corporate finance arena.
In summary, evidence from The World Competitiveness 
Report corroborates some of the primary evidence furnished 
in this section on Sweden concerning the relationship 
between financial institutions and the banks. For example, 
in a survey sent to twelve thousand executives from thirty- 
two countries asking whether the banking sector gives 
"positive help to business enterprises," Sweden ranked first 
among twenty-two OECD countries.Sweden also ranked 
second (behind Switzerland) in the "private sector borrowing 
category" in terms of "the extent to which the private 
sector is at an advantage vis-a-vis the public sector in 
tapping capital markets. Finally, Sweden ranked second
only behind the U.S. in terms of the availability of risk 
capital.
C. Denmark
Perhaps the greatest impediment to finance-industry 
relations in Denmark during the 1980s was the domestic 
economic and monetary atmosphere in which they worked.
Public debt remained high, GDP growth was sluggish, 
unemployment approached ten percent, the current account 
balance continued from past decades, and the savings rate to 
provide liquid funds to the financial institutions was among 
the worst in the industrialised w o r l d . A s  a result of 
this situation, external investment in the Danish economy
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was slow, and Danish financial intermediaries were less able 
to provide capital investment to Danish industry and to 
remain competitive in the international services sector.
Similar to many other small European states during the 
1980s, Danish financial institutions and enterprises were 
linked through share ownership. While banks were not 
allowed to own businesses, they were allowed to hold minor 
shares totalling twenty to twenty-five percent of equity and 
were not allowed to give industrial credits exceeding one- 
third of their own c a p i t a l . A s  a result, in The World 
Competitiveness Report Denmark ranked below the average 
ranking of a survey of twenty-two OECD countries in terms of 
the banking sector "providing positive help to business 
enterprise" and banks as a source of private credit.
However, ties between financial institutions and 
industry did exist during the decade. For example, in 1987 
Poul J. Svenholm was both chairman of Den Danske Bank, one 
of Denmark's three large banks (along with Kobenhavens 
Handelsbank and Privatbanken), and President of Carlsberg 
A/S, one of Denmark's ten largest industrials. Similarly, 
Fleming Count of Rosenborg, Chairman of the Danish 
industrial Calkas A/S, was Deputy Chairman of Den Danske 
Bank. Also in 1987, Hugo Schroeder was both chairman of 
Privatbanken and managing director of Skandinavisk Holding 
A/S, one of Denmark's twenty largest industrials.^^
Moreover, throughout the decade particular banks 
continued to act as primary financial sourcing agents, 
sometimes to the extent of almost nominal hausbanken. Two
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of Denmark's more renowned industrials, Novo and FL Smith 
banked primarily with Kobenhavens Handelsbank and United 
Breweries banked primarily with Den Danske Bank. As Steen 
Parsholt, the director for Copenhagen's Citibank office 
explained.
There is a very tight hausbank, principal bank, 
structure here. We [Citibank] will never fully succeed 
here because an atmosphere of hostility against foreign 
competition has been pervasive. While hausbank 
ownership relations are legally prohibited, the feeling 
is extremely strong and determined by groupings.^*
Foreign banks entered the market in the 1970s, and by
1980 most were involved in such activities as providing
letters of credit and short-term credit facilities.
However, most of these banks not only avoided traditional
banking, they also ran into credit problems because of
strict capital adequacy ratios that propelled a feeling
among foreign banks that the "lending control system
discriminate[d] against banks without a retail deposit base
.... [Moreover,] "corporate customers [were] fighting shy of
foreign banks because of the tough line they ... [took] in
bad debt negotiations."^^ In addition, new entrants to the
Danish financial markets faced very high expatriate taxation
that limited their staffing opportunities. As a result of
all of these factors, foreign financial institutions were
relatively small players in the Danish financial markets,
managing to garner less than five percent of the Danish
market during the decade.
While throughout the 1980s Denmark maintained
relatively strong working relations between Danish financial
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institutions and industry, the Swedish tradition of 
financial institution sphere ownership existed to a lesser 
extent in Denmark notably because Danish industry was 
significantly smaller than that in Sweden. As a result of 
Denmark's industrial structure, in which only twelve percent 
of the labour pool was used for industrial production in 
1987 and the majority worked in the public sector, 
financing through equity instruments was "not all that 
important"^* and less significant than in other small 
European states. (See Figure 3.19)
Figure 3.19
Market Value of Eauitv Shares of Domestic Companies.
December 1988
Exchange Market Value USS Millions
Amsterdam 103,643.9
Brussels 58,788.0
Copenhagen 26,878.1
Helsinki 30,549.2
Luxembourg 46,146.3
Stockholm 99,723.9
Zurich 140,359.0
Source: Shearson Lehman Hutton Public Finance (1989)
Instead of public equity securitisation being 
meaningful for Denmark's larger firms, Danish industrials 
preferred debt over equity instruments (and also because 
"the Dane is just not a natural private investor for the 
simple reason that he hardly saves. Ninety percent of
Den Danske Bank's and Privatbanken*s securities portfolios 
were composed of bonds, mostly the highly liquid and high 
yielding mortgage and government bonds,while shares 
accounted for less than ten percent.Under such
conditions, debt-equity ratios in Denmark remained high. 
(See Figure 3.20.)
Figure 3.20
Debt-Eouitv Ratios: A Sampling of Danish Enterprises
(Non-financial enterprises)
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Sample size (total number of companies) 
Average (mean) debt-equity ratio 
Average (median) debt-equity ratio 
Extreme low 
Extreme high
19
1.93
1.75
0.13
5.24
Debt-equity ratios of notable companies
Carlsberg
Novo
Royal Copenhagen
1.20
0.65
1.75
Source: Morgan Stanley (1989) Capital International
Perspective. (October).
Denmark differed from Sweden and Switzerland not only 
in the scale of financial institutions but also in the 
nature of ownership in industry. In 1986, financial 
services in Denmark accounted for only four percent of GDP; 
the Danish financial services sector was, relatively, ten 
times smaller than that of the British s e c t o r . W h i l e  
financial institutions had some ownership rights towards 
industry, industry remained relatively small with only ten 
to fifteen large industrials (with only three companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange) and often cooperatively 
or family-owned.^* For example, the electricity, food, and 
dairy industries were cooperatively owned. Well-known 
Danish industrials such as Carlsberg A/S was majority owned 
by a foundation, and AP Moller remained family-owned with a
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share structure designed to reduce the taxation burden yet 
maintain control through the family.Despite the 
objections from family firms, the pension funds grew in 
importance in terms of industrial investment by providing by 
the latter part of the decade twenty-five percent ownership 
of many enterprises.The pension funds also had equity 
investment in public financial institutions.^^
Realising the necessity for Danish financial 
institutions to become larger to compete in the world 
markets, and realising that many previous corporate 
customers of Denmark's largest banks were turning to other 
avenues of financing (such as the Eurobond markets and 
domestic financial institutions such as the assurance 
companies) the majority of the Danish banks merged and 
attempted to spread across Europe. Most of the banks' 
international strategies rested on their activities in 
Luxembourg, though banks such as Den Danske Bank entered the 
West German market in order to gain a foothold in Europe in 
preparation for the (more) unified European market projected 
for 1992.^ ®^ Towards the end of the decade Danish banks 
attempted to highlight their ability to be the Scandinavian 
outpost to the EC.
In addition, the Ministry of Industry maintained ties 
with financial institutions by appointing a representative 
to the boards of the country ' s largest banks. This 
involvement was expanded in the latter part of the decade 
through a major conference between the State and the large 
banks to discuss improvements in the Danish economy, most
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importantly by expanding its relatively small industrial
structure. As a consequence of its small size and limited
number of large financial institutions, the State worked
closely with the three major banks to form a financial
institution consortium designed to provide venture capital
to promote industry. As Jesper Kongstad of the Ministry of
Industry explained,
"This was not a traditional policy. It was done purely 
through consultations between the government, the 
Ministry of Industry, and three largest banks. It 
forced the three to work together ... and for our part, 
we said 'do this or we'll examine taxation issues with 
interest rate differentials. *
Throughout the latter part of the 1980s the consortium
continued to advise the government on debt policy and, more
generally, on the entire economy of Denmark. Indeed, this
cooperation remained a necessity in order to revamp an
economic and monetary environment that was stinting
industrial growth and thwarting the ability of domestic
financial institutions to be, not only competitive
themselves in the international services market, but also a
help Danish industries secure important investment capital.
D. Ireland
In contrast to Switzerland and Sweden, and to a lesser 
extent Denmark, relations between financial institutions and 
industry were relatively deficient throughout the decade, 
much as a result of Ireland's weak industrial and financial 
structures. While throughout much of the 1980s Ireland 
experienced significant industrial growth that positively
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affected its export position, its service sector remained 
extremely small. It ranked last out of twenty-two OECD 
countries in terms of the value added in services as a 
percentage of GDP in 1986 and twentieth in terms of the 
number of banks among the world's top five-hundred; only 
two, the Bank of Ireland (BOI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB), 
were included on the l i s t . ( See Figure 3.21.) A further 
example of Ireland's small financial services sector is the 
fact that Britain's largest Building Society, Halifax 
Building Society, maintained an asset base fifty percent 
larger than the assets of Ireland's two largest banks and 
all the Irish building societies combined.
Fiaure 3.21 
Banks Doina Business in Ireland. 1987 fBv Total Assets)
Rank Financial Institution Total Assets Irish Pounds
1 Allied Irish Banks 9,606.00
2 Bank of Ireland 8,838.00
3 Ulster bank 3,100.37
4 National Irish Bank 553.00
5 Industrial Credit Corpo. 543.62
6 Banque Nationale de Paris 511.18
7 Irish Intercontinental 446.00
8 Algemene Bank Nederland 445.11
9 Citibank 344.26
10 Bank of Nova Scotia 327.00
11 Hill Samuel Co. 232.21
12 Anglo Irish Bankcorp 215.08
13 Barclays Bank 211.00
14 Bank of America 142.37
Source: Business and Finance, Ireland (1989) January 26:
74-75.
Traditionally the Irish financial services sector was 
based on loyalty to the larger industrials through "key 
bankers, and as the above figure indicates the two
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largest banks in Ireland accounted for most of the large 
enterprise business. Much as a result of the influx of 
foreign multinationals, from 1980 onwards large bank- 
industry relationships weakened as new foreign banks 
accompanied this FDI into the Irish marketplace, "educating 
the old Irish establishment."^"^ By 1987, thirteen foreign 
banks had a presence in the country in which banking 
relationships based from the home country were transferred 
to the host country (Ireland) mainly because of the tax 
advantages afforded to foreign industrial and financial 
enterprises. As a result, much of the relationship banking 
that did exist prior to the major influx of foreign 
multinationals became diluted through transactional banking 
typically involving the use of syndicates of domestic and 
foreign financial intermediaries.
The Central Bank of Ireland maintained a relatively 
strong hold over financial institutions through an interest 
rate grid system that tightly regulated the ability of 
financial intermediaries to raise the prices of their 
products; the system also regulated liquidity through strict 
ratios.However, certain advantages were afforded to Irish 
banks, such as their knowledge of the domestic market and 
their ability to lend in the local currency at cheaper rates 
than their foreign competitors could through Section 84 
financing.Through this tax-based lending system, 
interest paid on loans by Irish resident companies was 
treated as dividends and was therefore not taxed. This 
benefit to the lender was passed to the borrower, and only
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Irish financial institutions were given the opportunity to 
provide Section 84 financing.However, foreign financial 
intermediaries often provided these credit opportunities by 
working with an Irish bank.^ ®°
Unlike the other three financial systems examined in 
the thesis, Irish laws remained extremely prohibitive in 
terms of board directorship relations between financial 
institutions and industry, mainly because of "disclosure 
problems. Indeed, with only one or two notable
exceptions,directorships in industry were held by other 
industrialists, while directorships in financial 
institutions were held by managers within the banks 
themselves and a small handful of industrialists. While AIB 
and BOI both maintained corporate relationships, the 
limitation by the Irish State to bank ownership of around 
five percent caused finance-industry links less extensive 
than those that existed during the 1980s in the other case 
countries and many other small European states.
(See Fiaure 3.22.)
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Figure 3.22 
Board of Directors Membership, 1987
(Listed for those with Industrial Affiliation Only)
Bank Director Name Affiliation* Comoanv Ranking**
AIB T. Cavanagh Cavanaghs Fermoy Not among top 1000
AIB J. Culliton Unidare 127
Radio Telefis Eire 74
AIB P. Fallon Euromoney Public's Not among top 1000
AIB J. McGuckian McGuckian Livestock Not among top 1000
Ulster Television 260
AIB D. Murphy St. Patrick Woollen Not among top 1000
Swansea Cork Ferries Not among top 1000
Securicor 418
BOI J. Callaghan Stokes, Kennedy 334
BOI D. Carroll Carroll Industries 30
BOI D. Kennedy Aer Lingus 10
BOI T. Toner Arnott Foods 147
BWG Foods 86
Irish Continental 220
♦Either Chairman or CEO of company as denoted by either 
"Aspect" or by bank annual report.
**As ranked by Aspect.
Source: Aspect: The Investor's Business Journal (1989) The
Top 1,000 companies and Who's Who in Irish Industry 1989; 
Bank of Ireland (1989) Report and Accounts for the Year: 21; 
Allied Irish Banks (1989) Report and Accounts for the Year: 
24-25.
Indeed, the Irish financial system followed the British 
example, with detached finance-industry relations evidenced 
by the lack of cooperative board relationships between 
financial institutions and enterprises as well as 
inconsequential bank ownership of industry. While following 
the British decision to maintain a "separatist" system,
Irish industry did not require the financing through the 
capital markets necessary for giant American and British 
enterprises in the 1980s under similar financing
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relationships. As a result, the Irish financial system, 
different than the continental Europe example of intimate 
finance-industry relations based on lending and high debt- 
equity ratios, remained a major competitive disadvantage for 
Ireland. Indeed, during the 1980s, debt-equity ratios of 
Irish enterprises remained around .75 (.75 : 1.0).^ ®^
By using its key resources such as its educated public, 
its ties with UK, membership in the EC, and proximity to the 
rest of the world, and by providing various incentives to 
entice foreign financial institutions into the Irish market, 
the Irish State put significant hopes on invigorating its 
relatively weak and ineffective financial s t r u c t u r e . B y  
the 1980s the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), whose 
relations with the banks remained relatively intimate 
throughout the decade in arranging financing for projects 
administered by the Agency, was provided an innovative 
mechanism to bolster Ireland's financial services position 
in the global market. A plan for an International Financial 
Services Centre (IFSC) located at the docks in Dublin was 
devised primarily by the IDA to house financial institutions 
to deal with various financing operations, including dealing 
and brokerage operations, insurance, and fund management.
Even with such attempts for the future, the Irish case 
of the 1980s provides a vivid example of a small European 
state unable to take advantage of proximate finance-industry 
relations to propel investment and financing for projects. 
Most importantly, the Irish economy was faced with a number 
of problems that detracted from monetary stability: a major
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debt problem that sapped the country’s credit rating; low 
levels of savings and reserves that thwarted the necessary 
liquidity to provide loans; and inflation that discouraged 
investment because of the high levels of real interest 
rates. Financial institutions remained technologically 
deficient in comparison to their West European counterparts 
and domestic financial institutions maintained a traditional 
attitude that resulted in their declining competitiveness in 
the open Irish financial markets against foreign financial 
institutions.
While the international monetary system shifted during 
the decade to the use of securitisation through the capital 
markets, Irish industry was so small that there was little 
need for it. As a consequence, Irish financial institutions 
became less sophisticated in their methods of financing for 
Irish domestic industry and less competitive, remaining 
relatively insignificant global financial players.
3.6 The Monetary Environment and Finance-industrv
Relations in the Small European State in the 1980si 
Lessons from the Case Countries
During the 1980s small European state monetary policies 
and financial practices varied in how they facilitated 
industrial financing. By 1980 all small European states 
were experiencing low growth and inflation as a result of 
the international recession spurred by the oil shocks of the 
1970s. Some small European states such as Switzerland and 
Sweden were better able to adapt to these adverse 
conditions, flexibly responding through monetary policies
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that curtailed inflation and promoted growth. It was under 
these monetary conditions that strong finance-industry 
relations propelled industrial investment, economic growth, 
and international competitiveness. In Denmark and Ireland, 
relatively poor domestic economic and monetary conditions 
inhibited finance-industry relations.
In Switzerland, the monetary policy was based on four 
principles: 1) monetary aggregates that realised their
targets and kept inflation under control; 2) a high savings 
rate that kept the necessary liquidity for financial 
institutions to maintain vital reserves; 3) external 
stability through a strong, steady Swiss Franc; and 4) 
relatively low real interest rates. These factors, coupled 
with socio-political stability and a deregulated, universal 
banking system, provided the necessary environment for 
Switzerland to maintain its strategy of being an 
international financial centre and to re&nforce strong 
finance-industry relations. Higly cooperative bilateral 
Principal bank relations supported industrial financing 
arrangements both through bank ownership of industry and 
directorships that mixed board memberships between financial 
institutions and industries.
Within Switzerland, the Big Three banks possessed a 
significant amount of authority because of Swiss industries' 
preference for high debt-equity ratios. As a result of 
industries' highly leveraged positions, the Swiss big banks 
maintained significant control of Switzerland's industry. 
With the real cost of funds being cheaper for Swiss firms.
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they could act more aggressively in the international 
marketplace against foreign competitors who were required to 
pay more for long-term development and growth. Moreover, 
externally the Big Three banks of Switzerland remained 
internationally powerful, often participating in 
transnational financing syndicates, particularly in North 
America.
Consequently, throughout the 1980s effective monetary 
policy-making by the SNB effectuated an environment that 
both remained conducive to strong finance-industry relations 
and helped to foster Switzerland's important financial 
sector. While the SNB guided the Swiss economy by 
maintaining monetary stability, private financial 
institutions worked alongside industry as both capital and 
management sources. It is for these reasons that financial 
institutions were the principal actor in maintaining 
Switzerland's high level of international competitiveness 
during the 1980s. (See Fiaure 3.23.)
With the international recession severely affecting the 
Swedish economy at the beginning of the 1980s, Swedish 
policy-makers actively pursued a monetary policy intended to 
spur growth. As a result of the devaluations of 1981 and 
1982, Sweden experienced significant economic and industrial 
growth throughout most of the 1980s. Under monetary 
circumstances conditioned for growth, finance-industry 
interaction could be characterised as cooperative bilateral, 
where familiar relations existed between Sweden's largest 
banks and industrials primarily through financial spheres.
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MONETARY POLICY-MAKING AND FINANCE-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, 1980-1987:
THE PRINCIPAL ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Swiss National Bank
Î Monetary Policy-making
Monetary and Financial Environment that Featured:
• Monetary policy geared to fight inflation
• Maintenance of strong, stable Swiss Franc
• Deregulated, non-restrictive, universal banking laws
• High rate of savings among Swiss ensures giant
level of reserves for Swiss banks
Monetary/Financial Environment Monetary/Financial Environment
Conducive to Strategy of Conducive to Strong
Switzerland as an International Finance-lndustry Relations
Financial Centre
Fostered by: Fostered by:
• International presence of Big • Principal bank relationship
Three Banks (Credit (up to 20% ownership)
Suisse, Swiss Bank • Cross-board directorships
Corporation, Union Bank between major financial
of Switzerland) institutions and industrials
• Strong working relationship • High debt-equity ratios among
between major Swiss industrials that ensure
banks; permanent and strong ties between
exclusive Swiss syndicate industry and financial
• Secrecy, confidentiality of institutions
Swiss banks • Social, political, economic
• Social, political, economic stability
stability
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Similar to Switzerland, the powerful Swedish industrial 
structure remained highly leveraged because overall business 
factors were favourable; such leverage reduced cost of 
capital, increased return to equity, induced equity 
investments in the firm, and allowed Sweden to act more 
aggressively in the international marketplace.
However, both Denmark and Ireland were faced with wage 
drift, foreign debt, and current account deficits that 
adversely affected their domestic monetary environments. 
While Denmark actively pursued a policy of austerity,
Ireland maintained a relatively passive monetary policy in 
which its primary goal was to maintain reserves adequacy 
and protect the exchange rate. By doing so, it pursued a 
passive interest-rate policy that mirrored the level of 
external rates. As explained earlier, by Irish policy­
makers refusing to devalue at the beginning of the decade, 
both vital agricultural output and incomes significantly 
diminished.
Given these poor monetary and economic conditions, 
neither Denmark nor Ireland could fully achieve intimate 
finance-industry relations. While Denmark maintained 
relatively cooperative bilateral relations between the two 
as a result of bank ownership of industry and mixed board 
directorships, austerity measures to halt inflation and 
reduce its current account deficit alienated these relations 
and caused domestic financial institutions to be unable to 
offer significant investment capital. In Ireland, poor 
economic and monetary conditions certainly did not
2 2 0
contribute to stronger working relations between financial 
institutions and industry; only by 1987 under the Programme 
for National Recovery did Ireland attempt to spur growth by 
controlling wage-inspired inflation while at the same time 
reducing real interest rates. Nonetheless, Ireland's 
financial practices throughout the decade did not help the 
situation either. Following the Anglo tradition of 
separatist systems, Irish banks and industry tended to work 
less intimately than their continental neighbours; as a 
result, this detached bilateral relationship did not benefit 
from the state's monocephalic, proximity communication 
advantage.
In sum, small European state monetary interventionism 
was nationally specific. In each of the four cases, though 
external stability was couched through monetary pegging 
arrangements, different strategies were followed. In 
Switzerland, monetary stability, even at the price of high 
growth, was an economic necessity. In Sweden, growth 
through devaluation, even at the price of inflation, was 
stressed in order to stimulate industrial productivity. In 
Denmark, austerity characterised monetary policy-making, 
which resulted in inflation and economic stagnation. In 
Ireland, policy-makers maintained a relatively passive 
monetary policy, following world fluctuations in interest 
rates and consequent exchange rates. Therefore, during the 
1980s monetary interventionism in Switzerland and Sweden - a 
necessity to respond flexibly to international monetary 
pressures - fostered favourable domestic monetary conditions
2 2 1
for economic growth and high levels of international 
competitiveness, but in Denmark and Ireland ineffective or 
delayed interventionism frustrated finance-industry 
relations.
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Chapter Four
Trade Union-*Industry Relations and Supportive 
Labour Market Policies
4.1 Labour-Industrv Bargaining and the Influence of 
Coordinated Labour Market Policies on the Small 
European State
This chapter will argue that with high levels of 
international economic vulnerability, small states can less 
afford to have inflated labour costs and needless periods of 
industrial inactivity than larger states, which have greater 
natural and human resources.^ While it is not assumed that 
larger states do not face labour unrest and wage drift, nor 
that their effects are not deleterious to their economies, 
increasing labour costs and excessive strike activity can 
more seriously affect a smaller, more concentrated, economy 
than a larger economy less dependent on foreign commerce and 
less sensitive to international prices.^ Significant wage 
increases tend to undermine small state industries, which 
are usually price takers, to a greater extent than larger 
states industries, which tend to be price makers.
As was explained in Chapter One, in examining the four 
case studies, it is not assumed that these states possess 
corporatist wage-negotiation structures nor that corporatism 
is a useful mechanism to examine the role of labour in the 
small European state. As Claus Offe explains, "In spite of 
its apparent virtues as a solution to some systematic 
problems of the political economy, [corporatism] turns out 
to be a mixed blessing, which may not only heal major
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institutional defects but also generate new patterns of 
political confl ict .Fo r example, each of the Benelux 
countries has had centralised wage setting, yet their 
unemployment rates were all in the double figures during at 
least a part of the 1980s. With corporatist Scandinavian 
brethren and supposedly a corporatist structure itself, 
Denmark has had significant wage inspired inflation along 
with unemployment. (See Figure 4.1.)
Unemolovment Rates. Third Quarter 1986
Small Eurooean states % Laraer states %
Austria 3.4 France 10.1
Belgium 12.0 Italy 10.7
Denmark 8.0 Japan 2.9
Ireland 19.8 Spain 21.0
Netherlands 12.2 UK 13.1
Sweden 2.6 USA 10.1
Switzerland 0.8 West Germany 8.2
Source: Financial Times (1987) February 12: 25; The
Economist (1987).
As illustrated above, while many larger European states 
such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have faced the 
dual problems of unemployment and labour unrest, small 
European states, though holding the monocephalic advantage, 
have not necessarily avoided the same problems. The position 
taken in this chapter is that while small states do possess 
a wage bargaining advantage over larger states as a result 
of their size, the process of bargaining between labour and 
industry and the role of the State in developing concomitant 
labour market programmes is a result of each small state's
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internal situation. Essential differences in trade union- 
industry relations obviate the utility of such terminology 
as corporatism as evidenced by the widely diverging levels 
of unionisation in the four small European states. While in 
Sweden and Denmark union membership as a percentage of the 
labour force approached ninety percent during the 1980s, in 
Ireland union membership was only around fifty percent and 
Swiss union membership less than forty percent.*
Relations between labour, industry, and the State can 
have a positive influence on the international 
competitiveness of the small European state, where low 
levels of unemployment and labour unrest are complemented by 
active labour market policies, such as in Sweden; little 
negative influence by maintaining a social compact, but 
without significant programmes to help labour, such as in 
Switzerland; or a negative influence, when the labour market 
system is inflexible or the structure is inadequate, such as 
in Denmark and Ireland.
Among those who have argued that the corporatist system 
in small European states provides a notable mechanism for 
labour and industry to bargain collectively, many point to 
the success of Sweden, which incorporated a Solidaristic 
Wage Policy with active labour market programmes during the 
1980s. While this thesis will not examine the role of 
labour in Sweden in such terms as corporatism, there is the 
assumption that a significant degree of bargaining occurred 
between trade unions, the State, and industry in Sweden 
throughout the decade. Much as a result of its
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communitarian ideology, discussed in detail in Chapter Two, 
the two major Swedish trade unions were able to exact a 
significant amount of power in developing and coordinating 
labour market policies with the SAP. As will be shown in 
this chapter, unlike the other three countries, labour 
remained the principal actor in Sweden; it set priorities, 
developed programmes, and implemented change as a result of 
the power it garnered through years of development and 
interaction with other actors. Consequently, much of the 
focus in this chapter will be on the Swedish case.
In Switzerland, wage bargaining between trade unions 
and industry was decentralised in the 1980s; however, the 
Swiss Peace of Work agreement, along with a binding 
arbitration system, solidified the social compact between 
labour and industry. Though the Swiss State restricted 
immigration in times of recession, it developed few 
programmes to help the unemployed, much as a result of the 
ingratiated, culturally strong work ethic. While Sweden was 
able to use its small state advantage to centralise wage 
bargaining, Switzerland's size augmented a decentralised 
process of wage bargaining.
Finally, from 1980-1987 both Ireland and Denmark 
struggled to control wage costs. After attempts at 
combatting an inflationary price-wage spiral, unemployment 
and wage drift became such impediments to Ireland's 
international competitiveness that industry and labour 
leaders in 1987 worked together to form a Programme for 
National Recovery, a plan to hold down wage increases. In
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Denmark the labour market structure, which was mixed between 
centralisation and decentralisation in the 1980s, was never 
capable of controlling increasing unit labour costs. As 
Newell and Symons explain in their monograph Corporatism, 
Laissez-Faire, and the Rise in Unemployment, those countries 
that have strongly established traditions of collective 
bargaining, yet also have independent unionisation, "appear 
to get the worst of all worlds, with a high underlying rate 
of unemployment whatever happens to inflation."^ Unlike 
Sweden, which was able to incorporate its communitarian 
ideology with active labour market policies, the Danish 
State and trade unions provided significant unemployment 
benefits without incentives for reemployment.
This chapter will, therefore, examine the four case 
studies by comparing relations between trade unions and 
industry and the use of labour market policies. The key 
points of discussion are summarised in the following chart. 
(See Figure 4.2.) Thereafter, short narratives introduce the 
nature of each state's labour-industry relations during the 
1980s.
Figure 4.2
TRADE UNION-INDUSTRY RELATIONS AND SUPPORTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES: THE CASE STUDIES COMPARED
DENMARK IRELAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
Level of labour unionisation Very high (85%) Moderate (50%) Very high (85%) Low (35%)
Degree of wage bargaining 
centralisation during the 1980s
Mixed between centralisation and 
decentralisation
Mixed between centralisation and 
decentralisation
Highly centralised Highly decentralised
Relative real unit labour costs in the 
1980s
Very high High before 1987, then moderate Low Low
Level of wage drift in the 1980s High High before 1987, then relatively low Moderate Low
Level of unemploymmt in the 1980s High Very high Low Low
Degree of labour unrest Moderately high High Moderate Very low
Unemployment insurance benefits Very generous (30 months) Very generous (15 months) Limited Extremely limited
Migration policies Somewhat restrictive towards 
immigration
Ineffective policies to thwart massive 
level of emigration of educated youth
Somewhat restrictive towards 
immigration
Very restrictive towards 
immigration
Extent artd nature of labour market 
policies
Few retraining and mobility 
programmes; emphasis on university 
education
Limited number of retraining and 
mobility programmes; significant 
emphasis on university education
Extensive retraining and mobility 
programmes; sophisticated 
university programmes
Few retraining and mobility 
programmes; extensive 
apprenticeship system
The effects of wsge bargaining and 
supportive labour market policies on the 
intemationsd competitiveness of the 
State in the 1980s
Decreasing levels of international 
competitiveness as a result of 
ineffective wage baragining that 
inspired wage increases and the lack 
of labour market policies (with 
generous unemployment benefits)
Decreasing levels of international 
competitiveness as a result of wage- 
inspired inflation, unemployment, 
emigration, and the lack of labour 
market policies (with generous 
unemployment benefits)
Increasing levels of international 
competitiveness as a result of a 
highly productive workforce inspired 
by the solidaristic wage policy and 
complemented by active labour 
market policies
Increasing levels of international 
competitiveness as a result of a 
highly productive workforce and 
effective decentralised wage 
bargaining
Cooperative or detached trade union- 
industry relations
Detached Detached before 1987, then 
cooperative
Cooperative Cooperative
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Sweden. With its Solidaristic Wage Policy and active 
labour market policies to counteract unemployment, labour- 
industry“State relations in Sweden were centralised in the 
1980s. Labour played a principal role as a result of the 
Swedish communitarian ideology. The main vehicles through 
which labour exerted its influence over the Swedish economy 
in the 1980s were the combination of 1) centralised wage 
agreements based on a social compact between labour and 
industry and a strict solidaristic wage guideline; 2) 
reduction of inflation through the EFO Model; and 3) active 
labour market policies and proper education of youth aimed 
at maintaining full employment, absorbing labour slack, and 
promoting structural adjustment.
Switzerland. In the 1980s, a social compact was 
maintained in a decentralised wage bargaining process. In 
Switzerland a combination of factors allowed for cooperative 
labour relations, thus contributing to Switzerland's 
economic success. These measures included 1) the Peace of 
Work agreement; 2) the binding arbitration system; 3) 
relatively low unemployment benefits coupled with a 
nationally pervasive work ethic; 4) the lack of youth 
unemployment as a result of the apprenticeship system; and 
5) significant immigration policies.
Ireland. While wages continued to grow from 1980-1986 
as a result of decentralised wage negotiations, the 
Programme for National Recovery was developed and 
implemented to minimise wage increases as a result of 
interaction between the central trade union, the employers'
240
confederation, and the State. This chapter will examine how 
the new government attempted to combat the public sector 
problem as well as a number of other labour problems from 
1980-1987. Those problems included 1) severe unemployment 
and the lack of job creation programmes; 2) significant wage 
drift; 3) a relatively high level of labour unrest; and 4) a 
high rate of emigration.
Denmark. The interactive wage bargaining process 
remained mixed between centralisation and decentralisation, 
with the trade unions being able to increase wages 
significantly at the cost of international competitiveness 
of the state's industries. This chapter will examine Danish 
labour-industry relations from 1980-1987 by analyzing its 
two major problems: (1) wage drift as a result of an
antiquated, inflexible system and (2) unemployment, the lack 
of job creation programmes, and significant unemployment 
benefits. Unlike Ireland from 1986-1987, where the social 
partners were able to suppress wage growth, during that 
period in Denmark labour negotiations became decentralised 
and wages dramatically increased.
4.2 Collective Bargaining. Wages, and Strikes In the Case 
Studies
A. Sweden
Since the 1961 report entitled Trade Unions and Full 
Employment, Swedish trade unionists and policy-makers have 
recognised, and acted upon, the implicit causal relationship 
between wage moderation, full employment, and international
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competitiveness. The LO, the premier trade union with
membership around ninety percent of the blue-collar
workforce, maintained in the report that strong fiscal and
monetary policies would prevent excess demand in those
regions and sectors with the tightest labour and goods
markets, thus checking inflationary tendencies. The notion
was to avoid formal price control machinery through a
balanced aggregate demand policy; the unions, moreover,
would bargain with industry to avoid both significant wage
increases and industrial disputes.
This pervasive understanding of the necessity for
labour restraint resulted from the LO realising that Swedish
industrial competitiveness would ensure employment
opportunities. As Richard Rosecrance indicates,
[in the post World War II period, the] trade unions 
sought to 'boost quality in the interest of export 
promotion' while restraining wage increases.®
In keeping with the Swedish value of communitarianism, trade
union appreciation of the need for wage moderation resulted
in virtual "restraint of greedy appropriations of special
products by special interests."^
However, during the 1970s Swedish international
competitiveness faded as a result of the oil shocks and the
consequent international recession.® Many of Sweden's
economic problems persisted because of the inability of the
State and trade unions to depress wage rate growth while
prices continued to rise.® Costs skyrocketed and wages
increased forty-four percent from 1976 to 1978.^° The
general real wage level should have been quickly adjusted to
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changes in productivity given the exogenous shock of the 
international recession; instead, the centre-right parties 
were unable to control the powerful LO, and wages continued 
to spiral despite decreasing industrial productivity. 
Relative unit labour costs rose by eleven percent per annum 
in Sweden from 1975-1982.^
Moreover, there were significant battles over pay 
increases during this period, mainly because the unions 
wanted to regain the purchasing power they had lost to 
inflation. However, the government wanted public sector 
employees to absorb the costs of maintaining a tight fiscal 
policy by minimising spending. The result was Sweden's 
first large strike in over forty years. As Peter Gourevitch 
asserts.
Among other things, the strike seemed to affirm the 
SAP's claim that it could manage relations with unions 
better than the bourgeois coalition, overcoming some of 
the political disadvantage that the party suffered from 
general anti-union sentiment.^
Perhaps the most notable discussion concerning
industrial adjustment from the mid-1970s into the 1980s
occurred when the Swedish government attempted to influence
the productivity of its industries through a policy on wage
earner funds. Under the Meidner Model, named after the
economist Rudolf Meidner, a portion of pre-tax profits were
to be transferred to wage-earner funds administered by the
unions. This new equity capital, which remained tax-exempt,
would accrue to union funds instead of to private
shareholders.^ These wage earner funds were intended both
to bolster the level of savings and investment without a
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drastic polarised redistribution of wealth and to supply the 
corporate sector with equity capital. At the same time, 
labour would maintain a significant management influence. 
Although the wage-earner fund issue illustrated labour's 
recognition of the need for equity capital for industrial 
adjustment, as well as the dramatic influence the Swedish 
trade unions sought to play in terms of industrial 
investment, some such as Pontusson have argued that it 
illustrates labour's failure to wield significant industrial 
adjustment influence during this period.
Although the issue of labour's management role under 
the wage-earner fund scheme was debated many times over, the 
original Meidner model was never implemented, since it was 
viewed by employers as a "Leninist policy of collective 
ownership, which challenged the capitalist s y s t e m . A s  
Henry Milner states, "When the LO called for the 
establishment of the Wage Earner Funds in 1976, it was, for 
many employers, the final straw; a line had been crossed."^®
Because of the uproar the wage earner fund debate had 
caused, combined with the economic difficulties the state 
had confronted in the 197 0s, the SAP began to work closely 
with the labour movement when it regained power in 1982. 
Eighty-five percent of the wage earners in Sweden were 
affiliated with one of the three major trade unions: the
LO; the TOO, the white-collar union for workers without 
university degrees; and, the SACO/SR, the union for 
employees with university degrees. Even with the failure of 
the Meidner model, Sweden's communitarian and egalitarian
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values did not diminish from 1980-1987. The trade unions 
maintained their significant power, working alongside the 
Social Democrats in augmenting Sweden's level of 
international competitiveness.
After the Meidner debacle, the LO recognised the need 
for continued investment as evidenced by the ongoing debate 
over wage earner funds. In 1983 the Edin Proposal (named 
after the LG's former research director Per-Olof Edin) 
changed the tone of the wage-earner fund debate by altering 
any Marxist (or "worker control") overtones. Instead, the 
notion was to augment industrial productivity, as well as to 
avoid costly wage increases, by increasing the supply of 
risk capital through regional funds that locally based fund 
managers could invest in any company's shares. In contrast 
to the Meidner model, under this plan the unions could only 
have up to one-half the voting power attached to any fund 
shares; workers were not given the power to manage these 
companies. The Edin proposal offered a mutually beneficial 
circumstance for both worker and employer. Wage costs would 
be restrained because the capital originally used for wage 
increases would now be invested back into the company, and 
the worker would now have greater incentive to increase his 
workplace efficiency. Although public reception to this 
plan was cool (55% against), legislation based on the plan 
passed through the Riksdag in August, when many Swedes had 
left on holiday.^
The ability to pass such legislation with negative 
public reaction indicates the power of the "two branches of
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the Swedish labour movement, the ... SAP and LO."^® As
Gourevitch alleges,
The strength of Swedish labour is intimately linked to 
its organizational forms, in particular the 
centralization of Swedish trade-union organization and 
its links to the Swedish Social Democrats; 
participating in the government provides resources and 
incentives that then, in an interactive process, 
reinforce governing. ®
Indeed, from 1982-1987 the LO created what many 
labelled a "closed shop" in dealing with the SAP and 
industry. While the threat of increased wage demands from 
the LO persisted from 1980-1987, the popular Finance 
Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt and the head of the LO, Stig Malm, 
emerged from annual meetings during this period with wages 
low enough to avoid adversely affecting the country's 
international competitiveness. At the root of these 
centralised negotiations steadfastly remained a social 
compact between labour and industry, coupled with the 
Solidaristic Wage Policy.
While it received some criticism concerning efficiency 
being compromised for egalitarianism,^® the Solidaristic 
Wage Policy remained virtually the same through 1987 as it 
was when introduced in the 1960s, maintaining its emphasis 
on "equal pay for equal work." The policy was originally 
developed under the principles of wage fairness and 
equality; however, it also affected the structural 
adjustment of Swedish industry because only efficient firms 
were able to pay the industrially specified wages.
Moreover, inflation previously strained by industrial 
growth was stabilised^^ through the so-called EFO Model,
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named after three economists from the LO who produced the 
collaborative study on the model. It divided the economy 
into competitive (”C”) sectors, based on export 
competitiveness, and sheltered ("S") sectors, those sectors 
in which the produced goods are not traded internationally. 
The essence of the EFO model was to provide a guideline by 
which wage rates could grow, or a calculation of the "'room' 
for increases in wages, salaries and p r o f i t s . S i n c e  
Sweden maintained an economy significantly based on export- 
led growth,the C-sector became the basis by which wage 
rates could increase. The unions could squeeze firms for 
high wages up to the point at which they would not exceed 
productivity and which investment would not be negatively 
affected. It was then up to the C-sector to provide wage 
guidelines that the S-sector could follow. Although the 
model was sometimes unreliable and proved difficult for 
practical use, it highlighted the importance of the trade 
unions' understanding the need for export competitiveness. 
Explains Andrew Martin, "At this point, the EFO Model's 
importance is that it testifies to the concern for external 
equilibrium shared by the LO with other actors.
Therefore, from 1982-1987 a "bilateral monopoly" 
existed between the LO, which set wages, and the SAF, which 
adjusted employment and work hours.Despite some wage 
bargaining at the local level, which resulted in wage 
drift,wage negotiations were concluded in a centralised 
process "through which distributive conflict among the 
affiliates and their rank-and-file members [could] be
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effectively m a n a g e d a n d  which wage-inspired inflation was 
controlled through the EFO model. While the SAF "tightly 
controlled power over its affiliates" in the collective 
bargaining process, the LO was able to use a "leap frog" 
strategy to gain more wages from year to year.^® In general, 
once wages were determined by the centralised collective 
bargaining system in trade union negotiations, chiefly for 
blue collar workers in the LO, firms unilaterally adjusted 
for employment and work hours.
The ability of the LO to secure desired wages has given 
ample reason for some Swedish labour market scholars such as 
Anders Bjorklund to argue rightfully that the trade unions 
held the upper hand over enterprises in terms of wage 
negotiations during the 1980s.Indeed, Sweden was ranked 
third behind Switzerland and West Germany in terms of hourly 
labour costs, including social security and paid leave. 
Nonetheless, it is argued here that while Sweden did 
maintain a relatively high wage level, industrial 
productivity followed and surpassed wage growth through 
increasing profits and investment. Consequently, the cost 
of labour in real terms involved in making each unit of 
output (i.e., unit labour costs) was lower in Sweden than in 
competing states. For Swedish employers, high wages were 
associated with high productivity, which translated into a 
lower unit labour costs than in countries with lower wages 
and lower productivity. (See Figure 4.3.)
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While some have argued that the Solidaristic Wage
Policy became an outdated, inefficient mechanism to ensure
wage equality,^ there was little question that labour was
able to rationalise a programme that augmented international
competitiveness. As Heclo and Madsen maintain,
The wage equality principle imbued the labour 
movement's position with a programmatic commitment for 
the future... this development epitomized a distinctly 
Swedish approach to policy: the ability to rationalize 
policy moves initiated ostensibly for other purposes 
and to forge subsequent policy initiatives to fit an 
overall framework.
In 1985, the difference between the average wage level 
for branches of industry above the general wage level and 
those below that level had been narrowed to 13%, compared to 
30% in 1960.3* Despite the powerful unions being able to
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exact high wages and short work weeks, Swedish industrial 
productivity grew; the high wage level did not diminish 
productivity but rather promoted profits and investments 
that enhanced growth in the manufacturing sector.
In sum, on the basis of a labour-demand equation and 
real-wage equation, a study of eighteen different labour 
markets on how they responded to the exogenous shocks of the 
early 1980s concluded that the Swedish labour market was the 
most flexible.^® In addition, according to a World 
Competitiveness Report survey, Sweden ranked second out of 
twenty-two OECD countries in terms of "the role of organised 
labour positively affecting the running of companies."^ 
Nonetheless, the Swedish collective bargaining system had an 
essential concomitant ingredient: significant retraining
and manpower programmes for workers unemployed as a result 
of the structural adjustment effects of the Solidaristic 
Wage Policy. These programmes will be discussed in the 
following section.
B. Switzerland
In the 1980s negotiations between labour and industry 
in Switzerland, unlike Sweden, were decentralised. Despite 
only around forty percent of workers in Switzerland being 
members of unions, union membership was heavily concentrated 
among Swiss male workers, even though major industries' 
labour forces had a large number of marginal or foreign 
workers, which were not easily organised.
Throughout the 1980s Switzerland's two main trade
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unions, the SGB and the CNG (Christlich-Nationaler 
Gewerkschaftsbund der Schweiz, the Swiss National Federation 
of Christian Trade Unions), primarily voiced unified labour 
opinions on national issues. However, a number of unions 
under these two umbrella unions conducted independent wage 
negotiations. Indeed, from the 1970s through the 1980s 
unions were fragmented as a result of the existence of 
various denominational unions, the separation between blue 
and white collar unions, and a split between craft and 
industrial unions. Much of the reason for these divisions 
was due to Switzerland's specialised labour force and highly 
differentiated product lines.
Moreover, unlike in Sweden, labour in Switzerland 
occupied "a subordinate position" as a result of 1) the 
decentralised nature of the trade unions and their 
differences in wage militancy, 2) the implicit threat of 
foreign direct investment by Swiss companies (i.e, the 
export of capital) and 3) the lack of coordination between 
the trade unions and the Swiss Social Democratic Party 
{Sozialdemokratische Partei)
While in most European countries relations between the 
Social Democratic Party and labour remained strong, in 
Switzerland differences remained far greater. Throughout 
the 1980s the unions preserved a private sector strategy for 
industrial growth, while the party's preference was for 
greater public activity. Even pension plans stirred 
significant controversy; the Social Democrats wanted a 
national plan similar to that in Sweden, while the unions
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wanted a union pension fund. In fact, in a late 1970s 
survey, less than one-half of Social Democratic party and 
union leaders expressed satisfaction with party-union 
relations.
With Swiss trade unions being relatively weak but also 
understanding the need for Swiss export competitiveness, 
decentralised wage negotiations in Switzerland remained 
highly cooperative. As many as eight-hundred to a thousand 
collective work agreements, settled through local collective 
agreements or between each firm and its work council, were 
bargained each year in the 1980s. This decentralised, yet 
cooperative, structure allowed for relative wage flexibility 
between sectors of the economy, in which real wage growth 
remained relatively low in comparison to competing states. 
(See Figure 4.4.)
Moreover, the Swiss process of collective bargaining 
tended to take into account the interests of both labour and 
industry. This dual awareness explains why Swiss firms used 
partial unemployment techniques during the 1981-1983 
recession, in which firms reduced working hours yet avoided 
lay-offs.^ Other states such as Denmark facing recession 
during this period were more inclined simply to lay off 
workers, substantially increasing unemployment levels.
Figure 4.4 ^
WAGES (EARNINGS) GROWTH PER YEAR,
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Hence, the institutional process of labour-industry 
bargaining, as a result of "Switzerland's well-known 
tradition of political and economic decentralization," was 
developed "by a succession of grand measures: first, wage
and profit moderation; second, shorter hours rsee Figure 
4.51 ; and in the last resort, layoffs affecting primarily 
outsiders, i.e., the foreign workers.
Figure 4.5
Average Hours Per Work Week. Switzerland
Year
1919
1957
1958 
1960 
1963
Hours
50
47
46
45
44
Year
1979
1983
1986
1988
Hours
43
42
41
40
Source: Kurt Humbel (1987) En Toute Bonne Foi: Genese et
Evolution De La Convention Du Travail Dans L'Industrie 
Suisse Des Machines et Des Métaux: 97.
Given the extraordinary success of the social compact 
between labour and industry in Switzerland, the binding 
arbitration mechanism helped ensure that industrial 
conflicts were both quickly and justly resolved. Even with 
the exogenous shocks in the 1970s, an agreement by the 
unions to limit strikes coupled with the binding arbitration 
system was an important means by which Switzerland was able 
to deal with difficult circumstances. As Katzenstein 
explains.
Despite massive layoffs, collective bargaining 
proceeded through the late 1970s without strikes and in 
an orderly fashion. Controversies were resolved by 
arbitration, and since union officials agreed with the 
employers on the essential strategy for the industry.
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relations between employers and union officials 
remained 'excellent'.*^
Moreover, the procedure to settle wage conflicts under 
a three-tiered system of arbitration proved particularly 
valuable throughout the 1970s and 1980s. At the highest 
level (the third echelon) the arbitral tribunal maintained 
the final, binding voice between the differing parties, but 
differences were rarely settled here. In most of the cases 
conflicts were resolved at the first echelon - at the 
enterprise echelon - in negotiations between the labour 
commission of the enterprise and the management. If the 
conflict could not be supplanted at that level, then it 
moved to the association echelon (the second echelon). For 
instance, for the Machinery Manufacturers, labour relations 
at the association level were between the Association for 
Machinery Manufacturers (VSM) and its sister organisation on 
the labour side, the Swiss Association of Machine and 
Industrial Manufacturers (ASM). (Its parent is the Union of 
All Employers' Associations, or DSAO, whose industrial 
counterpart is the Vorort. ) **
During the 1980s if no resolution was reached at the 
association level, then the conflict moved to the arbitral 
tribunal. The two parties would designate together the 
mutual president and a representative from each side. The 
tribunal of the three members then would elaborate a 
proposition of conciliation. If this was refused by either 
party, the tribunal resolved the conflict in the last 
instance. Its sentence remained mandatory for the two
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parties.^
In addition to the binding arbitration mechanism, the 
trade unions also agreed to a "peace agreement" formed in 
1937 with industry. The arguments in favour of the 
convention for the trade unions at the time were:
a) the trade unions and employers would be equal 
partners ;
b) the trade unions would be able to demonstrate 
their respect for the general interest of 
industry; and
c) negotiations are always sweeter than strikes.
The arguments in favour of the convention for employers 
were:
a) salaries would be regulated at the level of the 
enterprise ;
b) a peace of work agreement would assure the 
continuation of production.
And the advantages for both included:
a) an autonomous arbitrage procedure;
b) the peace agreement would help the internal unity 
of the country;
c) it would reenforce democratic principles;
d) the understanding that strikes are costly for 
everyone ;
e) the belief that a voluntary entente is in the best 
interests of each, since it augments the prestige 
of each.^G
Since its inception, the peace agreement has been 
extraordinarily strong and is well accepted by the Swiss 
public at large, illustrated by the level of strike activity 
in Switzerland being the lowest in the industrialised world. 
(See Figure 4.6.) According to a World Competitiveness 
Report survey, Switzerland ranked first out of twenty-two 
OECD countries in terms of "the extent to which unions are 
conducive to labour peace.
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Figure 4.6 
The Swiss Peace of Work Advantage. 
Days Lost Per 1.000 Workers
Country Days
Italy 1276
Spain 729
U.K. 529
U.S.A. 269
France 166
West Germany 51
Switzerland 2
Source: Kurt Humbel (1987) En Toute Bonne Foi: Genese et
Evolution De La Convention Du Travail Dans L'Industrie 
Suisse Des Machines et Des Métaux: 97,
Because the peace agreement prohibited strikes and 
lockouts throughout the 1980s, the trade unions and 
employers' confederations maintained close bargaining 
contacts. Every five years the peace agreement has been 
renewed, and work hours and vacations have been revised.
Perhaps most importantly, under favourable labour 
market conditions and with labour scarcity during the 1970s 
and 1980s, Swiss trade unions did not sacrifice free 
collective bargaining to constrain inflation. The trade 
unions, as social partners to business (Sozialpartner) also 
included in their collective bargains a number of issues 
beyond conditions of work, including social welfare 
measures.^® Indeed, with highly favourable economic 
conditions within Switzerland in the 1980s, it ranked first 
among the industrialised countries of the world in terms of 
hourly labour costs that included social security and paid
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leave. Moreover, as Katzenstein affirms, "Because the Swiss 
union movement [would] not trade a stronger position in 
labor markets for a weaker position in politics, it has 
adamantly opposed any curtailing of free collective 
bargaining. As a result, Switzerland has no incomes 
policy."^
C. Ireland
From the 1970s through the early part of the 1980s 
collective bargaining between trade unions and industry in 
Ireland was centralised, yet the economic climate of the 
1980s proved to be quite different from that of the 
preceding decade. With the oil crisis and the international 
economic recession ushering in the 1980s, the second 
National Understanding (NU) was followed by decentralised 
"rounds," which continued to prevail to 1987.
Throughout the 1970s tripartite negotiations between 
the government (the public sector), the ICTU, and the FUE 
evolved into norm-setting, in which centralised agreements 
brought about tiered increases in wages each year from 1970- 
1981. Two wage provisions, "productivity" and 
"unsustainable inequity," were abused and overused at the 
same time that the oil shocks, accompanied by the 
international recession, promoted inflation.As the 
Economic and Social Research Institute of Dublin has 
documented, between 1970 and 1980 in Ireland real income 
grew fifteen percent more rapidly than productivity, while 
the differential in West Germany during this period was only
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around two percent.
A political debate dividing those who supported free,
decentralised bargaining and those who favoured centralised
wage negotiations ensued, and though the Fine Gael
government tried to buttress waning support for centralised
collective bargaining by attempting to forge a peace
agreement, the FUE opted against agreeing to centralised
wage negotiations much as a result of imported inflation.
Hence, the centralised bargaining that prevailed throughout
the 1970s collapsed because "norms” were set too high and
the two aforementioned provisions abused.
With labour negotiations decentralised after 1981, the
role of the ICTU diminished. Although it did issue
guidelines to its affiliates in terms of pay guidelines, the
ICTU had no centralised authority. "There was no collective
mechanism of any sort to ensure equity in pay developments
or protection of the interests of the low-paid, less still
of the unemployed."^*
No longer having direct ties with the government, and
reduced ties with the Labour Party, the role of the ICTU
became overtly criticised. As Hardiman indicates.
The fragmentation of trade union interests due to 
decentralised bargaining became increasingly to be
criticised A shared feeling began to become
apparent that unless it could effect internal changes 
the trade union movement would lose any sense of 
collective purpose and would increasingly find itself 
unable to exert effective influence over public policy 
debates.^
Moreover, local bargaining procedures caused 
significant problems as a result of the large State and
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semi-state sector. With the State being the country's 
largest employer, bargaining agreements aroused lengthy 
phases of negotiation. These agreements became "front-" and 
"back-" loaded; the result was that the Irish State had the 
highest debt to GNP service ratio in the OECD, two-and-a- 
half times that which was tolerable by OECD standards. With 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) about to intercede to 
help the Irish State in 1987, the new minority government 
led by the Fianna Fails had to develop a programme to slim 
the public payroll.
Because of the international recession and inflation in 
Ireland topping twenty percent in 1981, wage drift became 
a major problem in the 1980s. While real after-tax earnings 
declined by around fifteen percent between 1979 and 1985, 
the estimated average real cost of employing an industrial 
worker increased by between five and ten percent.^ As 
price inflation increased on an annual basis, wage increases 
followed a similar pattern, with wage-price inspired 
inflation becoming a circular dilemma that resulted in some 
of the worst wage drift in Europe. (See Figure 4.7.)
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Figure 4.7
Index of Hourly Earnings in Manufacturing
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
US 100 110 117 121 126 131 134 136
Japan 100 106 110 114 118 122 124 126
UK 100 113 126 137 149 163 175 190
France 100 115 132 147 158 167 174 180
FRG 100 105 110 114 117 122 127 132
Nthlnds 100 103 110 113 114 120 122 124
Denmark 100 109 120 128 134 141 148 162
Ireland 100 116 134 149 165 179 193 204
Source: Ministry of Finance (1989) Economic Statistics: 35.
Furthermore, significant wage expansion was experienced in 
traditional industry, which accounted for approximately 
three-fifths of manufacturing from 1980 to 1987. (See 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9.) While modern industry almost tripled 
its output and wage increases were kept to a minimum, 
traditional industry production output did not significantly 
change over the period; relative unit wage costs in these 
particular sectors significantly increased (particularly in 
1981 and 1982) relative to other EMS currencies.^
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Figure 4.8 
Industrial Production in Ireland, 1984
Industry Group Net Output* Numbers Engaged
fOOOs)
Modern
Traditional
Total
Manufacturing
2273.6
3031.5
5305.1
39,400
156,800
196,150
*in Million Irish Pounds 
Modern -
Traditional -
Pharmaceuticals, Machinery, Electrical 
Engineering, Instrument Engineering, "Other 
Foods"
Non-metallic Minerals, Rest of Chemicals, 
Rest of Metals, Rest of Food, Drink and 
Tobacco, Textiles, Clothing, Footwear, 
Leather, Timber, Wood, Furniture, paper. 
Printing, Misc. Industries
Source: T.J. Baker (1988) "Industrial Output and Wage
Costs, 1980-1987." ESCRI Quarterly Economic Commentary: 
34, 35.
Unit Wage Costs.
Figure 4.9
1980-1987 findex 1980=100)
Indstrv Grouo 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Modern
Traditional
98.7
112.6
116.7
123.9
104.4
128.4
99.4
132.6
100.7
132.5
107.3
141.4
91.7
142.5
Total 
Manuf'ing 107.8 118.9 115.0 113.6 112.3 116.4 108.1
Source: T.J. Baker (1988) op.cit.: 38.
In addition, the Irish system of conflict resolution 
remained non-binding for the private sector and binding for 
the public sector. In the private sector the non-binding
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arbitration system became inadequate for solving labour 
disputes, while in the public sector the binding arbitration 
mechanism remained too rigid for the government, which 
remained in a fiscal deficit. The examples below help 
illustrate these two points.
a) In 1982 the trade unions won an important victory 
over the FUE by amending the 1906 Trade Disputes Act, which 
in the past had excluded workers from the protection against 
tort action companies received from the act. Nonetheless, 
with case law in Ireland, different from many other European 
countries, the Trade Disputes Act had "implicity given 
workers the right to strike if they felt they were being 
injured, even with the changes.” ®^ Under the non-binding 
arbitration system the Labour Court, an independent body of 
six members (three nominated from the FUE, three from the 
ICTU), was established in 1946 to encourage the "voluntary 
resolution of industrial disputes."®® While the court set 
the standard for arbitration, its non-binding status for 
private industry was inadequate for difficult labour 
disputes during the 1980s.
With an adversarial relationship between the ICTU and 
the FUE, one trade union official asserted, "We do not have 
a cosy relationship. We do have a relationship based on 
respect, and we do have to do business, yet because of our 
legal system, and the ramifications of the trade disputes 
act, trade unions must at times exert their right to 
strike."^
b) In the public sector, where the court maintained a
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binding arbitration mechanism, the government as an employer 
was bound by extremely high wage figures even when the 
international recession severely affected the fiscal budget. 
In a dispute between the government and the ICTU's Public 
Services Committee in 1985, the binding arbitration decision 
was overturned by a Dail vote to negate special pay 
increases for teachers. It was the first time since 1953 
that the government had overturned a public service pay 
recommendation, and the result was a giant teachers' union 
strike.
Moreover, strike activity continued to be a problem in 
Ireland throughout the 1980s. (See Figure 4.10.)
Figure 4.10 
Strike Statistics (Official and Unofficial") 
Ireland. 1980-1987
Year No. of Strikes
1980 132
1981 117
1982 131
1983 151
1984 191
1985 116
1986 100
1987 76
Davs Lost Per 1.000 Workers
404
436
437 
311 
364 
412 
316 
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Source: Department of Labour Estimates (1989)
With the unions being less able to take on a militant stance 
as a result of the recession and consequent unemployment, 
there was less industrial action between 1980 and 1987 than 
in the previous decade, even though the "free-for-all often 
produced many strikes that might not have occurred under
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centralised bargaining.”®^ Even with these downward trends,
strike activity remained a problem for Ireland during this
period, especially when compared with the striking activity
of such countries as Switzerland. (Also see Figure 4.6.)
As a result of the major problems Ireland faced in the
early to mid-1980s, such as unemployment, wage drift,
relatively high interest rates, inflation, and high levels
of national debt, the CII began a massive campaign to
educate the public about the increasing labour costs as a
result of rising inflation. As Dr. Con Power, Director of
Economic Policy at the CII, asserted.
We jumped in where angels would fear to tread. We knew 
that no politician was willing to go to the public and 
say 'I have misled you; we have been pledging the 
taxpayers money on credit. '
Moreover, public sector wage demands continued to 
undermine the national budget and increase national debt. 
While the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) led a 
specific campaign to reduce the budget deficit through lower 
energy, transport, telecommunication, and postal costs, the 
CII, the FUE, the CIF (Construction Industry Federation) and 
the ICTU - the so-called "social partners" - began to deal 
with the management of wage costs.
In the autumn of 1986 discussion commenced between the 
social partners and the middle-of-the-road opposition party 
Fianna Fail, which subsequently produced the party's 
election manifesto entitled The Programme for National 
Recovery. W i t h  the election of the Fianna Fails in 1987, 
negotiations began between the Prime Minister's Department
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(the Taoiseach), the ICTU, FUE, and CII. The Fianna Fail 
government entered into office with an attitude of 
attempting to defuse, rather than oppose, industrial 
conflict. At the same time, the new Prime Minister, Charles 
Haughey, openly declared that spending cuts needed to be 
made to reduce the national debt.
Consequently, the Programme for National Recovery was 
an attempt by the social partners to cut back on the public 
sector's payroll and at the same time suppress inflating 
wage costs on the private side. Based on the ICTU's policy 
document entitled "Confronting the Jobs' Crisis," along with 
negotiations between the FUE and the ICTU, Programme 
guidelines for annual wage increases would average 2.7% per 
annum from 1987-1989, with a working week of forty hours.®® 
With centralised negotiations between the social partners on 
wages, the problem of wage drift was substantially 
alleviated, as was industrial action. Other policies of the 
national Programme attempted to regenerate the economy 
through tax reform and debt reduction policies.®^ Moreover, 
many of the problems associated with the decentralised 
nature of those agencies involved in job creation were being 
amalgamated into a single organisation known as FAS, the 
Central Training and Employment Authority, whose goal was to 
rationalise the three agencies' seventeen different 
programmes.
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P. Denmark
From 1980-1987 Denmark was plagued by wage drift 
difficulties. Hourly labour costs in industry remained 
among the highest in the EC throughout much of the 1980s.®® 
These problems persisted not only as a result of the 
international recession and oil shocks, but also because of 
Denmark's antiquated and inflexible labour market structure. 
From 1983 through 1987 labour costs per unit of output 
increased twenty percent faster than they did (on average) 
in other industrialised countries; wages rose faster than 
abroad, and productivity increased more slowly.®® While 
comparisons are often formed among Scandinavian countries as 
a result of supposedly corporatist wage bargaining 
processes, in the 1980s there were significant differences 
between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in their 
relative unit labour costs in manufacturing. (See Figure 
4.11.)
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Figure 4.11
RELATIVE UNIT LABOUR COSTS  
IN MANUFACTURING,
DENMARK, NORWAY, FINLAND AND SW EDEN
(1982=  100)
120
DENMARK
NORWAY
100:
FINLAND
SWEDEN
80
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Source: OECD (1988)
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Guided by the two umbrella or peak labour market 
organisations, the LO and the Confederation of Danish 
Employer's Associations (known as the DA), wages and 
conditions of work were negotiated on both centralised and 
decentralised bases in the 1 9 8 0 s . A s  shown below, the 
system of collective bargaining between the trade unions and 
the employers' confederations changed from year to year from 
1980 to 1987.
In 1980/1981 bargaining was decentralised (the LO and 
the DA left it to the individual unions to negotiate 
all claims, both generally and special, directly with 
their employers);
in 1982/1983 a combination of centralised and 
decentralised bargaining was applied. At first an 
attempt was made at decentralised bargaining, and, when 
this did not prove successful, LO and DA took over 
negotiations ;
in 1984/85 LO decided that collective bargaining should 
be divided into general and special claims .... special 
claims should be negotiated directly between the 
individual unions and their employers' organisations. 
After that the general issues on working hours should 
be negotiated directly between the negotiating 
committees of LO and DA .... negotiations were referred 
to arbitration, yet the mediator's proposal was 
rejected by the DA;
in 1986 .... the individual unions came to a quick 
agreement with their respective employers regarding pay 
increases and a reduction in working hours from 
thirty-nine to thirty-seven hours; and
in 1987 decentralised wage negotiations took place 
between individual trade unions and their employers' 
organisation - wage costs jumped by ten percent.^
While the international recession and domestic
inflation inspired some small states into a course of
dramatic action to forestall further wage increases, in
Denmark the process of interaction between the trade unions
and industry was unsuccessful in easing wage drift
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pressures. In Ireland in 1987 a social partnership between 
trade unions, the State, and industry developed into a 
national programme to suppress wage increases, yet in 
Denmark during the same period wage increases actually 
doubled under a decentralised process of collective 
bargaining.
While wage reduction did occur from 1983 through 1987 
under biannual voluntary agreements initiated primarily by 
the LO, in 1985 negotiations failed. There are three 
interesting points about this particular period of 
negotiations. First, the LO proposed a wage negotiation 
scheme mixed between centralisation and decentralisation, in 
which special claims would be negotiated at the shop level, 
while general claims would be negotiated at the central 
level. Second, because negotiations between the LO and the 
DA failed, binding arbitration ensued. While the Industrial 
Court's decisions were "final and must be respected by both 
parties,the mediator's proposal was rejected by the DA. 
While maintaining an "Obligation of Peace" agreement, in 
1985 major strike action occurred as a result of failed wage 
negotiations.^ While the government intervened in 1985 by 
imposing a legislated two percent wage increase, in 1986, 
much as a result of political pressures to avoid industrial 
disputes and declining support, the State opted against wage 
intervention. In 1987 wages increased ten percent due to 
the reduction of working hours to thirty-seven with full 
compensation. Wage negotiations became decentralised and 
hourly wages increased five percent more than the five
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percent annual average weighted increase.
Moreover, Denmark became plagued by labour unrest; 
according to the World Competitiveness Report, between 1984- 
1987 nearly 132 days were lost per one-thousand inhabitants 
due to industrial disputes ranking Denmark number eighteen 
out of twenty-two OECD countries. Comparably, Switzerland 
lost less than one day per one-thousand inhabitants during 
the same period.^
With bargaining primarily at the shop level, the 
metalworkers, the largest manufacturing sector, had agreed 
in 1985 to no increases in minimum wages for two years; 
however, in 1987 they concluded an agreement that gave 
substantial increases in the minimum wage and a reduction of 
working hours. After the metalworkers had been successful, 
these pay increases fed into other sectors, most notably the 
construction workers and public sector workers. While 
minimum wages had been settled for the metalworkers, normal 
wages dramatically escalated. As one LO official explained, 
"They wanted to catch up to the minimum wage system, so they 
compensated even though they were already getting paid an 
annual five percent increase.Similar to the minimum 
wage scenario, other sectors followed the metalworkers wage 
gains, causing overall wage drift to increase by ten 
percent. From 1986 to 1987, therefore, the background of 
the statutory incomes policy was not accepted by the 
unions - large pay increases ensued. (See Figure 4.12.)
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WAGES (EARNINGS) GROWTH PER YEAR, 
1980-1985 
DENMARK, IRELAND AND SELECTED 
COUNTRIES (%)
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Source: The Economist (1987) The World in Figures : 155,179, 220, 230, 237.
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Furthermore, most Danish scholars have agreed that 
during the 1980s the Danish labour structure was outdated 
because of the segmentation^ of the unions' and employers' 
confederations' organisations, which included numerous small 
organisations. For example, in Denmark trade union 
membership remained high, with the ratio of unionisation 
around 82%. LO membership consisted of nearly 1.5 million 
wage earners, nearly sixty percent of the labour force. 
Within the LO were thirty-two member unions, 140 joint 
organisations, and approximately 1,400 branches. These 
numbers were strikingly large for a small state. 
Consequently, the "antiquated labour market structure became 
an obstacle; clear-cut borders between various local trade 
unions ... became unclear."^® Moreover, the LO and the 
FTF, the second largest union, became, as Tonboe explains, 
increasingly "municipalised". "They [the municipal unions] 
attract and stimulate local activity at the cost of 
centrally coordinated activity....this restructuring weakens 
the unions.. . . "®°
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Danish trade 
unions during the 1980s was the pension schemes, which were 
introduced to stimulate household savings and industrial 
investment, as well as initiating an attempt at subduing 
wage d r i f t . B y  1987 over one-third of the labour market 
was involved in the pension scheme, which reduced the wage 
costs for Danish enterprises much as a result of the Real 
Interest Tax System, in which a tax advantage was granted to 
those individuals who invested in equity capital. As one LO
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official indicated, "This programme helps our enterprises 
become more internationally competitive; the pension funds 
spur investment so that eventually if we want higher wages, 
our enterprises will be able to pay them."®^ Nonetheless, 
while the pension fund scheme became an innovative mechanism 
to spur industrial investment, it was relatively ineffective 
in combatting the wage drift problem.
By the end of the 1980s, however. Prime Minister Foul 
Schluter attempted to form a deal with Danish wage earners; 
by cutting their wages by ten percent, they would be given 
tax reductions. While the offer received a forty-nine 
percent approval rating from Denmark's wage-earners, "The 
very thought of reducing wages [was] galling for the 
unions. "®®
4.3 Combatting Unemolovment and Training the Workforce
A. Sweden
Much, if not all, of the restructuring of industry in 
Sweden during the past twenty-five years can be attributed 
to the combination of centralised wage bargaining and 
labour-intensified, market-oriented policies. This section 
will examine what important trade unionists such as Meidner 
and Rehn developed as corollary programmes for growth and 
full employment to its successful centralised collective 
bargaining system.
Throughout the 1980s Sweden maintained comparatively 
low unemployment rates. (See Figure 4.13.)
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figure 4.13
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(YMrty Avwag*)
Source: Svenska Handelsbsnk. "Sweden in the Wortd Econoiny:' 22;
Svensk Indusirl Och Indueiripom. Industribepartmentol, 1987
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As a result of Swedish society valuing such communitarian 
goals as full employment and social welfare, the trade 
unions along with the State attempted to coordinate labour 
market programmes that would positively influence industry 
while maintaining their own egalitarian goals. In the 1960s 
the relationship between the LG and the government brought 
about compromise plans between neo-classical economists and 
trade unionists through the Rehn Plan, the original 
blueprint for the Solidaristic Wage Policy, which seemed to 
be a powerful vehicle towards forming a stronger industrial 
structure. The notion was to give unions the power to form 
wage agreements and make the State responsible for overall 
economic stability, including programmes to keep Swedish
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society employed.®^ For the most part the Rehn Plan 
achieved its primary goal: it eliminated the defensiveness
of the powerful labour unions, maintained the 
rationalisation necessary for the industrial sector to move 
forward, and kept workers employed.®^
Centred on the notion that the State would act as the 
facilitator in an active labour market policy, the main 
element of the plan was to starve those firms that were 
inefficient by making all firms provide discretionary 
reserve funds, or "wage equalisation pools." The desired 
effect of the model, which was implemented in 1960, was to 
promote only efficient, innovative firms that could survive 
the strict wage guidelines.®®
Throughout the 1980s this Solidaristic Wage Policy was 
combined with a policy of labour mobility and retraining, in 
which the government played an active role in finding, 
transporting, and training labour for work. These manpower 
policies were necessary because the wage equalisation policy 
tended to create unemployment in weak industries; the labour 
mobility and retraining policies helped workers move to 
other industries that were flourishing. In the words of Ira 
Magaziner and Mark Patinkin, Swedish active labour market 
policies were based on the simple strategy of "retraining 
for yesterday's workers."®^ Others such as Peter Swenson 
have argued that government intervention was necessary under 
the Swedish centralised system of wage bargaining to resolve 
the "trilemma" between fair wage differentials, higher 
wages, and full employment.®®
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When the SAP regained power in 1982 and throughout the 
rest of the 1980s, workers who had been laid off had a 
number of options. Mobility grants covered travelling costs 
to prospective employers, and if hired in another region, 
the State paid moving costs plus a separate amount as a pre­
stimulus move. In 1984 this amounted to 15,000 S.Kr.®® The 
retraining programme, run by Labour Market Training Centres, 
maintained a notable participation rate of around four to 
five percent of the labour force per year. In general, 
applicants who were unemployed or ran the risk of being 
unemployed were retrained in growth industries. Employers 
also had two major responsibilities to their employees (or 
prospective employees). In case an employee was to be 
fired, all firms were required to give one month's notice; 
if any major lay-offs occurred at a particular firm, the 
Employment Exchange Office was notified in advance so that 
the office could begin a search process for employment of 
laid-off workers. Firms were also required to give notice 
of job openings.®®
In addition, programmes were developed for disabled, 
young, aged, and female workers. For example, from 1982 
throughout the rest of the 1980s there was a major policy 
shift towards educational measures to help youth employment, 
and the results were noticeable.®^ (See Figure 4.14.)
Through Youth Cooperative Enterprises (YCEs), in which local 
governments and trade unions organised study courses which 
eventually turned into cooperative enterprises, the youth 
labour market became more productive and increasingly
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skilled. This mechanism became an increasingly important 
tool to supplement labour training programmes.®^
Figure 4.14
Unemployment As % of Labour Force of Each Group (A) 
Unemployment As % of Each Group (B)
A B
Year 16 17 18 19 16 17 18 19
80 9.9 9.0 7.6 5.5 3.3 4.3 5.2 4.1
81 11.6 10.1 10.0 7.5 2.9 4.2 6.2 5.6
82 9.1 11.2 11.9 9.6 2.3 4.2 7.4 7.0
83 7.2 8.3 13.1 10.2 1.7 2.9 7.6 7.3
84 4.8 6.5 5.2 3.9 1.1 2.1 3.0 2.6
85 4.0 5.6 5.5 3.5 0.9 1.9 3.1 1.6
Source: Eskil Wadensjo (1987) "The Youth Labour Market in 
Sweden: Changes in the 1980s." Economla and Lavoro: 99.
Moreoyer, the Swedish educational system produced one 
of the most educated populations in the world, which helped 
breed high leyels of worker productiyity. With the State 
spending roughly eight percent of its GDP on education 
throughout the 1980s, compared with America's seyen percent, 
Japan's six and one-half percent, and Britain's fiye 
percent, oyer ninety percent of Swedish students continued 
in school for two years past age sixteen.
Most importantly, with an educational system unlike 
that in Switzerland, which featured an apprenticeship 
approach, Swedish students spent more time in the classroom 
than most of their European counterparts and then afterwards 
spent two years at the yocational gymnasium. With such 
training, particularly in engineering, it is not surprising 
that Sweden's most internationally competitiye firms, such
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as Àsea-Brown Boveri, Alfa-Laval, Ericsson, Saab-Scania, and 
Volvo, have been in the high tech, engineering fields.
The interactive process between the trade unions and 
the government was fundamental in Sweden's active labour 
market policy. This policy was mainly administered by the 
Swedish Labour Market Board (LMB), whose role throughout the 
1980s was to move unemployed workers to places where jobs 
remained available, create jobs, and retrain and 
rehabilitate unemployed workers. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, after 1982 when the State ended subsidisation 
to particular declining industries, most notably 
shipbuilding, the LMB helped these depressed regions attract 
new industries by offering training incentives.
Of central importance is the fact that the active 
labour market policy acted as a complement to the 
Solidaristic Wage Policy by 1) moving workers from 
enterprises expelled from the market because they were 
unable to remain competitive by not being able to pay the 
solidaristic wages and 2) retraining workers to those areas 
where they could be gainfully employed. Moreover, the 
Swedish State provided an educational system that 
comprehensively trained young people, particularly in the 
sciences, a necessity for Swedish industry to remain 
internationally competitive in the future. In essence, the 
government in the 1980s helped to provide incentives for 
people to work, as opposed to simply paying cash to the 
unemployed, such as was the case in both Denmark and 
Ireland.^ Hence, centralised wage negotiations were
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reenforced as a result of labour mobility and retraining.®^
B. Switzerland
As was discussed in Chapter Two, in Switzerland during 
the 1980s there were relatively few welfare state benefits; 
the State had an extremely limited unemployment insurance 
programme and restricted labour mobility programmes. With 
few State labour market policies, much as a result of a 
relatively small tax revenue base from which to establish 
them, and a nationally pervasive strict working ethic, the 
onus was placed on the individual to find work and on the 
firm to train workers.
Throughout the 1980s the Ministry of Economic Policy 
facilitated meetings between industry and research 
organisations to deliberate over projects for further 
training courses that would be managed and run by the 
employers* associations. Such plans called for the 
government to cover the costs of the training and for firms 
to cover the loss of income during the training period - in 
essence, the private sector would internalise the benefits 
of these further training costs.®^
Training (or "impulse*') programmes attempted to improve 
the knowledge of skilled employees and to "increase the 
diffusion of new knowledge," yet such programmes were 
relatively underdeveloped and a low priority of the State. 
With courses generally lasting from one day to one month, 
covering such subjects as software engineering and energy 
saving, the amount spent on these programmes declined from
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sixteen million S.Fr. in 1980 to 8.2 million S.Fr. in 
1984.®® In addition, the government sponsored retraining 
courses of other orientations, such as language skills 
classes. Geographic mobility aid, primarily in the form of 
grants, was also extended to a select number of persons who 
were retrained and moved to other parts of Switzerland, 
though the programme was not nearly as extensive as that in 
Sweden.
Aside from Zurich with its 354,000 inhabitants, during 
the 1980s most of the population lived in villages and 
towns, where the social distance was minimal and the Ruf, or 
reputation, of a family in the community was extremely 
important. "If a child should begin to falter in such 
preparation [vocational training] for adult self- 
sufficiency, it is the concern of the whole community, not 
just school personnel."®® The compulsory military service 
also played an important role in steering youth "the right 
way - ready and willing to work, rising early and working 
late." Every male was required to attend basic training for 
four months followed by an annual service, and employers 
were required to fund the wages of employees while they were 
on military duty "and usually glad to do so because military 
contacts are often helpful and 'good for business.'"®®
Throughout the 1980s around eighty percent of young 
people attended the Vocational Training System, which was 
comprised of a two- to four-year apprenticeship with post 
graduate developing facilities in most professions. 
Vocational training incorporated "on the job" training.
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consisting of three-and-a-half days per week of professional 
instruction with one-and-a-half days of theoretical 
schooling in order to gain a formation professionelle.^^^ 
Training began at age fifteen and lasted for four years, 
which helps to explain why Switzerland maintained an 
unparalleled low level of youth unemployment. This form of 
occasional training allowed firms to internalise the costs 
during the four years of instruction, moulding young 
employees, and facilitating integration to the firm.^ °^  The 
hazard was training young minds without allowing them to 
broaden their horizons.
In Swiss business there was a clear priority to 
practice and experience during the 1980s; young people were 
required to prove they could manage day-to-day problems 
before they were awared broader responsibilities. As a 
result of this business priority, only twenty percent of 
youths went to high schools and universities. In 1987 forty 
percent of industry felt they had a problem of lack of 
qualified workers, while seventy-five percent of the banking 
and insurance sectors expressed similar sentiments.In 
general, while the student quota was well below the OECD 
average, vocational training in Switzerland (with a ninety- 
seven percent success rate for males, ninety-one percent for 
females) was well above the OECD average.
Maintaining a workforce capable of handling the demands 
of the high-tech orientation of Swiss industry was primarily 
controlled through the immigration of foreign engineers and 
scientists. Around one-quarter of the working population in
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Switzerland was foreign throughout most of the 1980s, and in
general, immigration policies were geared to fill gaps
between long-term labour market demand and supply. Those
undesirable tasks that immigrants handled became less a part
of the work composition of foreign labour, mainly because of
their rising qualifications. From the beginning of the 1980s
through 1986, foreigners as entrepreneurs, scientists, and
inventors comprised nearly two-thirds of the yearly federal
quota for new annual permits.^*
Nonetheless, throughout the 1970s and 1980s foreign
workers in Switzerland were tightly regulated, mainly
because of their numbers - one million foreign people lived
in Switzerland, or around one-sixth of the population.
Permits, either on a frontier or seasonal basis, were
granted by the Ministry for Industry and Work, yet they were
not granted without significant speculation in regard to
their effect on the "equilibrium of the labour market.
As Segalman alleges,
...the Swiss policy on immigrants operates almost as if 
it were controlled by a calibrated spigot which is 
opened only when labour shortages exist and is quickly 
shut when Swiss natives begin to draw excessively on 
unemployment compensation.
Consequently, during periods of recession Switzerland
exported its unemployment, while in times of recovery and
economic growth, workers were allowed entry into the
c o u n t r y . ( See Figure 4.15.)
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Figure 4.15 
Changes in the Swiss Labour Force
1974-76 Recession 1976-81 Recovery 1981-83 Recession
%000' s % 000 * s % OOO's
Change
In:
Employment -330 -10.7 + 125 +4 . 0 -65 -2.1
Labour Supply 
Swiss -60 -1.9 +5 +0.2 -20 -0.7
Foreign -245 -7.9 + 100 + 3.2 -20 -0.7
Unemployment +25 +0.8 -20 — 0.6 +25 + 0.8
*As of total labour force.
Source: R. Lewin (1983) "Niveau und Struktur der
Arbeitslosigkeit in der Schweiz 1979-1983." Monnaie et 
Conjoncture, Bulletin Trimestriel No. 5, Banque Nationale 
Suisse from Danthine and Lambelet (1987) "The Swiss Recipe." 
Economie Policy: 163.
With only around one-sixth of the working population 
being covered by unemployment insurance,and despite 
significant labour market policies, Switzerland avoided 
significant unemployment problems. With favourable economic 
conditions during most of the 1980s, Switzerland's 
Vocational Training System, as well as immigration policies, 
added to its effective decentralised collective bargaining 
system.
C. Ireland
With unemployment in the 1980s consistently hovering 
around fifteen to twenty percent, and with forty-five 
percent of those unemployed between 1980 and 1987 remaining 
unemployed for over a year,^ °® Ireland was faced with severe
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problems as to how to create employment. With the 
international recession affecting the Irish economy in the 
beginning of the decade, along with a giant national debt, 
the government imposed stringent measures against increasing 
public spending, opting against developing significant job 
creation programmes.
After 1981 when negotiations between the ICTU and the 
FUE became decentralised and when the ICTU no longer had 
centralised authority, the Dail decided to cut spending on 
already limited job creation programmes to help diminish a 
significant budget deficit even in the face of twenty 
percent unemployment. While the ICTU lobbied for job 
creation programmes, the results were ineffective. In one 
report, the ICTU exclaimed, "Trade unions insist that the 
causes of unemployment are political, that the responses, or 
lack of them, are also political and that governments are 
not powerless to deal with the c r i s i s . T h e  result was 
deteriorating relations with its main political ally, the 
Labour Party.
Without a sufficient degree of central coordination by 
the government in forming manpower policies, two respected 
economists, Dennis Conniffe and Kieran Kennedy, writing on 
Ireland's employment policy (or lack thereof) indicated 
that, "A reasonable degree of harmony is difficult to 
maintain in the absence of a coherent overall set of 
policies providing the framework within which the various 
agencies can work. With the Department of Labour playing 
virtually no role at all in the formulation of job creation
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programmes, three agencies (ANCO, the National Training
Authority; the National Manpower Service; and the Youth
Employment Agency) provided a total of seventeen different
programmes in training and employment schemes, most of them
only short-term solutions to difficult long-term structural
unemployment problems.Understanding the need to
rationalise with overlapping programmes, Conniffe and
Kennedy asserted that, ^
There is an urgent need for central coordination of all 
the agencies operating in the [manpower] sphere 
because, currently, responsibility is fragmented, 
accountability is difficult to enforce, inter-agency 
friction occurs and agencies are left to form policy 
which is properly the prerogative of Government 
ministers and their departments.^^
Similar in nature to the unemployment insurance
programme offered in Denmark, unemployed individuals could
remain unemployed and receive insurance benefits for up to
156 days (15 months).With virtually an open-ended
unemployment insurance scheme, the Irish State provided few
incentives for those unemployed to seek jobs. Under the
unemployment assistance programme, 5.6% of Ireland's GDP in
1987 was spent on this programme and the decentralised
manpower programmes, the highest in the OECD.
Furthermore, in the 1980s emigration, considered a
major cause for economic decline in Ireland, rose to levels
not seen since the 1950s. (See Figure 4.16.Ï While
emigration helped to offset some of the unemployment
problems in the country, much of the reason that emigration
occurred at such a substantial rate was obviously because of
better job prospects abroad.
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Figure 4.16 
Migration Statistics. Ireland 1980-1987
Year Mid-April Population Estimated Net Migration in
Estimate the year to mid-April
_____ ________ (OOP)_______   f- = Outflow. 000s)
1980 3,401 -8
1981 3,443 2
1982 3,480 -1
1983 3,504 -14
1984 3,529 -9
1985 3,540 -20
1986 3,541 -28
1987 3,543 -27
Source; Central Statistics Office (1989)
In terms of youthful human capital, the results were 
impressive: between 1985 and 1986, 33% of university
engineering graduates emigrated; in electronic engineering, 
40% emigrated; and in computer science, 2 6% emigrated. 
Persons with third level qualifications who gained 
employment in Ireland fell from 84% in 1980 to 64% in 1986; 
in 1985 and 1986, 14.5% and 17.1% of these persons emigrated 
to find work.
Consequently, while in earlier periods such as the 
1950s, the majority of the emigrants were from 
underdeveloped areas with limited educational opportunities, 
in the 1980s the group contained "an inordinately high 
proportion of qualified workers. According to The World 
Competitiveness Report, Ireland ranked first out of twenty- 
two OECD countries in terms of "the extent to which 
institutions adequately prepared executives for the needs of 
the business" (categorised in the report as "education and
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training"). It also ranked first in both quantity and 
quality of available skilled labour. However, Ireland ranked 
last among those same countries in terms of "the extent to 
which a 'brain drain* of well-educated people occurs due to 
better job opportunities abroad.
Therefore, both the Fine Gael and the Fianna Fail 
(coalition) governments of the 1980s attempted to combat 
unemployment by reinvigorating the economy, specifically 
through economic programmes that included major tax 
incentives; however, job creation programmes as necessary 
concomitants to these programmes lacked departmental 
centralisation, remained unreliable, and in need of extreme 
rationalisation. The unemployment insurance programme 
provided few reemployment benefits and remained a drain on 
the fiscal budget. At the same time, perhaps Ireland's 
greatest asset, its well-educated and youthful population, 
emigrated.
D. Denmark
From 1980-1987 Denmark was not only plagued by wage 
drift problems, but also unemployment difficulties. 
Unemployment as a percentage of the working population in 
Denmark between 1980 and 1984 averaged 9.2%.^ °^ This problem 
persisted not only as a result of the international 
recession and oil shocks, but also because of its antiquated 
and inflexible labour market structure along with the 
limited presence of labour market policies.
According to most economists, the unemployment problem
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in Denmark affected those on long-term assistance, social 
assistance clients, and early retired workers; these three 
groups grew from 9.9% of the Danish population in 1972-1973 
to 21.1% in 1982.^ ^^  The largest group of those who remained 
unemployed were the unskilled workers, a situation primarily 
caused by the Danish unemployment insurance scheme. The 
inequality of the unemployment burden was evidenced by those 
insured being the highest number of unemployed workers in 
Denmark. Denmark ranked amongst the worst in the OECD for 
having a significant proportion of the workforce being 
unemployed for over an extended period of t i m e . ( See 
Figure 4.17.) Moreover, Danish legislation with respect to 
job security was among the most liberal in Europe, providing 
little employment protection against individual and 
collective dismissals.
Risk of
Figure 4.17 
Unemolovment in the Danish Workforce . 1987
A B Ç D
Unskilled,
Insured 54.0 33.6 18.9 657,269
Clericals 27.5 36.6 10.1 290,764
Construction 48.5 16.6 8.1 91,358
Metalworkers 36.3 20.1 7.3 111,244
Rest 18.0 33.3 6.0 1.322.365
Total* 28.6 30.7 8.8 2,473,000
♦Average in A, B, C; added total in D
A = Risk of being unemployed after one year 
B = Average share of year unemployed per unemployed worker 
C = Aggregate unemployment ratio 
D = Total unemployed
Source: Det Okonomiske Rad (1988) Dansk Okonomi. (June):
86.
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Throughout the 1980s the basic system of unemployment 
insurance offered unemployed unskilled workers (at a 
minimum) ninety percent of their previous wage, fifty 
percent for skilled workers. No matter the level of skill, 
the worker could receive these benefits for thirty months 
(two-and-a-half years). As a consequence there was little 
incentive for unskilled workers to accept a job at a lower 
wage, and even the benefits for the skilled worker were more 
generous than most other European unemployment programmes.^*
Furthermore, not only were retraining programmes scarce 
in Denmark, but there were also only a limited number of 
mobility programmes. With a limited regional problem 
primarily in the south of Zealand, the Danish State did 
almost nothing in terms of labour mobility. Only a few very 
specific mobility programmes were offered to revitalise 
problem areas in the country.
Although by the 1950s the Danish State had discovered 
that labour mobility remained a problem, there was greater 
focus in terms of improvement of coordination of wages and 
socio-economic necessities than actual State incentives to 
change locations to gain w o r k . W h i l e  in the 1970s and 
1980s negotiations did take place to reorganise labour 
market mobility and training, the State, remaining in a 
deficit through much of the 1980s, opted against direct 
mobility programmes such as grants. Instead, State money 
was pumped into the generous unemployment insurance scheme.
Much of the reason for the failure of the Danish State 
to initiate labour market programmes was due to ineffective.
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fragmented consultation between governmental bureaucracies.
From the 1970s through the 1980s, the Ministry of Labour
handled the retraining of skilled workers, while the
Ministry of Education handled the training of unskilled
workers. Yet the Minister for Labour in the 1980s was a
conservative, while the education minister was a Social
Democrat. Neither could agree on a suitable integration of
these federations, and a stalemate ensued. While the LO and
the DA could reasonably accept any policies, the
institutionalisation stalemated the retraining process. As
Nielsen and Pedersen maintained in an interview.
We are not saying this is an inflexible system. There 
are long-standing traditions for negotiation, yet the 
problem is how do you use the flexibility of the system 
to break up the allocational inflexibilities. That is 
the contradiction.^^
Consequently, while unemployment remained a problem, 
the Danish provident state granted generous unemployment 
insurance programmes with few incentives to work. At the 
same time few retraining and mobility programmes, such as 
those found in Denmark's neighbouring state Sweden, were 
generated to create employment opportunities.
4.4 Comparing Labour Market Svstems: Swedish and Swiss
Success and the Need for Change in Ireland and Denmark
With continual bargaining among labour, the State, and 
industry, Swedish trade unionists, policy-makers, and 
industrialists formed an innovative system in the 1980s 
whereby those unable to work were cared for by the State 
while those who were able to contribute in the workforce
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were mobilised, thus reducing and equalising the costs of a
welfare state.
Swedish active labour market policy has been based on
the principle that training and education provide an
incentive for able-bodied workers. At the same time, the
State must provide social welfare benefits for those who
cannot work. As Gosta Rehn explains.
The offer of economic incentives is designed to 
stimulate those who are willing and able to undertake 
adjustments in the labour market voluntarily instead of 
laying most of the burden of adjustment on the weaker 
groups, making 'social cases' of those who are most 
vulnerable to unemployment and least adaptable for new 
jobs___
In Sweden during the 1980s there remained an effective 
social compact between labour and industry; relations 
between the two could be characterised as cooperative 
bilateral. Wage growth was restrained enough for firms to 
remain competitive, yet high enough to motivate workers and 
to avert significant labour disruption. While wage levels 
were relatively high, workers remained extremely productive. 
As a consequence, real unit labour costs in Sweden during 
the 1980s were relatively lower than most, if not all, of 
its competitors. In addition, as a result of the 
Solidaristic Wage Policy, firms unable to pay the bargained 
wages were forced out of the marketplace. Indeed, this "pay 
up or get out system" is precisely why in the 1980s Sweden 
maintained a relatively oligopolistic structure of 
multinationals, with twenty of the largest companies forming 
the backbone of the Swedish industrial base and providing 
over half of all employment in Sweden. (See Figure 4.18.)
Figure 4.18
THE ROLE OF LABOUR IN SWEDEN, 1982 - 1987: 
TRADE UNION - INDUSTRY RELATIONS 
AND SUPPORTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
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The influence of Sweden's trade unions and the process 
of The interaction between the LO, the SAF, and the State 
was the primary vehicle for Sweden's industrial success; as 
illustrated through this process explained in this chapter, 
labour was the principal actor in Sweden's attempt at 
remaining internationally competitive in the 1980s.
In the 1980s negotiations between labour and industry 
in Switzerland, unlike Sweden, were decentralised. Wage 
issues were settled through local collective agreements or 
between each firm and its work council. This decentralised 
structure allowed for relative wage flexibility between 
sectors of the economy and integrated the interests of both 
labour and industry. As a result, relations between trade 
unions and industry could be characterised as cooperative 
bilateral. The Peace of Work agreement fosted labour 
cooperation, and when the odd industrial dispute did arise, 
it was resolved quickly through a binding arbitration 
mechanism. With few State programmes, much as a result of a 
relatively small tax revenue base from which to establish 
and a nationally pervasive strict working ethic, the onus 
was placed on the individual to find work and the firm to 
train the workers; however, the Swiss education system 
placed significant emphasis on apprenticeship training. In 
order to overcome a shortage of highly skilled workers 
during favourable economic periods, immigration policies 
attempted to attract highly skilled workers. However, 
during less favourable economic periods, strict immigration 
policies precluded an influx of less skilled workers.
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Hence, Switzerland exported its unemployment during periods 
of recession, while in times of recovery and economic 
growth, workers were allowed entry into the country.
Under the Programme for National Recovery, Ireland was 
able to halt the growth of wage costs experienced under 
detached bilateral relations between trade unions and 
employers. At the same time the State began to undertake 
policies to reduce the national debt and unemployment.
Unlike the Danish case, the Irish case (from 1987) provides 
a striking example of a small state struggling to tackle its 
problems, taking advantage of its size for negotiation and 
bargaining. Particular economic actors - the central trade 
union, the central employers' confederation, and the 
government - worked together in a monocephalic environment 
as so-called "social partners" to induce necessary changes. 
While the national consensus achieved in Ireland might not 
have taken place without the long, erratic period of the 
1970s and early to mid-1980s, and although enormous labour 
problems persisted thereafter, the Programme did provide the 
necessary steps to suppress wage growth, a significant 
accomplishment for a state that was burdened with high wage 
costs and excessive unemployment throughout most of the 
1980s.
As scholars such as Lars Calmfors and Newell and Symons 
have illustrated in their works, the most efficient forms of 
collective bargaining occur under very high levels of 
centralisation, such as the Swedish case, or under very low 
levels of centralisation, such as the Swiss case. However,
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between the two extremes during the 1980s was the Danish 
case; according to one Danish economist, over one-half of 
wage increases in the 1980s were due to the inefficient, 
mixed labour market structur. Hence, during the 1980s 
relations between trade unions and industry in Denmark could 
be characterised as detached bilateral.There is also 
evidence that this relatively inefficient means of wage 
bargaining will produce further wage drift and possible 
strikes into the 1990s.
In relating this chapter back to the original thesis, 
interaction between labour and industry varied during the 
1980s among small European states. In the two cases of 
Sweden and Switzerland, positive interaction augmented the 
state's international competitiveness. Moreover, labour 
market interventionism, particularly in Sweden with its 
labour market policies and in Switzerland with its 
immigration policies, acted as active State policy 
concomitants to their impressive wage bargaining systems.
In cases where active labour market policies were not 
implemented in the face of declining international 
competitiveness in the small European state, such as in 
Denmark and Ireland, the state faced significant wage drift, 
high levels of unemployment, high levels of labour unrest, 
and (in the case of Ireland) significant emigration of its 
trained youthful population. Only by the end of the 1980s 
had policy-makers in Ireland mapped a course of action, and 
in Denmark little was done at all during the decade to 
resolve its major labour market problems. Consequently,
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during the 1980s not all small European states were able to 
take advantage of their monocephalic communication 
advantage, and in cases where labour-industry interaction 
was successful, State interventionism was employed through 
complementary labour market policies.
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Chapter Five
State-Industry Relations and Industrial Policy-Making
5.1 The Relationship Between the State and Industry: The
Formation of Industrial Policies
This chapter will examine industrial policies, which 
are developed and implemented through State-industry 
interaction and intended to change the composition and/or 
location of industrial output.^ Students of industrial 
policy have primarily examined large states such as France 
and Japan, where the use of credit mechanisms, targeting, 
public procurement, and research and development policy have 
been "aimed directly to affect the structure of industry"^ 
and the decisions of enterprises. Yet as Katzenstein 
explains, "In all industrial states, be they small or large, 
one can find a substantial array of policies seeking to 
modify market conditions through such instruments as 
subsidies, tax policies, regional development, 
concentration, and national development."^
Because forms of State intervention differed throughout 
the 1980s among small European states depending upon their 
economic development, economic performance, and changes in 
political circumstances (to name but three factors), 
industrial policy weapons varied both in name and form from 
state to state. As was identified in the first chapter, 
nearly all macroeconomic and microeconomic policies 
explicitly or implicitly influenced the structure of 
industry in the small European state.* In the two previous
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chapters it was illustrated that labour market policies and 
monetary policies were necessary forms of State intervention 
to act in concert with labour-industry and financial 
institution-industry relations. This chapter will be 
concerned with various measures by the State to influence 
the investment decisions of enterprises in the 1980s, 
covering "not only the creation, expansion, and re-equipment 
of production capacity, but decisions about research and 
development facilities and product development."^ 
Consequently, significant attention will be directed not 
only to such standard analyses of industrial policy as 
nationalisation of industry and direct sectoral 
subsidisation, but also such policy avenues as production 
subsidies, mainly in the form of R & D capital transfers.
Throughout the decade one of the most meaningful ways in 
which small state industries could remain competitive in 
world markets, despite being highly vulnerable international 
price takers, was through technological sophistication.® As 
a consequence of actor proximity in the small European 
state, national "systems of innovation"^ involving 
interaction between key actors (such as the State, research 
institutions, and industry) could produce a competitive 
advantage. Yet during the 1980s, while the small European 
state had the advantage of actor proximity in developing 
this interaction, varying degrees of technological 
innovation influenced the industrial success of these states 
as a result of "idiosyncratic technological capabilities."® 
Much of the reason for these differences in the level of
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technological competitiveness depended upon the role of the 
State in supporting R & D projects and the state's 
industrial structure.®
Both Sweden and Switzerland maintained high levels of 
technological sophistication, while Ireland was 
significantly less successful in promoting research and 
development. In Denmark, policy-makers recognised their 
industries' technological deficiencies and developed 
policies to modernise their industrial structure. According 
to the World Competitiveness Report, in 1986 Sweden and 
Switzerland ranked first and second, respectively, among 
twenty-two OECD countries in terms of total expenditure on 
R & D as a percentage of GDP, while Denmark and Ireland 
ranked sixteenth and eighteenth.^®
While it is nearly impossible to provide an exhaustive 
listing of industrial policy measures, this chapter will 
target the most meaningful industrial policy instruments 
according to how each of the four small European states 
introduced and developed state-specific industrial policies. 
Analysis of industrial policy-making in these states is 
grouped into two categories:
1) defensive measures, notably direct sectoral 
subsidisation and nationalisation of industry; and
2) policies that attempted to stimulate the state's 
industrial competitiveness through R & D measures, 
regional development, credit provisions, taxation 
incentives, export promotion, and FDI promotion.
The key points of discussion within this chapter are
summarised in the chart on the following page. (See Figure
5.1.)
Figure 5.1
STATE - INDUSTRY RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE CASE STUDIES COMPARED
DENMARK IRELAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
Degree that indigenous industry 
remained nationalized during the 1980s
Almost none A large number of enterprises A few enterprises Almost none
Direct defensive sectoral subsidation in 
the 1980s
Extensive subsidies almost 
exclusively to the shipbuilding 
Industry
Some, primarily to nationalised 
enterprises
Extensive shipbuilding subsidies 
prior to 1982; thereafter no 
subsidies to shipbuilding and limited 
use to other sectors
Negligible
Level of research and development 
funding (for industrial deveiopment) in 
the 1980s
Low until mid-1980s, then moderate Low Very high Very high
Research and development funding 
orientation
Derived primarily from the public 
sector
Derived primarily from foreign 
subsidiaries, though relatively 
unsuccessfully
Derived from both the public and 
private sectors
Derived primarily from the private 
sector
Attitude towards inward foreign direct 
investment in the 1980s
Not actively sought or prevented Actively sought Actively prevented Actively prevented
Overall industrial policy focus during 
the 1980s
"Persistently liberal" approach until 
mid-1980s, then focus on 
technology policy
Focus on attracting foreign MNCs 
Into Ireland to boost employment 
and induce technology transfer
Focus on R & D and other 
measures to stimulate growth/ 
renewal
Some limited measures, such as 
export promotion and export credit 
guarantees
Power of ministry (or other authority) 
dealing with industriai policy matters (in 
comparison to other state ministries)
Minimal until mid-1980s, somewfiat 
stronger thereafter (Ministry of 
Industry)
Very strong (Department of Industry 
and Commerce, IDA)
Moderate (Ministry of Industry) No such authority In Switzerland
Nature of relationship between the 
state's industrial policy authority and 
industry
State's role was minimal before 
mid-1980s, thereafter close ties to 
foster Industrial modernisation; 
Increasingly dose relationship
State actively pursues projects for 
industrial development; very close 
relationship
State acts to support environment 
necessary for large MNCs to 
prosper; moderately dose 
relationship
State's role Is minimal In Industrial 
development; distant relationship
Cooperative or detached state-industry 
relations
Detached before mid-1980s, then 
relatively cooperative
Cooperative Cooperative Relatively detached
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5.2 Industrial Policy-making in the Four Small European 
States: From the 1970s to the 1980s
During the 1980s the role of the State in developing 
industrial policies depended to a significant degree upon 
both national priorities (e.g., economic performance and 
level of economic development) and societal values (e.g., 
attitudes towards the role of the State) in the small 
European s t a t e . A s  a consequence, among the four case 
studies particular industrial policies were developed and 
implemented to varying degrees, policies that directly 
influenced the composition and location of industrial 
output.
Because of its relatively poor infrastructure and semi­
peripheral location, the Irish economy developed slowly in 
comparison to the three other case studies. Because of 
these two factors coupled with its relatively modern 
formation^ (and hence "late industrialisation"^^) and the 
lack of defence initiatives that would spur strategic 
sectors^\ Ireland became a state with an extremely weak 
indigenous industrial structure. For the most part the 
State had historically taken an actively interventionist 
role through subsidisation of its large State commercial 
enterprise sector and initiatives to attract inward FDI.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, because unemployment 
remained endemically high, the State attempted to use direct 
industrial policy measures as a means of spurring 
employment. Membership in the EC adversely affected a number 
of Irish companies because of increased competition, and
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this had obvious detrimental effects on employment in 
Ireland. Consequently, the State imposed measures to induce 
foreign-owned companies to locate their factories and plants 
on Irish soil. The hopeful expectation was that technology 
from these foreign sources would spin off to Irish 
indigenous industry, yet with the international recession 
ushering in the 1980s, and unemployment surpassing twenty 
percent, employment (not value-added) was the sole criterion 
for industrial policy success. On both measures, however, 
during the first half of the 1980s the State was relatively 
unsuccessful. Different from countries with large 
industrial sectors involved in such sunset industries as 
steel and shipbuilding, Ireland's problem was even more 
fundamental - it had yet to cultivate an industrial 
structure that was not dependent on highly mobile foreign 
industry, and its major export sector, agriculture, was 
dependent on EC and Irish State subsidisation.
By the mid-1980s, the State's industrial policy 
champion, the Industrial Development Authority of Ireland 
(IDA), initiated further steps to induce foreign-owned MNCs 
to locate in Ireland. Yet having learned from many of its 
failures from the past, it attempted to augment the state's 
indigenous industrial structure, which became the principal 
industrial policy focus. While certainly the revamped 
industrial policy was "an organic evolution from its 
predecessors,"^^ the emphasis away from employment creation 
to industrial value-added (i.e., wealth) creation was a 
positive step towards the restructuring of the Irish
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indigenous industrial structure.
In Denmark, despite a number of international economic
pressures, from the 1970s through the 1980s the lines
between social and economic policy remained clearly
delineated. The State attempted to tackle its cross-current
demands, ranging from its giant welfare state commitment to
maintaining a high standard of living (evidenced by the
borrowing for personal consumption). As inflation,
unemployment, a current account deficit, and foreign debt
sapped the economic vitality of the Danish economy into the
1980s, the Danish State had relatively few ideas as to how
to increase productivity. Policy-makers were unclear as to
what role the state should play in terms of industrial
development, though they were certain that "some action
needed to be taken.
More out of practice than reason, Denmark chose its
"persistently liberalpath of limited intervention
without attempting to respond flexibly to changing external
conditions. As Niels Chr. Sidenius contended (in 1983),
Ever since the beginning of industrial policy in 
Denmark in the 1920s, the policy-making process has 
been characterised more by consensus than conflict, 
more by continuity than by ruptures .... the result of 
this has been an emerging and persisting dominance of a 
1 iberalistic paradigm.
By the beginning of the 1980s and under extreme economic
pressures, Danish fiscal policy remained clearly oriented
towards the demand side, while the supply side was
neglected. With the increasing vulnerability of its
economy, Denmark's international competitiveness waned.
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Yet, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the State 
initiated steps to "modernise” ®^ its industrial structure 
through revamped industrial policy objectives, primarily by 
introducing a programme designed to augment its relatively 
weak and technologically deficient industrial structure.
Due to these adverse domestic economic conditions, by the 
mid-1980s "direct interplay," notably between the Federation 
of Danish Industries {Industrirardet), the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry of Industry, "changed the aims and 
the instruments of Danish industrial policy."^
In Sweden, welfare and egalitarianism remained central 
precepts to the Swedish model of communitarianism. 
Nevertheless, policy-makers, industrialists, trade 
unionists, and scholars in the state agreed that the most 
effective way to promote industrial progress was through the 
free market. Sweden typified the mixed economy, where the 
State provided significant egalitarian social benefits while 
maintaining a relatively non-interventionist outlook for 
industry.^
However, the bourgeois interregnum (1976-1982), when
the centre parties governed Sweden, was marked by a massive
bail-out policy in a situation that can only be described as
paradoxical given the liberal record of the bourgeois
centre-right parties. States Heclo and Madsen,
...the new bourgeois coalition government elected in 
1976 maintained the overall design of its predecessor's 
economic policy. While awaiting the recovery in the 
international business cycle, the non-socialist 
coalition accelerated industrial subsidies, other 
government spending, and deficits.^'
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From 1976 to 1982, the Swedish State helped its 
indigenous industry "weather the storm" until there was a 
suitable international economic climate.While 
subsidisation measures exacerbated wage and budget deficit 
problems, the new Swedish SAP government of 1982 would be 
operating on a relatively clean slate. Sunset industries 
would no longer be the backbone of Sweden's industrial base 
and measures to "renew"^ '' its industrial structure through 
such measures as R & D policies became Sweden's primary 
industrial policy objective.
The combination of high levels of economic development 
and societal disdain for direct governmental intervention 
curtailed the role of industrial policy-making in 
Switzerland. Throughout the 1980s Swiss industrial success 
was achieved through a highly progressive interactive 
process in which the State's role remained subordinate to 
that of industry and financial institutions. Even with the 
international economic pressures of the 1970s and 1980s, the 
State almost never forged industrial policies (with the one 
major exception of the watch industry bailout in the 1970s) 
mainly because it lacked control over investment capital, 
which is essential to meaningful State intervention.
Consequently, by the mid-1980s under positive economic 
conditions State policies had little direct impact on firm 
strategies; industrial rebuilding as a result of economic 
crisis in Switzerland was accomplished through private 
enterprise, not the State.“ Switzerland's industrial 
policy was relatively modest, with some regional policies,
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export credits, and export promotion policies. According to 
The World Competitiveness Report, Switzerland ranked first 
among twenty-two OECD countries in terms of the lack of 
involvement by the State in influencing industry.^®
5.3 Defensive Sectoral Subsidisation and Nationalisation
A. Ireland
Certainly the state with the largest public enterprise 
sector of the four case studies during the 1980s was 
Ireland. Illustrative of this is the fact that six of the 
top ten employers in 1985 were State-sponsored public 
enterprises that were not part of the civil service yet 
belonged to the public sector of the economy. (See Figure
5.2.) James D. O'Donnell defines them as "permanent, 
autonomous, public bodies whose staff is not drawn from the 
civil service, but to whose board or council the government 
or ministers in the government appoint directors or council 
members.
The commercial semi-State sector consisted of numerous 
companies involved in energy (ESB, Bord na Mona, Bord Gais, 
INPC), industry (NET, Irish Steel, Ceimici, Siucre Eireann), 
transport (Aer Lingus, Aer Rianta, B + I, CIE), banking and 
insurance (Industrial Credit, Agricultural Credit, Irish 
Life), communications {Bord Telecom, An Post, RTE), and 
other miscellaneous enterprises (National Stud, Arramara, 
OIE). For the most part, these enterprises within the State 
commercial sector remained a vital source of employment in a
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country whose unemployment remained around twenty percent. 
The total number of employees in public enterprises in 1986 
was nearly eighty thousand, and total turnover was 3,925 
million Ir.Pd..^®
Figure 5.2 
Top Ten Employers in Ireland. 1985 
(By Numbers Employed)
Company Numbers Employed
Telecom Eireann* 17,260
CIE* 15,000
ESB* 12,454
Smurfit Group 12,000
An Post* 8,871
Roadstone 6,935
Waterford Glass 6,407
Aer Lingus* 5,900
Bord na Mona* 5,850
Guinness Irl. 4,700
*Public enterprise
Source: ICTU (1986) Public Enterprise: Everybody's
Business: 7.
A survey of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce's 
budget between 1983 and 1987, excluding capital expenditure 
on the promotion of industrial development for the IDA, the 
Shannon Free Airport Development Co., the National 
Development Corp., and Udaras na Gaeltachta, shows around 
forty percent of the Ministry's budget was for the provision 
of assistance to its semi-State enterprises. Yet this 
figure discounts the particular sectoral aid which State 
agencies like the IDA provided to State commercial 
enterprises.^
Nonetheless, the performance of these State enterprises
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was relatively poor, not only because many enterprises' 
operations were in relatively declining industries, but also 
because of poor management. The trading results and 
financial positions of the State enterprise sector 
illustrate the sector's relatively poor performance: in
1987 industrial bodies in the commercial semi-State sector 
posted a seven percent net loss as a percentage of sales 
with net liabilities at twenty-eight million Ir.Pd.^° 
Examples of floundering State enterprises included Siucre 
Eireann, one of Ireland's fifty largest enterprises, which 
was forced to close its troubled Thurles Plant, ultimately 
threatening the company's solvency. Ireland's semi-State 
airline, Aer Lingus, and the airport authority, Aer Rianta, 
were plagued by poor management and competitive conditions 
within the European market that resulted in poor company 
performance.
The capital support for these industries was provided 
directly by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, yet the 
IDA and Foir Teoranta were primarily responsible for the 
"industrial rescue"^^ of these as well as private 
enterprises. Throughout the 1980s the IDA and Foir Teoranta 
provided between eighty-five and ninety-two percent of their 
grants for building and other fixed assets directly to 
industries, while marketing and R & D project grants were 
less than ten percent combined.Indeed, the IDA was the 
primary organisation involved in providing direct sectoral 
and enterprise subsidisation. (See Figure 5.3.)
Most important, significant subsidisation was provided
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for Ireland's vital agricultural sector, both by the State 
and by the EC under the CAP. Between 1980 and 1987, an 
average of eighty-four million Ir.Pd. was granted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture for sectoral economic investment.^ 
Under the CAP'S FEOGA grant scheme, the average grant was 
around ten times the amount the Irish State provided.In 
1987, FEOGA receipts surpassed Ireland's total contribution 
to the budget by over 625 million Irish pounds. As Sheehy 
explains, "...allowing for the multiplier effect on both 
FEOGA and trade gains, the Irish economy in 1987 would 
probably have been between ten and fifteen percent smaller 
in the absence of the CAP.^ ®
Figure 5.3
IDA Fixed Asset Payments to Industrv. 1983-1986 
(Total & % of Total Payments to Industry by the Irish State)
Million Irish Pounds IDA %*
1983 120,757 60
1984 114,116 57
1985 114,055 53
1986 101,571 54
* Percent of total fixed asset payments by IDA to industry
Source; Department of Industry and Commerce (1986) Review 
of Industrial Performance: 85.
In sum, because of Ireland's weak private indigenous 
industrial structure, the State continued to provide 
significant sectoral subsidisation to its relatively 
numerous semi-State enterprises as well as to private 
companies. Agriculture, its most important sector, 
accounting for around forty percent of indigenous industry
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exports and nearly twenty percent of employment throughout 
the 1980s, was heavily subsidised by both the the CAP and 
the Irish State.
B. Denmark
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the steel industry, the 
agro-industrial complex, and the shipbuilding industry 
encountered problems of increased international surplus 
capacity, and as a result the Danish government initiated 
defensive programmes primarily through sectorally specific 
subsidisation. While the State did impose limited 
nationalisation of particular steelworks^ and iron ore 
mines, the steel industry received defensive subsidies 
throughout the 1980s. As Ole Jess Olsen stated in an 
interview, "The Danish government has not been eager to 
nationalise its industries; the steel example is a special 
case with only particular examples of nationalisation."^® 
Furthermore, a Ministry of Industry publication stated that, 
"There are no state-owned enterprises and no tradition for 
offering public assistance to individual enterprises in 
difficulties.
Nonetheless, with agriculture's share of employment and 
net value of production in Denmark around twenty percent 
during the 1980s, Denmark remained Europe's largest producer 
and exporter of farm produce, notably animal products, 
relative to its population. Denmark's giant agriculture 
sector furnished the most significant amount of foreign 
exchange for trade and industrial capital in order to import
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industrial raw materials and manufactured goods, and as a 
result "occupied a strategic position” in the Danish 
economy.Consequently, in 1987 the agricultural sector 
received State subsidies that totalled thirty-six percent of 
the value added of the entire sector, and 62,334 D.Kr. were 
allotted by the State per employee. Comparably, the most 
subsidised sector, shipbuilding, received seventy percent of 
its value added in subsidies, and 252,472 D.Kr. were 
allotted per employee.Of course the agricultural subsidy 
was coupled with the relatively large contribution by the 
EC's CAP. By the latter part of the 1980s the curbs on farm 
production imposed by the EC provoked the Danish government 
to provide more than one billion D.Kr. of State aid to the 
agricultural sector.^
Ironically, while the Danish State continued to 
subsidise the shipbuilding industry, documents produced by 
the Budget Office professed that "crisis" support was 
virtually nil between 1970 and 1983.^  ^ In another document 
by the Ministry of Industry, a primary table indicates that 
between 1982 and 1984 the State did not give any "aid to 
enterprises in difficulties," despite the fact that 
"sectoral measures" listed above referred specifically to 
targeted steel and shipbuilding subsidies.** Indeed, there 
is much evidence to support Europe's and Denmark's declining 
share of shipbuilding in the world. For example, while in 
1950 West European countries maintained nearly eighty 
percent of the world market share in merchant shipbuilding 
(with Denmark having around four percent of the world
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total), in 1980 West Europe had just over twenty percent of 
the world market and Denmark only two percent/^
Despite the contraction of the shipbuilding industry in 
Europe, Denmark continued to subsidise its ailing 
shipbuilding industry throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 
sharp contrast to Sweden, whose policy-makers realised that 
its shipbuilding industry would never be able to recover 
from significant world competition (and hence closed most of 
its shipyards by the mid-1980s), the Danish State continued 
to provide direct industrial subsidies to its ailing 
shipbuilding industry, mainly through export credits and 
leasing incentives.^®
With the shipbuilding industry in stagnation, the 
government offered individual tax incentives to encourage 
ship leasing, and with the Danish marginal personal income 
tax being extremely high, the leasing of ships by groups of 
Danish citizens became a popular vehicle for individuals' 
tax deductions. As a result, the shipbuilding misfortune 
became the private investor's advantage; "Money put into a 
notoriously non-profitable industry which had been backed by 
the taxpayer for so long, suddenly, in effect, generated 
profits which were not ploughed back into productive 
investment.
With shipbuilding being a "nationally-identifiable 
industry,yet one that was experiencing degeneration, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s the subsidy scheme fluctuated 
with the electoral process; policy-making regarding the 
shipbuilding industry never gained coherence or direction
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and remained in a "slow-down - speed-up" position/® (See 
Figure 5.4.)
Figure 5.4
Shipbuilding Subsidies in Denmark. 1981-1988
Year Million Krona % of Industrv Ministry Budget
1981 1,457 49.1
1982 1,706 50.0
1983 1,163 47.1
1984 752 35.2
1985 362 22.0
1986 171 61.6
1987 385 57.8
1988 2,200 59.4
Source: Ministry of Industry (1988), Ministry of Finance
(1988) Redegorelse Om Den Offentlige Sektor, 1988: 178.
C. Sweden
As the world economy experienced the oil shocks and an 
international recession during the bourgeois interregnum 
(1976-1982) direct State intervention began to implant 
itself firmly in a defensive mode. What were once Sweden's 
strongest industries, such as shipbuilding, mining, and 
forest products, needed help from the government in order to 
survive. As a consequence, the bourgeois interregnum was 
marked by a massive bail-out policy in a situation that can 
only be described as paradoxical given the non­
interventionist manifestos of the centre-right parties in 
the years preceding their control of government.
While awaiting the recovery of the international 
economic environment, the governing coalition "accelerated 
industrial subsidies, other government spending, and
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deficits.” ®^ (See Figure 5.5.)
Figure 5.5
Sectoral Distribution of State Aid to Industrv. 
Sweden. F.R.G.. France and U.K.. 1970-1977
Declining 
Sectors 
Coal Mining 
Shipbuilding 
Steel
Textiles/Apparel 
Forest Products 
Others 
Subtotal
Growth
Sectors
Nuclear Power
Aerospace
Electronics/
Computers
Mech. Engin./Autos
Chemicals
Subtotal
Others
Sweden
51%
9
2
6
_5
73%
2%
10
3
8
_2
25
100%
F.R.G.
12%
5
3
5
27%
14%
10
10
20
_8
68
100%
France
17%
7
7
32%
14%
17
27
6
4
66
100%
U.K.
10%
9
14
1
1
_2
27%
5%
27
27
9
_4
61
100%
Source: Boston Consulting Group (1979) Framework for
Swedish Industrial Policy: Exhibit 31.
Most notably, by the mid-1970s its large shipbuilding 
industry was financially strapped; the State bailed out the 
ailing companies in a nationalisation effort (e.g. through 
Swedyards) that did not subsequently help the wounded 
industry.Measures of support by the Swedish State to its 
shipbuilding industry were more directly interventionist as 
a result of nationalisation efforts and direct production 
subsidies than the home credit and export credit subsidies 
used by the Danish State during the same period.
The forest products and steel industries were other
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examples of the bourgeois government's nationalisation
efforts. In the forest products case, the government bailed
out the two major forest-products companies that remained
more structurally vulnerable than the other forest products
firms (given their lack of ownership of forests and power
plants). In a similar vein, the steel industry faced a dire
economic crisis of overcapacity during the same period, and
though subsidy loans and loan guarantees were offered to
ailing companies such as Uddeholdm Corp., there was a
significant downturn in the industry. Again, the government
acted by (a) supporting the proposed merger of the three
largest companies, (b) proposing an industry effort to
specialise in order to adjust to changing competitive
forces, and (c) offer 1.2 billion S.Kr. to form the Swedish
Steel, Ltd. (the merger of the three companies under a
national parent).
In sum, the policies of the bourgeois parties continued
and extended those of the pre-bourgeois years. (See Figure
5.6.) As Pontusson asserts.
All told, the bourgeois parties nationalized more 
industry during their first three years in power than 
the Social Democrats had done in the previous forty- 
four years!^
After 1982 industrial subsidies were severely cut, and 
Swedish industrial policy-making significantly changed 
course away from defensive sectoral subsidisation. Evidence 
of this is found in the Swedish steel sector, where 
employment in the steel industry by the end of the 1980s was 
one-half that ten years earlier.
324
Figure 5.6
Industrial Policy Expenditures in Sweden Disaggregated bv
(In Billion S.Kr. at 1980 Prices)
Year A B Ç D E F
70/71 0.8 1.6 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.3
71/72 1.1 1.6 1.4 0.4 1.4 3.9
72/73 0.8 1.5 1.1 0.5 2.3 0.5
73/74 1.2 2.0 1.0 0.5 1.2 0.5
74/75 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.9 0.9
75/76 1.1 2.0 1.9 1.2 2.1 1.9
76/77 1.1 2.4 1.4 1.3 2.2 5.1
77/78 1.1 2.5 2.6 1.4 2.2 5.0
78/79 0.8 3.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 8.8
79/80 1.1 2.7 1.3 2.1 1.6 8.1
A= regional aid, B= aid to small businesses, C= sectoral
programmes, D= research and development support , E= expo;
credits r F= extraordinary aid
Source: Jonas Pontusson (1986) Labour .Reforms ,and the
Politics of Capital Formation in Sweden: 559; SOU 1981: 53.
Moreover, by 1986 such major Swedish shipyards as Cityvarvet 
Arendal, Eriksberg, Kockums, Oresundsvarvet, and 
Uddevallavarvet, which in 1975 had employed over twenty-five 
thousand workers, were closed, under closure, or 
significantly decreased; what was once one of Sweden's most 
powerful industries barely existed by the end of the decade.
Those sunset industries that still existed in Sweden by 
the mid-1980s remained nationalised. The one notable 
exception of a non-sunset nationalised industy was 
Procordia, Sweden's successful tobacco, hotel, and 
restaurant conglomerate.^ In total, the government 
operated seven public enterprises and a number of wholly or 
partly owned enterprises in which public sector operations
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amounted to 168 billion S.Kr. and employed 310,000 workers. 
Nonetheless, about 87% of Swedish industry was in private 
hands, with 8% government-owned and the rest held by 
cooperatives. Unlike other European left-of-centre parties, 
the SAP spared nationalisation efforts (...actually going 
towards greater privatisation) and moved towards a policy of 
growth and renewal. (See Figure 5.7.)
Figure 5.7
Kev Data for Manor State-Owned Swedish Companies. 1987
Name Result fm.S.Kr) Turnover Emplovees
Procordia 389 12,788 25,499
Svenska Varv (Shipbuilding) 418 8,987 16,634
LKAB (Iron Mining) 121 5,453 4,752
SSAB (Steel) -16 11,634 14,865
ASSI (Forest Industries) 21 6,202 7,688
NCB (Forest Industries) 9 2,792 3,848
Source: Ministry of Finance (1987) The Swedish Budget,
1987/88: 124.
D. Switzerland
While other European countries in the 1960s and early 
1970s were adopting policies to expand employment by 
increasing governmental spending during periods of 
unfavourable economic conditions, Switzerland maintained a 
firm posture to preserve a limited interventionist position. 
Swiss policy-makers felt that the country's political 
stability coupled with its strong export orientation could 
sustain Swiss economic prosperity without significant direct 
aid to industry.Certainly the trade balance was
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supported by an undervalued Swiss Franc, a significant 
influx of foreign workers, and union restraint.
The 1970s, however, witnessed an unusual overvaluation 
of the Swiss Franc that compelled adaptation by those 
sectors dependant on domestic production and export 
competitiveness.^ The industries most affected were 
textiles and watches, and while the government practically 
avoided textiles industry assistance, the banks and 
government rescued the watch industry because of 
Switzerland's prestigious history of watchmaking. Omega 
Watches, for example, was "completely mismanaged,so the 
federal government approached the banks to aid the industry 
through a debt-handling, credit-offering programme. While 
the entire watch industry was supported by the State and the 
banks for a number of years, the industry has since 
rebounded with strong results. Moreover, the watch industry 
is the only example in modern Swiss history in which the 
State has acted directly to save an ailing industrial 
sector. One can witness the textiles example as a case-in- 
point in which Switzerland did not assist a declining 
industry; for the most part, the State relied more on market 
Gesundschrumpfen ("building up") than on State rescue 
operations.^
Since the mid-1960s the reduction of direct subsidies 
in Switzerland has been such that no outright governmental 
aid has been granted to any industrial firms or sectors.^® 
Only the "embryonic" Strukturpolitik, which refers primarily 
to regional policy, comes close to any form of direct
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intervention. It is thus not surprising that some have 
termed Swiss industrial policy "passive.
Furthermore, the State held virtually no industrial 
shares. The only important block of shares held by the 
government - ASUAG/SMH - (around six million Swiss Francs) 
was cut to ten percent in 1983 when the company was 
restructured.®^ In this instance the State acted as a 
"supervisory body" in which "they have nothing to do with an 
active industrial policy."®^ Direct subsidies to industry 
represent eight percent of the total, and they are designed 
not to "assign the total amount of a subsidy to units of 
output"®^ but as small-scale measures to promote industries 
that should become profitable without state aid in the near 
future.
5.4 Policies that Attempted to Stimulate the State's 
Industrial Competitiveness
A. Ireland
In Ireland the IDA had remained a permanent industrial 
policy fixture since the late 1940s, but its true influence 
did not develop until the 1960s, when it was determined that 
the IDA would help to induce inward FDl as well as develop 
small manufacturing businesses.®* By the end of the 1970s 
the IDA had undertaken a strategy of developing "high 
flyers,"®® industries with turnover of over twenty million 
Ir.Pd. These major multinational companies were being lured 
by the IDA through a number of enticements, the most 
prominent being fiscal incentives and capital grants.
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Under IDA schemes a firm could expect a low tax on its 
manufacturing profits (only around ten percent®®) and other 
advantages through leasing or special Section Eighty-Four 
loans (which are discussed in Chapter Three). Other 
incentives included non-repayable fixed asset grants that 
could be as high as sixty percent of total fixed asset 
expenditure, rent reductions, factory accommodation, 
training grants, and technology acquisition grants.®^ The 
IDA also stressed the highly trained Irish workforce and 
relatively large amount of unused land.
As a result of such actions, by the beginning of the 
1980s a number of sunrise industries were operating in 
Ireland due to the significant influx of foreign 
multinationals. Over ninety percent of employment in the 
electronics industry and sixty-five percent of the chemicals 
industry was due to the presence of foreign companies 
operating on Irish soil.®® By 1982, foreign MNCs accounted 
for nearly one-third of all manufacturing employment and 
seventy percent of manufactured exports.®® (See Figure 5.8)
Figure 5.8
Manufacturing Emolovment in New Foreign Industrv and 
the Rest of Industry in Ireland. 1960-1980 (Thousands)
1960 1966 1973 1980
New foreign industry 3 10 36 61
Rest of Industrv 169 188 186 182
Total 172 198 222 243
Source: Eion O'Malley (1985) "The Problem of Late
Industrialisation and the Experience of the Republic of 
Ireland." Cambridge Journal of Economics: 145.
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With external shocks ushering in the 1980s, Ireland 
struggled with poor economic performance: the debt-to-GNP 
ratio remained around three times the average of European 
Community nations,unemployment was near twenty percent, 
and growth was sluggish. Ireland's industrial structure 
became dichotomised between strong economic performance by 
foreign subsidiaries in sunrise industries and sluggish 
performance by Ireland's indigenous enterprises.^
Nonetheless, Irish industrial policy continued on its 
course of inward FDI attraction through investment 
incentives, following a focus on creating the right 
environment. While foreign subsidiaries did employ Irish 
workers, this inward FDI was simply not enough to revitalise 
Ireland's sagging infrastructural difficulties and long-term 
unemployment problems. While the Fine Gael coalition began 
an austerity programme upon its election in 1982, little 
progress was made on Ireland's national debt, which doubled 
in a period of four years. Labour costs, as a manifestation 
of high inflation and high personal tax rates, also deterred 
Irish industry from becoming more internationally 
competitive. While many have claimed that Irish society has 
been marked by both ethnic and "confessional" homogeneity 
that "would appear to facilitate the development of a 
bargained consensual approach to economic p o l i c y , t h e  
beginning of the 1980s was marked by little agreement as to 
how policy-making could offset declining levels of 
international competitiveness.
By the mid-1980s the State began to examine the issue
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of industrial policy revitalisation, beginning with the 
Telesis Report of 1982. The report stated that while 
Ireland was able to induce foreign subsidiaries into the 
country, it was unable to develop its own indigenous 
industrial base because of lack of spin-off effects. It was 
recommended that there be "a more systematic programme for 
developing linkages between indigenous and foreign-owned 
firms.
As a consequence of this report, as well as a
subsequent report by the government entitled A White Paper
on Industrial Policy, the new industrial policy focus was on
strengthening Ireland's industrial structure, as opposed to
previous efforts to control unemployment by virtual
acceptance of any foreign MNC that could provide employment
opportunities regardless of their impact on Ireland's
industrial structure or long-term employment consequences.
(See Figure 5.9.) As J.P. O'Carroll explains.
The result was a major shift in industrialisation. 
Whereas previous policies emphasised the direct 
employment potential of industrial projects, their 
total impact on the economy would be the main 
consideration in the future.^*
The industrial policy strategy the State pursued by the 
mid-1980s was based on the government's White Paper, which 
suggested a "'hands-on' approach by the State agencies... in 
a selective number of projects aimed at developing 
competencies within firms themselves."^" The Programme for 
National Recovery of 1987, which was also designed to 
suppress wage growth, outlined industrial policy changes by 
focusing on programmes to develop specific Irish industries
Figure 5.9
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN IRELAND, 1987: 
THE FORMATION OF 
THE PROGRAMME FOR NATIONAL RECOVERY
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Dialogue
State
Confederation of 
Irish Industries
Federated Union of 
Employers
Irish Confederation 
of Trade Unions
Policy Development: Programme for National Recovery
Industrial Policy Focus:
• Strengthening of indigenous 
manufacturing sector
• Technological development of 
indigenous manufacturing 
sector through expansion 
and growth of selected Irish 
companies
• Emphasis on State aid to 
upgrade marketing, product 
development, R & D as 
opposed to support of fixed 
asset investment
• Sector by sector development 
strategy
• Continuation of State incentives 
for inward FDI
Labour and Monetary Focus:
• Wage growth for 1988,1989,
1990 set at 2.5% per year
• Increased training grant 
expenditures to provide 
unemployment benefits and 
increase marketing, management, 
technological skills
• Monetary policy to be 
determined by the "need to 
bring about the lowest possible 
interest rates.. .  to promote 
investor confidence"
• Lower level of inflation as a 
consequence of wage growth 
reduction
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that would help modernise its weak, low tech indigenous 
industrial structure. As a result, the Ministry for 
Industry and Commerce began to work with the IDA "on a daily 
basis"^® to stimulate particular high growth, sunrise 
industries such as electronics and pharmaceuticals. Both 
agencies began a strategy of creating "high flyers" as well 
as medium-sized enterprises (annual sales in excess of five 
million Ir.Pd.). The IDA became increasingly cognisant of 
attracting only those foreign subsidiaries that would add 
long-term benefits in line with this strategy and "provide 
guarantees" that factories would be more than simple 
assembly plants.
At the same time, the State advocated close cooperation 
between the IDA, foreign firms operating in Ireland, and 
Irish indigenous industry. In particular, the IDA would 
oversee and administer prospective projects; indeed, the IDA 
under the supervision of only two directors in its history 
had maintained a philosophy based on the principle that "the 
only way to attract suitable foreign investment is if the 
IDA has the right people - the 'best and the brightest' if 
you will."^®
Along with this sectoral strategy of attracting 
projects to augment its relatively weak industrial structure 
was an emphasis on export development and promotion and 
technology development.^^ A higher proportion of Ireland's 
GDP was placed in export promotion than in any other 
industrialised c o u n t r y . ( See Figure 5.10.)
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Figure 5.10
Trade Promotion for Selected European States. 1986
(% State Budget)
Ireland 0.250%
Denmark 0.231
Sweden 0.093
Switzerland 0.011
Source: Verein Schweizerischer Maschinen-Industrieller
(1987) "Bulletin: ExportFoerderung Im Europaeischen
Vergleich.” (3 July): 2.
Perhaps most significant, Ireland suffered from 
relatively low levels of indigenous industrial technological 
development, not only because of the State's unwillingness 
and inability to pursue R & D projects as a result of its 
fiscal deficit problems, but also because of industries' 
size and orientation. The Irish industrial structure was 
composed of small- and medium-sized enterprises, and 
indigenous industry tended to be less technology driven than 
most other small European states.
Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s 
"technological development was overlooked" by both Irish 
industry and the Irish State.While important economic 
actors such as the CII recognised the necessity for 
significant increases in R & D investment "with State 
support,"®^ they also appreciated that labour and other 
input costs needed to be reduced and that the government's 
fiscal budget deficit would hamper attempts to stimulate 
industrial innovation programmes. Reviews of industrial 
performance by the OECD®® and the government's industrial
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White Paper during the period illustrated the necessity for 
Irish industry to develop technology programmes, though in 
the latter case remarkably few recommendations were 
proposed.^
Ironically, throughout the 1980s Ireland maintained the 
highest share among EC countries of high tech products in 
its total exports, yet as McAleese explains, "This does not, 
of course, reflect any substantial strength in depth in 
these products."®^ The reasons for this paradox are that 
Irish indigenous industry maintained a relatively weak R & D 
capacity, and foreign multinationals lured by incentives to 
produce their products on Irish soil had few linkages with 
Irish industry. Consequently, while the IDA consciously 
attempted to attract high-value foreign manufacturing 
industry that could be applied for technological development 
of Irish industry,*® R & D spin-off was not assured.®^
At the same time, because Ireland's indigenous 
industries produced commodity and intermediate goods as 
opposed to capital goods, capital investment in R & D was 
risky for small and medium-sized enterprises; a cautious, 
low risk policy became necessary for indigenous industry.®® 
At the same time, the State maintained a passive position, 
employing only minor R & D projects to "raise people's 
awareness" that technological development was a necessity in 
order for Irish industry to become more internationally 
competitive.®® In 1985, fifty-three percent of gross public 
expenditure on industry was in the form of payments (or 
grants), of which only 6.1% was distributed to industry for
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R & D purposes.®®
Again, it was not until the Haughey Government in 1987 
under the Programme for National Recovery that the State 
pursued an R & D policy, yet the administration of such 
programmes were not seriously funded or manned, nor were 
they earnestly organised to develop industrial technology. 
Perhaps most importantly, because of the budget deficit and 
high rate of foreign debt, R & D programmes received less 
funding and less personnel support than that given to other 
State programmes designed to change the composition of 
industrial output. In 1980 there was hardly any funding for 
technological development, and in 1987 only eight to nine 
million Ir.Pd. were secured for R & D. Also, in 1987 the 
Office of Science and Technology in the Department of 
Commerce and Industry maintained an executive staff of only 
five persons.
Other organisations devoted to technological 
development such as the Irish Science and Technology Agency 
(EOLAS) (until 1987 the National Board for Science and 
Technology) worked with universities; in addition, some 
informal contacts were made with industry, notably through 
the IDA for prospective projects from foreign firms.
Ireland did profit to a limited extent from several notable 
EC technology programmes. Such programmes as EPRIT (the 
most promising strategy for R & D in information 
technologies), EURONET (the first major European network for 
the long-distance transmission of computerised information), 
and TEDIS (a programme designed to promote the electronic
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transfer of data for commercial use) continued to gain 
increasing funding throughout the 1980s.
In sum, Ireland's industrial policy objectives changed 
more in orientation than in actual funding. The majority of 
aid to industry was placed through two avenues: State
commercial enterprises and the IDA. It should be noted, 
moreover, that Ireland faced a significant fiscal deficit 
and as a result placed its money almost equally between its 
sectoral (industry, agriculture, fisheries), productive 
(transport, roads, sanitation), and social (housing, 
education, hospitals) infrastructures. (See Figure 5.11)
Ireland's Public Caoital Proaramme.
(% Volume Change)
Fisheries -69%
Agriculture — 62
Industry —45
Education -34
Energy -33
Housing -29
Telecommunications -21
Hospitals -19
Government Construction, etc. +97
Forestry +55
Tourism +43
Roads and Sanitary Services etc. +41
Source: Ministry for Finance (1988) Budget, 1988: 140.
One of the more important means for industrial development 
in Ireland was through infrastructural development, which 
was firmly supported by the CII and consequently received 
significant attention from the State. Asserts Con Power,
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Director of Economic Policy for the CII, "The greatest 
single problem which still remains is the extraordinary high 
cost of inland freight transport, particularly road 
transport.
Moreover, while the Irish State remained committed to 
developing its industrial structure, Irish technological 
development remained stagnant throughout the 1980s as a 
result of negative economic conditions coupled with an 
industrial structure unable to handle the investment 
requirements of technological development. At the same 
time, Ireland's hopes for technology transfer through inward 
FDI incentives managed by the IDA never came to fruition; 
foreign parent companies either avoided technology transfer 
or were working on a single stage of production (often 
component parts) which was unbefitting or unsuitable for 
replication by Irish industry. As a result, Irish 
indigenous industry was unable to absorb innovative 
productive techniques from foreign competition, and the 
Irish State, straddled with a budget deficit, could garner 
neither the funding nor the support from the business 
community to develop R & D programmes.
Nonetheless, Irish industrial policy became positively 
influenced through a coordinated understanding between the 
IDA, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the CII. 
These three groups became convinced that Irish industrial 
policy needed to evolve into one based on the development of 
Ireland's indigenous industry much as a result of the 
pressures of the Single European Act. By 1987 the State
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initiated the most important steps to revitalise Irish 
industry by acting as the consensus maker in developing the 
National Programme for Recovery, which slowed wage-inspired 
inflation. At the same time, the IDA took on definitive 
supply-side measures to modernise its industrial structure; 
by the State working through these two positive goals, it 
was the Principal Actor in Ireland's quest for a higher 
level of international competitiveness.
B. Denmark
By the mid-1980s Denmark's industrial policy 
orientation was significantly modified to make technological 
competitiveness a major State priority. This action was 
taken to augment Denmark's relatively weak industrial 
structure. Unlike Sweden and Switzerland, Denmark had 
hardly any large, high technology oriented MNCs, nor did it 
have the ability to spin off high tech goods from a military 
sector; the problem was manifested by an impressively small 
proportion of high tech products being exported from the 
1970s into the 1980s.
Moreover, evidence provided from The World 
Competitiveness Report confirms that the role of the State 
in Denmark during much of the 1980s did not remain conducive 
to industrial growth. In fact, according to a survey within 
the report, Denmark ranked twenty-first out of twenty-two 
OECD countries in terms of "government economic priorities 
being directed towards investment and growth." Denmark also 
ranked eighteenth, twentieth, and twenty-second in three
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different surveys in terms of its fiscal policy orientation: 
(a) "favouring renewal of its infrastructure," (b) 
"stimulating investment," and (c) "encouraging 
entrepreneurial activity".
Since the early 1960s the Danish industrial structure 
has been dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
with only a smattering of large corporations, all of which 
paled in size beside the major Swedish and Swiss 
corporations. Danish industrialists felt that by being 
small they could be flexible and adaptable to world market 
changes, and that there was no need for governmental policy 
to be adaptive when small enterprises "could act more 
quickly".®® Throughout the 1980s Denmark's products were 
developed too slowly; the level of Danish FDI was 
significantly less than that in other small European states 
with similar levels of GDP per capita, such as Sweden and 
Switzerland, and exports were not as oriented towards high 
growth. For example, in 1985 total R & D personnel in 
Danish manufacturing industries totalled 8,659 persons, with 
the largest proportion being in the chemicals industry with 
1,947 persons in 1985.®^  Two years earlier in Switzerland, 
there were 23,109 persons classified as R & D personnel, and 
in the chemicals industry, there were 7,695 R & D persons; 
in short, Swiss industry had nearly three times as many 
R & D personnel and virtually the same number of R & D 
persons working in the chemicals industry as all of Danish 
R & D personnel industry-wide.®®
Without the same industrial structure impetus for
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technological innovation as in states such as Sweden and 
Switzerland, as well as the State's past disregard for R & D 
policy-making, Danish industry was technologically 
deficient.®® (See Figure 5.12.) Hence, Danish small- and 
medium-sized enterprises relied to a significant extent on 
technology diffusion from other countries.
Figure 5.12
A Comparison of Business R & D Intensity in 
Selected States 1985 
(R & D Expenditure as Percent of GDP)
State Business Enterprise :
Denmark 0.69
Ireland 0.41
Sweden 1.98
Switzerland 1.69
Belgium 1.12
Netherlands 1.18
Norway 1.01
Japan 1.88
United States 1.98
Germany 1.92
Source: OECD (1988) Denmark: Reviews of National Science
and Technology Policy: 13.
While Danish policy-making through much of the 1980s 
focused primarily on the supply side through such measures 
as the Potato Diet, Danish policy-makers began to realise 
that progress was necessary on the demand side. Danish 
policy-makers and industrialists had historically frowned 
upon industrial policy measures with the exception of aid 
for particular sectors, notably shipbuilding. Following the 
inception of the Ministry of Industry just three years 
earlier, in 1982 the minority coalition of the right
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developed as its main industrial policy ingredient a
coordinated R & D programme, which was complemented by two
other policy areas: regional development and export
promotion. While regional development policy was not
stressed throughout the 1980s, export promotion, primarily
through grants that covered forty percent of projects,
became an increasingly important industrial policy
v e h i c l e . ( See Figure 5.10.)
For the new centre-right coalition the main industrial
policy component (its technology programme) was a relatively
safe policy avenue "that did not stir societal anxiety about
having an interventionist industrial policy.
Nonetheless, while the various ministries and political
parties discussed possible industrial policies, dialogue
among a small number of industrialists and scientists, a
group which Jan Annerstedt refers to as the "industrial
modernists,was the primary impetus to the State's
eventually developing technology policies. (See Figure
5.13.) In an interview he stated.
The rhetoric after 1982 was about innovation, 
structure, and where procurement is coupled with 
technology push programmes. This was not done by the 
leftist parties, but by the Conservative party. Yet 
the Ministry of industry was in a stalemate until they 
were stimulated by the directors of companies to get a 
new direction. That was followed by eight to ten 
people who crystallised their ideas into technology 
policies.
Figure 5.13
THE ROLE OF THE STATEtFt DENMARK, 1982-1987: 
THE ADVENT OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY-MAKING 342
Industrial Modernists'
Ministry of 
Education
Centre-Right Coalition 
Government
Ministry of 
Agriculture
Dialogue
Ministry of 
Industry
Bio-Technology
Programme
International 
Cooperation 
(EUREKA. Nordic 
Co-Operation,
EC Programmes)
State Funding
Information
Diffusion
Programme
Helped niche 
Danish bio-tech 
firms remain 
technologically 
advanced
Gained valuable 
technological input 
from other European, 
Scandinavian states
Programme Effects
Increased exports 
of high-tech goods
Active supply side measure to reduce current account deficit 
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Following the industrial modernists* lead by realising 
that the Danish industrial structure was too small to yield 
effective technological results, the Danish State began to 
take on a principal role by elevating R & D as a "top 
priority policy area"^ °^  to restore the level of 
international competitiveness of Danish industry. (See 
Figure 5.14.) Nonetheless, until 1986 technology policy was 
not "guided by an overall plan" and there was "no 
significant saliency devoted to the analysis and planning of
technology."106
Figure 5.14 
State Support Schemes. Denmark 1982-1987 
(As % and Million Danish Krona)
(%)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
A 14.2 15.0 21.6 26.3 40.9 58.1 52.7
B 5.1 5.9 4.2 6.1 6. 6 0.7 0.6
C 6.3 6.3 9.3 12.8 17.3 18.7 17.5
D 20.6 19.0 12.4 14.2 3.8 0.0 0.0
E 49.1 50.0 46.8 34.6 22.0 11.6 19.7
F 4.7 3.8 5.7 6.0 9.4 10.9 9.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Million 
A 422
Danish
516
Kronor)
537 571 673 859 1,032
B 152 201 104 133 109 10 12
C 186 215 231 277 285 277 343
D 612 649 307 308 21 0 0
E 1,457 1,706 1,163 752 362 171 385
F 138 128 143 131 29 162 185
2,967 3,415 2,485 2,172 1,644 1,479 1,957
A= Technology Policies, B= Regional Policies, C= Export 
Promotion, D= Export Finance, E= Shipbuilding Subsidies, 
F= Other
Source: Ministry of Industry (1988) "Subsidies and
Structural Adjustment: The Danish Reply to Questionnaire
IND(87)5:" Tabel 5, Bilag 7.
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Yet in 1986 the government contended in its Statement on
Industrial Policy:
The jump in the technological development that is 
taking place these years means that even fairly large 
Danish enterprises are too small individually to be 
sufficiently offensive with regard to the development 
of technology. Therefore, the enterprises have to be 
encouraged to increase their efforts considerably as 
regards research and development.^^
Much as a result of the Industrirardet objecting to 
direct sectoral intervention (e.g, "not promoting particular 
interests from member industries") yet favouring measures to 
adjust industry structurally through targeted R & D 
policies, consultation between the State and the 
Industrirardet eventually generated two technology 
programmes, one in information technology and the other in 
bio-technology.^* Before 1986 the major technology 
programme was in information technology diffusion in which 
the State spent 1.5 bn. D.Kr. to spread existing technology 
throughout industry; indeed, this first technology programme 
was fostered by a significant degree of backing from the 
Industrirardet. Much as a consequence of Denmark's 
technological diffusion programme, particularly in 
electronics, engineering, and pharmaceutical products, it 
achieved a "remarkable" trade balance in high technology 
goods, in which its export/import ratio improved from 76.3% 
in 1970 to 97.0% in 1985.^ °®
In addition, as a result of its significant agro­
industrial sector, the State was interested in bio­
technology innovation, despite the previous lack of 
cooperation among bio-tech firms in developing coordinated
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research programmes.The Ministry of Education assumed 
much of the responsibility for bio-tech research, and due to 
the harmonisation efforts of the Ministries of Education, 
Agriculture, and Industry, the State appropriated five 
hundred million D.Kr. for a five year bio-tech programme 
that would establish twelve new centres for bio-technology 
research as well as arrange for joint public/ private 
programmes. As a consequence, Denmark's niche high bio­
technology firms such as NOVO, with major breakthroughs in 
enzymes,and Nordisk Gentrofte, a world leader in insulin 
production, gained valuable public support from the State's 
bio-technology programme initiated in 1986.
By 1987 the State had increased its commitments through 
its "Action Plan," adding an extra two hundred million D.Kr. 
to an R & D programme that totalled 1,420 million D.kr. for 
the years 1986-1990.^^ Not only were funds directed to 
information diffusion and bio-technological development, but 
funds were also directed to firm participation in 
international R & D programmes such as EUREKA, a scheme 
encompassing nineteen European countries to promote the 
technological development of non-military industrial 
activity.
In sum, the State became the principal actor in 
attempting to restore Denmark's level of international 
competitiveness. Although Denmark's current account deficit 
forced Danish fiscal policy to remain restrictive, a major 
policy priority of the Danish State after 1982 was to 
augment its level of industrial productivity through R & D
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programmes, which was a major change from its past policy 
preferences of sectoral-specific intervention. Although 
Denmark had the same (if not higher) standard of living of 
many of its European counterparts, its major competitive 
disadvantage was its industrial structure, which unlike 
those in Sweden and Switzerland, did not have the dual 
advantages of being both large and high tech oriented. 
Consequently the State acted as an impetus to modernise its 
industrial structure; the State understood the importance of 
technological innovation for its niche industries, 
encouraging them through technological policies to "increase 
their efforts considerably as regards research and 
development."^^ Having taken an active policy approach, by 
the end of the decade the State helped Danish industry 
achieve a strong trade balance in high technology goods 
through its diffusion programme and bolstered important 
technology funding for its agro-industrial niche 
enterprises. At the same time, it began a long-term supply- 
side strategy to defeat its enduring current account 
deficit, and the State actively attempted to formulate a 
modernisation programme to prepare Danish enterprises for 
increased competition in the European market driven by the 
Single European Act of 1992.
C. Sweden
Sweden's improved economic performance at the beginning 
of the decade was encouraged by the devaluations of 1981 and 
1982, and at the same time Swedish industrial policy-making
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changed from the "money-oriented aid” (of the centre-right 
parties through sectoral subsidisation) to "service-oriented 
aid."^ ®^ The emphasis of Swedish industrial policy shifted 
in the direction of regional development policies and 
programmes to "encourage industrial evolution by providing 
incentives for the diffusion of flexible manufacturing and 
other forms of advanced technology.""^ (See Figure 5.15.)
Figure 5.15
State Support to Swedish Industrv. 1975/1976 - 1983/1984 
(% According to Restructuring vs. Growth)
Restructuring/Reduction Growth/Renewal
75/76 SAP 17% 83%
76/77 CR 73 27
77/78 CR 81 19
78/79 CR 79 21
79/80 CR 81 19
80/81 CR 70 30
81/82 CR 77 23
82/83 CR 73 27
83/84 SAP 45 55
84/85 SAP 39 61
85/86 SAP 20 70
86/87 SAP 20 70
87/88 SAP 22 68
Rest./Reduction = temporary support + sectoral support 
Growth/Renewal = R & D support + Regional Policy
support + Export Support + Small Business Support 
SAP = Social Democratic Party in power, CR = Coalition Govt
Source: Ministry of Industry (1985) Swedish Industry and
Industrial Policy: 15; Ministry of Finance (1987) The 
Swedish Budget, 1987-1988.
From 1982 onwards, the Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof 
Feldt remained a most influential political personality, in 
many ways surpassing Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson"^ in his 
abilities in the latter part of the 1980s to form policies. 
Feldt, in particular, remained a staunch advocate of a
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declining role of the Ministry of Industry in terms of 
budget support for direct intervention.Conseguently, by 
1987 the role of the Ministry of Industry in terms of 
funding was relatively small (less than 2% of the ministry 
budget and 1.5% of the entire budget) in comparison to other 
ministries. (See Figure 5.16.)
Figure 5.16 
Profile of the Swedish Budget. 1987-1988 
(In Million Swedish Kronor, % Ministry Budget)
Expenditure bv Ministry Amount fm.S.Kr.) % Ministry :
Health and Social Affairs 91,262 33.63%
Education and Cultural Affairs 43,169 15.91
Defence 26,378 9.72
Labour 21,250 7.83
Finance 20,690 7.63
Housing and Physical Planning 15,763 5.81
Foreign Affairs 11,631 4.29
Transport and Communications 11,532 4.25
Justice 10,330 3.81
Agriculture 6,191 2.28
Industry 5,081 1.87
Environment and Energy 4,889 1.80
Public Administration 3.168 1.17
Total Ministry Expenditure 271,334 100.00%
Total Swedish Budget 
% Ministry Expenditure to
338,847
Total Budget 80.08%
Source: Ministry of Finance (1987) The Swedish Budget,
1987/88: 49.
After 1982 the Swedish Ministry of Industry began to 
view industrial policy in terms of structural changes in the 
market; significant funding by the ministry was directed to 
regional development policy. New factories were encouraged 
to relocate near distressed regions where former shipyards
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and steel mines were once located. With State incentives 
for firms to move, firms that welcomed the State scheme were 
allowed to pay their taxes into reserve funds, which they 
could subsequently recapture. As a complementary policy, 
the State helped to train workers in these distressed areas. 
Consequently, over 40% of the Ministry of Industry budget 
was directed to the regional development fund by 1987.^ ^^
(See Figure 5.17.)
Figure 5.17 
Ministrv of Industry Budget in Sweden. 1987 
(In m.S.Kr., % Budget)
Policy 1986/7 1987/8 % 87/8 Bdgt Diff.86/7-87/8
Regional 1604 2025 40% +421
Devlpmnt
Industry 1436 1135 22 -301
Technical 1200 1151 22 - 49
Devlpmnt
State-Owned 582 593 12 + 11
Companies
Minerals 123 127 3 + 4
Policy
Miscell. 64 50 1 - 14
Total 5009 5081 100% + 72
Source: Ministry of Finance (1987) The Swedish Budget,
1987/88: 120.
Industrial policy-making, particularly with regard to these 
regional policy schemes, was funded through central State 
authorities (e.g., the Ministry of Industry) yet often 
enacted by regional authorities. States Jon Pierre of 
Gothenburg University, the Ministry of Industry adopted a
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strategy whereby,
[It] provided subsidies for R & D projects, local 
restructuring initiatives, and infrastructural 
development, leaving the allocation of the capital to 
consortiums of public and private actors at the local 
and regional levels in order to encourage local 
resource mobilization....^^
Moreover, the Ministry of Industry engaged in a serious 
effort to bolster technical research through its research 
and development programme. Six percent of the value of the 
country's industrial output was spent on research and 
development, making Sweden second only to the U.S. and well 
above most of its industrial competitors. Moreover, through 
the period 1987-1989, 2.5 billion S.Kr. was put forward to 
the National Board for Technical Development as finance 
grants.^* Through the use of collaborative research 
institutes, the major universities attempted to use 
"greenhouses" where new enterprise ideas "germinated"and 
also to promote university interest in technology-based "T"- 
Line degrees.
In Sweden, R & D spending remained highly concentrated 
in large firms; ninety-five percent of R & D spending 
occurred in those with more 500 employees, with the ten 
largest firms accounting for two-thirds of all R & From
the end of the bourgeois interregnum in 1982 to 1988, the 
Swedish State spent four percent of its public money on 
commercial R & D, a higher percentage than in any other 
country in the world; most States spent only two to three 
percent, including the amount disbursed for defence.
Because of such R & D intensity, in 1983 Sweden had 2.00
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robots per 1000 employees in manufacturing, while Japan had 
1.46, the Federal Republic of Germany 0.63, the U.S. 0.43, 
Italy 0.38, France 0.32, and the U.K. 0.32.^ ®^ Consequently, 
Sweden ranked first in a survey among OECD countries in 
terms of the level of automation in industry.
In addition, other measures, such as Sweden's corporate 
taxation system and the furnishing of export credits, 
inspired industrial growth and investment. Throughout the 
1980s the Swedish corporate taxation system allowed firms to 
pay lower taxes as long as profits were reinvested back into 
the firm. For multinationals operating abroad, the Swedish 
territorial tax system was far more lenient than in states 
such as the U.S. in exempting or deferring their home 
country t a x . A s  one business executive stated, "Sweden 
does not believe in rich people, but we do believe in rich 
companies.Consequently, while the nominal corporate tax 
rate was 52%, with various tax breaks, the use of reserve 
funds, and the lenient territorial tax system, the corporate 
taxation burden was relatively modest. For example, while 
Sweden had the highest corporate income tax rate among OECD 
countries during the 1980s, Sweden ranked among the top five 
OECD countries in terms of corporate income after tax 
between 1984 and 1 9 8 6 . As Magaziner and Patinkin contend, 
"The effective tax rate for most Swedish companies is close 
to zero....It is a very effective system, which encourages 
investment in the economy, enhances public purpose, yet 
gives Swedish companies a competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
foreign competitors that are taxed.
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Moreover, the Swedish State provided effective export 
financing through AB Svensk Exportkredit (SEK), a joint 
venture of the Swedish government and Swedish commercial 
banks; the Kingdom of Sweden owned fifty percent of SEK and 
the major commercial banks owned the other half. Working 
with the Exportkreditnamnden (EKN), a government institution 
acting independently (though a part of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), these two institutions provided three 
major programmes: funding, insurance, and mixed credits.
Under the joint system, a sales contract would be negotiated 
between the buyer and seller, a bank would then provide a 
long-term loan at the market rate plus fees, the SEK would 
provide an interest made agreement to the bank, and the EKN 
would insure against buyer default.In the funding area, 
the SEK provided financing under a market rate and state 
support system. The market rate system provided export 
financing for Swedish firms at the market rate of interest 
and was fixed at a quarter of a percent above the cost of 
borrowed funds. The State support system provided loans for 
exports below market rates and remained "extremely 
flexible"^^® for Swedish exporters who face various political 
risks. Unlike the Swiss export credit guarantee programme 
that was scaled down during the 1980s in favour of private 
financing, SEK total assets, operating profit, and return on 
equity grew during the decade.
Unlike in Ireland, where the State actively pursued 
inward EDI as a result of its weak indigenous industrial 
structure, in Sweden the State's approach was much more
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restrictive given its powerful, high tech indigenous 
industrial structure. In cases when mergers or acquisitions 
were proposed between a Swedish enterprise and a foreign 
company, the Ministry of Industry prepared a report based on 
discussions with the LO, the SAP, the authority for economic 
affairs, and the authority for technical development. The 
report, which would take three to four weeks to prepare, was 
a synthesis of the various viewpoints examining the global 
risks involved. After the government was briefed, a final 
cabinet decision was made by a vote of all the Ministries, 
not just the Ministry of Industry. Indeed, the government 
took these steps in regard to Sweden's biggest international 
merger during the 1980s - that between Asea and 
Switzerland's BBC Brown Boveri. Following the example of 
this merger, the position of the Ministry of Industry was, 
in the words of one bureaucrat in the Large-Scale Enterprise 
Section of the ministry, "an almost benign policing 
authority.
Consequently, the Ministry of Industry adopted an 
industrial policy philosophy based on R & D subsidisation, 
regional and infrastructural development, and the provision 
of export credits. National and regional coordination 
became necessary because the allocation of industrial policy 
capital was typically given to consortiums mixed between 
public and private actors primarily at the local and 
regional levels.
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D. Switzerland
In Switzerland, throughout the 1980s industry was 
represented primarily through the Vorort, Switzerland's peak 
business association, which was able to convey to the 
government in an organised sense the needs of industry and 
financial institutions.^^ The Vorort worked "intensely" 
in a consultative way with the parliament, government, and 
the Ministry of Industry and Work (the Gewerbeverbamt); it 
aggregated the views of its associations, the major 
industrial associations being the Machinery and Chemicals 
Associations,^^ through standing committees on particular 
issues.^* Despite diversified interests within the Vorort 
and with a high degree of regionalism, particular industrial 
interests never changed the overall market philosophy of the 
Vorort, which "strongly oppose[d] any sustained 
interference."^^ Consequently, problems of economic 
adjustment were viewed by the Swiss as a problem for the 
firm, not the State; this perspective explains why Rudolf 
Walser, Secretary of the Vorort asserted that, "Switzerland 
does not have an 'industrial' or 'structural' policy.
A poignant example of this non-interventionist outlook 
occurred in 1985 when the three major Swiss banks (Union 
Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Credit 
Suisse) examined the possibility of providing capital 
assistance for young Swiss firms that were unable to 
establish themselves in the face of international 
competition. Under the scheme, the federal government would
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offer guarantees to new companies as a risk premium which 
would essentially cover possible losses. While the scheme 
passed parliament, the Vorort successfully thwarted the 
proposal through a public referendum,which overrode the 
parliament's earlier decision."^*
Moreover, although Switzerland continued to advocate 
applied research in locations such as universities, R & D 
development occurred at the enterprise l e v e l . T h e  
chemicals industry accounted for 52.9% of R & D spending by 
industry, while the machinery industry accounted for 42.2%; 
in sum, industry spent 3597 million S.Fr. on R & D, or 740 
S.Fr. per each head in Switzerland. ( See Figures 5.18. 
5.19. and 5.20.)
Figure 5.18 
Research and Development Expenditures 
For Selected Countries. 1986
(As % of Internal Production)
Private State Part of :
Countrv Financed Financed Others In Produ
Switzerland 75% 25% 0% 2.3%
Japan 62 27 11 2.4
FRG 58 41 1 2.6
Sweden 57 40 3 2.2
USA 49 49 2 2.7
Italy 49 49 2 1.1
Netherlands 46 48 6 1.9
Canada 42 50 8 1.4
France 42 58 0 2.1
Britain 41 50 9 2.4
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Figure 5.19
Amount Spent on R & D in Switzerland Per Sector. 1986 
(Millions Swiss Francs and % per sector)
Sector
Machines, Electrotechnics,
m.S.Fr. %
Metals 1517.1 42.2
Chemicals 1901.6 52.9
Watchmaking 68.9 1.9
Textiles 27.3 0.8
Clothing Industry 36.0 1.0
Paper and Plastic 14.2 0.4
Construction 32.1 0.9
3597.2 100.0
Figure 5.20
R & D Spending in Switzerland bv Size of Enterprise. 1986
No. of Emolovees In m.S.Fr. % of R & D Spending
Less than 10 10.1 0.3
10-49 134.6 3.7
50-99 196.0 5.4
100-499 723.8 20.1
500-999 405.3 11.3
100-4999 2127.4 59.1
Source: Union Suisse Du Commerce et De L'Industrie (1987)
La Recherche et Le 
Suisse: 17, 23, 40
Développement Dans L'Economie Privee En
Such societal values, strong economic conditions that 
did not necessitate intervention, and relatively passive 
fiscal policy-making in general,resulted in government 
aid to industry in Switzerland being relatively small 
throughout the 1980s. (See Figure 5.21.)
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Figure 5.21
Government Aid to Industry in Switzerland. 1981-1986
(In Million S.Fr.)
Aid 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
General Aids 
- Grants 0.68 0.67
- Loans - - - - 0.18 0.10
Regional Aid 
- Grants 0.38 2.34 3.60 2.85 0.59 1.01
- Loans - - - - - -
- Grntees 28.40 37.10 60.80 86.60 2.36 3.69
R & D 
- Grants 9.20 11.20 11.80 15.80 15.33 16.33
Emplymnt Aid 
- Grants 0.78 1.90 0.07 0.08
Sectoral Aids - - - - - -
Strct'l Sppt 
and Rscue 
- Grants 14.40 15.40 7.80 8.20 6.22 6.97
Small Firm 
Dvlpmnt 
- Guarantees 0.55 0.61 0.74 0.36 1.70 1.87
Firm Specific 
Subsidies
Export Promo 
-Grants 7.10 7.10 6.30 6.30 9.53 9.45
Total 49.93 63.53 70.04 105.01 41.88 46.31
Source: EFTÀ/EC, Annex VI, 11/86, "Government Aids to
Industry in Switzerland: 7; Bundesamt fur Aussenwirtschaft 
(1987) "Government Aids to Industry in Switzerland, October 
14.
Nevertheless, a substantial portion of support for industry 
was derived at the cantonal (or state) level; Switzerland 
ranked first among twenty-two OECD countries in terms of 
"the independence of regional authorities for central 
government in financing and decision-making. Out of 
twenty-six cantons, thirteen provided their industries with 
direct aid (grants, lower interest rates, security losses). 
Areas that were particularly affected by the recession of
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the 1970s - namely the watch cantons (Group A) of Soluthurn, 
Jura, Berne, Basle country, Neuchatel, and Vaud - received 
cantonal aid, mainly in the form of guarantees and interest 
rate subsidies. Cantonal aid was also awarded to the 
mountain cantons (Group B) and the Midland cantons (Group 
C). (See Figure 5.22.)
Figure 5.22
Cantonal Support to Industry in Switzerland. 1981-1985 
(Net Cost Expenditures in Millions S.Fr.)
Canton 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Group A 2.1 5.4 12.0 7.1 9.4
Group B 1.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.3
Group C 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
3.7 6.5 13.4 8.7 11.2
Source: EFTA/EC, Annex VI, 11/86, "Government Aids to
Industry in Switzerland: 8.
This minimal amount of State aid, even through the 
cantons, illustrates that the crisis of the latter 1970s was 
insufficient to prompt the Swiss State to use large-scale 
measures of intervention. Notably in 1978, under the 
regional programme that focused on the watch cantons in the 
Jura, the State began to grant only limited subsidisation 
and loan guarantees for private investment projects that 
were considered promising. Stated one government official, 
"In principal, if there were any problems within any 
industry other than the watch industry, the government would 
not step in.
Moreover, completely opposite to both the Irish 
industrial structure and the Irish industrial policy
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orientation, Switzerland's indigenous industrial structure
was filled with large multinational corporations that
remained relatively closed to foreign companies seeking FDI
through acquisition. During the 1980s Switzerland's
commercial code had few limits on the way in which companies
wrote their statutes, and directors could refuse to register
a shareholder for nearly any reason. Stated one British
newspaper, "The Swiss legal system allows Swiss companies to
be virtually bid-proof, while the UK, along with the US, is
probably the most open market in the world. As Urs W.
Benz explains.
There are instances where restrictions on the free 
transfer of shares are in the interest of corporations 
and/or their shareholders. Most often one finds 
transfer restrictions in the charters of so-called 
closed corporations or family corporations. Such 
transfer restrictions are designed to maintain the 
original balance of control, avoiding the sale of 
shares to outside persons, or to ensure that shares can 
be held only by members of one of a few families.
As a consequence, Swiss MNCs preferred to protect their
large MNCs' to preserve their national character, avoid
dependence on foreign competitors, and maintain government
contacts in some cases where only domestic producers would
be considered. Hence, Swiss MNCs usually maintained one of
the following restrictions with regard to ownership:
1) only Swiss citizens may be registered as 
shareholders ;
2) foreigners and foreign companies may not be 
registered as shareholders. Swiss companies that 
are controlled by foreigners are regarded as 
foreign companies;
3) only Swiss citizens and foreigners who are 
domiciled in Switzerland may be registered 
shareholders ;
4) the board of directors may refuse a new 
shareholder without stating a reason;
5) the board of directors may refuse a new
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shareholder 'on important grounds';
6) the board of directors may refuse a new 
shareholder if one of certain enumerated grounds 
applies; and
7) a foreigner may not acquire more than a certain 
number or percentage of nominal shares.
In the 1980s all of the following companies had such
restrictions: Alusuisse, Bank Leu, Ciba Geigy, Hasler
Holding, Kolderbank, Nestle,Oerlikon-Buhrle Holding,
Schweiz Bankverein, Schweiz Ruckversicherung, Sibra Holding,
Sulzer, Swissair, and Winterthur.
Moreover, the State granted Swiss multinationals an
extreme amount of independence in which Swiss firms were
able to build up hidden assets (Stille Reserven). The
reasons for the secrecy was the fear that if the size of
assets were to become public, this would spur government
taxation and further recognition from international
competitors. As a consequence, corporate reporting was
extremely lax in Switzerland. During the 1980s a number of
corporations did not publish consolidated reports because
there were no formal balance sheet schemes required^^®. As
Pauchard explains,
...no precise scheme of regulations exists for the 
composition of the balance sheet and the profit and 
loss account, and the reporting of companies with a 
broad shareholder base is, at best, as good as in other 
continental European countries, where accounting 
standards have probably not affected the economy 
negatively.
Moreover, in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Swiss taxes 
were by far the lowest of all the small European states, 
hovering just above Japanese rates. Swiss revenue loss 
remained around 2.85% of GDP, which was much higher than in
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other OECD coun t r i e s . I n general, it should be remembered 
that the Swiss themselves directly voted on how much they 
should tax themselves and their corporations (indeed, a 
unique, if not startling, circumstance). The proportion of 
federal, cantonal, and local taxes to GDP per capita was 
just over thirty p e r c e n t . T a x  reliefs included those for 
"interesting" firms, which consisted of partial or total tax 
exemption for a period of up to ten years or additional 
possibilities for depreciation.^®^
In taking an active role in stimulating Swiss 
industrial competitiveness, the State did attempt to 
positively affect industry through two notable policies: 
export risk guarantees and export promotion. The Export Risk 
Guarantees (ERG), operated by the Office Suisse d ’Expansion 
Commerciale, provided risk guarantees for depreciation of 
foreign currency, difficulties for transfer, insolvability 
or the refusal to pay, extraordinary measures taken by 
foreign states or political events, and problems of 
transportation to foreign recipient. By the mid-1980s, 
new guarantee issues were reduced; in 1985 these totalled 
two million S.Fr., which represented a decrease of twenty 
percent from the preceding year of 2.5 million S.Fr. ERG 
coverage was phased down because of the suspension of 
guarantees against monetary risk after April 1985, the 
decision to use the private sector to shoulder more of the 
coverage burden, and the general reticence to accord 
guarantees for projects in countries with high political 
risks. ( See Figures 5.23 and 5.24.)
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Figure 5.23
Guarantees Provided bv the GRE in Switzerland. 1974-1985
(Total Numbers)
Year No. of Guarantees New Guarantees
1974 6,456 3,406.0 6,921.3
1975 7,492 3,067.6 8,465.5
1976 8,718 6,216.7 12,663.9
1977 10,703 6,310.4 16,166.0
1978 14,325 8,877.3 22,957.5
1979 14,593 6,332.3 25,470.8
1980 15,596 6,959.4 25,282.6
1981 11,469 4,481.5 22,280.5
1982 9,315 2,345.3 19,694.4
1983 8,787 4,184.5 17,989.4
1984 7,961 2,513.5 15,837.7
1985 7,613 2,007.5 14,123.2
Source: Office de Gestion De La Garantie Contre Les Risques
a L*Exportation (1986) "Rapport Sur L'Exercice de la 
Garantie Contre Les Risques a L'Exportation:" 11.
Total
Figure 
Engagements for
5.24
Ail Branches. 1985
Sector m.S.Fr. Part in % Part +/- 1984
Machines 11319 80.15 —5.6
Chemicals 969 6.86 -40.2
Watches 59 0.42 -67.0
Textiles/ 131 0.93 -33.6
Clothing
Construction 990 7.00 -12.6
Permits 7 0.05 -31.0
Engineering 549 3.88 -11.9
Miscellaneous 99 0.71 -12.6
Source: Office de Gestion De La Garantie Contre Les Risques
a L'Exportation (1986) "Rapport Sur L'Exercice de la
Garantie Contre Les Risques a L'Exportation:" 13.
Second, export promotion was one of the most important 
aspects of Swiss industrial policy and was run by the 2,500 
member Office Suisse d'Expansion Commerciale (OSEC) [the
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Swiss Office for Commercial Expansion]. Throughout the 
1980s the Federal Department of Public Economy contributed 
one-third of its budget for export promotion, and it 
accomplished its tasks in a consultative procedure among the 
Vorort, foreign chambers of commerce, and Swiss embassies 
around the world. In general, the Swiss Export Promotion 
Programme attempted to gather and distribute information on 
foreign markets in favour of Swiss companies; gather and 
distribute information on Swiss goods and services;^®® 
organise, manage, and assist in finding business partners 
abroad; and organise trade fairs and special conferences.^^ 
In general, it remained an effective policy avenue because 
of the highly organised system of interaction among the 
State, foreign Swiss Chambers of Commerce, embassies and 
consulates, foreign representations, and OSEC.
In sum, Switzerland devoted a relatively small 
proportion of its fiscal budget towards industrial policy 
measures because of societal disaffection for fiscal 
intervention as well as the lack of necessity for industrial 
policy-making given the performance of the Swiss economy. 
Nonetheless, the State did have a minimal form of industrial 
policy that was implemented primarily at the cantonal level. 
Because of its oligopolised industrial structure. State 
R & D policies were less notable than technology development 
from within its major industrial firms.
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5.5 The Role of the State in Developing Industrial 
Policies: Lessons from the Case Studies
This chapter has examined the role of the State in 
developing and implementing industrial policies in each of 
the four case studies. To different degrees each of the 
four small European states used various forms of industrial 
policy-making during the 1980s.
In Ireland, from the 1970s through the beginning of the
1980s industrial policy-making had historically emphasised
the funding of a large State enterprise sector, along with
promoting inward FDI. Agriculture, the state's most
important sector, remained heavily subsidised from both the 
EC and the Irish State. By 1984 the State began to assess 
ways in which its industrial policy could be improved, 
specifically by examining the overall effects on Ireland's 
weak industrial structure as opposed to the effects on 
unemployment.
As the primary administrator of Ireland's industrial 
policy, the IDA became increasingly cognisant of attracting 
only those foreign subsidiaries that would add long-term 
benefits, benefits which could be achieved by carefully 
scrutinising foreign subsidiaries' industrial projects. In 
so doing, the IDA would preclude the historical problems of 
foreign subsidiary short-term employment and attracting only 
assembly plants where technology transfer to Irish 
indigenous industry could not take place. Needless to say, 
Ireland's indigenous industry remained small and without a 
significant technological base; as a result the new focus on
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industrial policy was not only one of encouraging improved 
direct foreign investment, but also of funding targeted 
sunrise sectors, such as the chemicals and electronics 
industry.
Consequently, under the Programme for National 
Recovery, the Irish State initiated a major transformation 
of its industrial policy, in which the new emphasis was 
placed on value for money defined in terms of wealth 
creation (as opposed to employment). At the same time, 
appreciating that its international competitiveness was 
being sapped by wage-inspired inflation, the State also 
worked with the ICTU and the FUE to suppress wage growth. 
(See Chapter Four). Through cooperative bilateral relations 
between the State and industry, by 1987 the State developed 
new industrial policy initiatives that stressed assistance 
to only high technology, sunrise industries. By initiating 
this programme as well as bringing about major wage 
reductions in 1987, the State established itself as the 
principal actor in attempting to elevate Ireland's level of 
international competitiveness.
In a similar vein, Denmark's industrial structure was 
composed of small- and medium-sized enterprises, operating 
primarily in the agricultural field. While Denmark's 
agricultural sector was also heavily subsidised by the CAP, 
its industrial policy had historically been one of non­
intervention; a Ministry of Industry was formed only by the 
latter part of the 1970s and there were few if any 
nationalised industries.
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Nonetheless, the international recession at the 
beginning of the 1980s negatively affected some of Denmark's 
most important industries, the most notable of which was 
shipbuilding. As a result, despite the State's rhetoric of 
avoiding subsidisation into "declining" sectors, the State 
disbursed a significant amount of its budget into various 
credit and leasing programmes to subsidise the ailing 
industry. Unlike Sweden, Denmark continued on a relatively 
inflexible course, pumping in public funding to the 
shipbuilding industry with varying annual amounts dependent 
upon the political winds. (See Figure 5.4.)
By the mid-1980s bilateral relations between the State 
and industry began to shift from detached to cooperative 
bilateral as Denmark's industrialists and policy-makers 
reassessed their industrial policy objectives. In 
particular, they evaluated Denmark's relatively weak, low 
technology oriented industrial structure. Due to the 
efforts of the "industrial modernists" in an interactive 
process involving several governmental ministries and 
industries, Danish industrial policy was transformed into a 
nationwide effort to modernise their industrial structure 
through comprehensive technology programmes. In particular, 
the State initiated a technology diffusion programme that 
resulted in increased levels of high technology good 
exports, and because of Denmark's large agro-industrial 
complex, it spearheaded a bio-technology programme. Despite 
the State's inability to control other negative economic 
factors (e.g., unemployment, inflation, current account
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deficit, foreign debt) through other fiscal policies, it 
provided the important impetus in recognising a primary 
state deficiency - its industrial structure. As a 
consequence, the State was the principal actor in Denmark in 
attempting to restore its level of international 
competitiveness.
The Swedish case of the 1980s provides a stimulating 
parallel. In 1976, the centre-right parties, which overtook 
the Social Democrats, provided significant subsidisation to 
the ailing shipbuilding sector, including nationalisation 
efforts of particular shipyards. In 1982, however, under 
Social Democratic leadership, shipbuilding subsidies were 
cut off, and what was once one of Sweden's largest 
industries no longer existed by the middle of the 1980s.
From 1982 onwards the SAP changed Sweden's past industrial 
policy orientation away from restructuring and reduction to 
growth and renewal. The Swedish Ministry of Industry also 
attempted to spur its already oligopolised, high technology 
oriented industrial structure by spending on R & D 
programmes.
Because of Sweden's Solidaristic Wage Policy that 
forced companies to pay agreed-upon wages, only the 
strongest and largest could survive; as a result, unlike 
states such as Denmark and Ireland that had weak industrial 
structures, Sweden was filled with large MNCs. (See Chapter 
Four) With the State pumping money into the economy for 
reemployment, evidenced through regional policies that were 
complemented by active labour market polices in areas most
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affected by the shipbuilding closures, Swedish 
multinationals were highly productive, maintained low real 
unit labour costs, and were able to contribute vast sums of 
money for technological development. Through cooperative 
bilateral relations between the State and industry, the 
Swedish State complemented corporate R & D investment, 
providing the highest per capita amount of any state in the 
world.
With excellent economic performance and cultural 
aversion against interventionism, Switzerland had relatively 
minor industrial policies. With the Swiss industrial 
structure composed primarily of internationally powerful 
MNCs, the Swiss orientation towards inward FDI differed 
dramatically from the Irish industrial policy of enticing 
foreign companies to locate on domestic soil. With an 
already powerful industrial structure, Swiss laws remained 
compliant with indigenous industries' desire to prevent 
foreign ownership of Swiss MNCs through restrictive share 
ownership. Indeed, while Ireland ranked first in a survey 
of twenty-two OECD countries in terms of "the extent to 
which foreign investment is welcome at home," Switzerland 
ranked twentieth.^®®
For the most part Swiss industrial policies that 
attempted to stimulate the state's industrial 
competitiveness were implemented at the cantonal level, 
though its export credit guarantee and export promotion 
programmes remained excellent examples of successful federal 
programme development and implementation. Similar in
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industrial structure to Sweden, Switzerland maintained an 
industrial structure filled with large, high technology 
oriented MNCs that were backed by Switzerland's powerful 
financial institutions. (See Chapter Three.) In 
Switzerland, however, the State played only a relatively 
minor role in granting R & D assistance.
Nonetheless, for both Switzerland and Sweden the record 
on patents provides a poignant illustration of just how 
effective technological development was for both states 
during the 1980s. Switzerland and Sweden ranked first and 
fourth, respectively, among twenty-two OECD countries in 
terms of the average annual number of patents granted to 
residents per 100,000 inhabitants between 1984-1986. (See 
Figure 5.25.) At the same time, both states successfully 
secured patent rights from abroad; they were ranked first 
and second, respectively, by the number of patents in the 
rest of the world per one-hundred thousand inhabitants. 
Moreover, both states' industrials protected their patent 
rights and secured them for their own use; Switzerland and 
Sweden ranked eighteenth and nineteenth among twenty-two 
OECD countries in terms of patents granted to foreign 
competitors.
With such impressive R & D results in these two states, 
the evidence provided in this chapter with regard to Denmark 
and Ireland illustrate the level of importance that both 
states placed on technological development. While Sweden 
and Switzerland maintained powerful industrial structures 
that could afford to invest in technological development.
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Figure 5.25
NUMBER OF PATENTS PER THOUSAND INHABITANTS
IN 1985
S o u r c e :  W o r ld  Indus t r i al  P r o p e r t y  O r g a n i z a t i o n  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .  
I n du s t r i a l  P r o p e r t y  S t a t i s t ics
-  In Force 
~ Granted
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much as a consequence of the impetus provided by each 
state's principal actor, neither Denmark nor Ireland 
possessed the industrial structure for this important form 
of investment. Consequently, in both states the State 
assumed the responsiblity for modernising its industrial 
structure, acting as the catalyst to foster industrial 
technological development. In Denmark, industrial policy and 
technology policy were terms that could be used 
interchangeably by the middle of the 1980s. In Ireland, the 
State's realisation that its industrial policy was not 
effective in transforming foreign subsidiary technology to 
its indigenous industry caused a major reformation of 
industrial policy focus.
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Chapter Six
Explaining Differences in Small European State International 
Competitiveness in the 1980s and Looking Towards the 1990s
6.1 The Small European State As an International Price 
Taker: Domestic Interventionism as a Necessity in
the 1980s
This thesis has argued that because small European 
state industries are usually international price takers, 
during the 1980s small European states were forced to use 
various forms of intervention - such as monetary, labour 
market, and industrial policies - that acted as necessary 
complements to interaction between industry, financial 
institutions, and labour. However, because small European 
states remained dependent on international trade as a result 
of their limited producing and consuming markets, small 
state policy-makers also favoured in their public statements 
multilateralism in order to guarantee unobstructed trade.
One can conclude from this paradox that small states 
inherently followed an 'embedded liberalist' path, one where 
"... multilateralism and domestic stability were coupled and 
even conditioned by one another...."^ Yet at the same time 
through various forms of intervention, the State actively 
supported state priorities and societal values in an attempt 
to provide such state benefits as full employment, a higher 
standard of living, a social welfare system based on 
equality, and higher levels of international competitiveness 
for industry.
For scholars of international political economy, the
n
y
/
385
lessons of the four case studies provide a source for 
analysis and investigation in studying the nature of the 
international economic system in the 1980s. In particular, 
given the various state-specific policy programmes discussed 
throughout the thesis, the small European state example 
questions whether the international economic system was 
'liberal' during the decade.
Two significant questions with regard to the nature of 
the international economic system must be addressed. First, 
one must consider whether small European state domestic 
interventionism was indicative of the policy-making efforts 
of all states in the 1980s as a means to remain 
internationally competitive. In this respect, small 
European states may not have been distinctive. Small 
European states had only limited political and economic 
power, yet evidence from the thesis suggests that these 
states were able to use various forms of policy-making to 
attempt to maintain international competitiveness. One must 
question whether the small state example suggests that large 
states could, or did, use similar state-specific policy 
programmes during the 1980s without recrimination from their 
trading partners. Given the small European state's limited 
political and economic power, perhaps their interventionism 
was simply overlooked by large states? Or, maybe one could 
surmise that small European state policy-maker rhetoric 
worked.
Second, serious consideration must be given to the 
question of whether all states, small or large, required
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domestic interventionism to sustain international 
competitiveness. If indeed state-specific policy-making 
remained a necessity for states to remain internationally 
competitive, analysis of the international economic system 
by political economists will be guided less by such 
unqualified terms as free trade and protectionism. Such 
stark distinctions become obsolete in a world where all 
states have forms of domestic policy programmes - from 
strategic trade policies^ to industrial policies - to 
stimulate political-economic performance as well as to 
augment their industries' competitiveness in world markets.^ 
For example, as John Zysman contends, any State has as 
many as four policy orientation alternatives through which 
it can help industry remain internationally competitive. 
First, the State can abide by the outcomes of market 
competition, avoiding any form of policy interference. 
Second, the State can attempt to influence industry through 
aggregate macroeconomic measures that affect all sectors 
equally, such as taxes or monetary policies. Third, the 
State can grant support to particular industries or sectors. 
Finally, the State can protect domestic firms, either by 
external protection or defensive subsidy.*
Of the four options, only the first option of economic 
liberalism was not employed in the case studies because of 
the small European state's international economic 
vulnerability. Contrary to those who have suggested that 
small European states are forced to employ 'laissez-faire,' 
'liberal,' 'open,' or 'free trade' practices because of
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their international vulnerability, during the 1980s small
European states used various state-specific policy
programmes, which often included labour market policies,
monetary policies, R & D policies, policies that provided
capital transfers to troubled industries, or policies that
promoted export expansion. (See Figures 1.12 and 1.13.)
At the same time, because of the small European state's
high level of dependence on foreign markets, during the
1980s small European state policy-makers developed public
images for their states of commitments to both openness and
economic programmes based on laissez-faire principles. These
policy-makers developed particular patterned habits of
expression - ways they desired larger states to perceive
their policy-making. As Peter Gourevitch explains.
The growth of neo-liberalism [has been] in rhetoric and 
to a lesser degree in reality. In the early 1970s the 
challenge to consensus came largely from the left in 
demands for more democratization of the economy: 
workers' control, co-management, union investment 
funds, equality of income. A decade later the focus 
has shifted to themes of productivity, renewal, job 
creation, rationalization, and restoring 
competitiveness.^
6.2 From Rhetoric to Reality: Examining Interventionism in
Denmark. Ireland. Sweden, and Switzerland during the 
1980s
Of the four case studies, Switzerland was the best 
example of a small European state that limited its use of 
State policies to stimulate international competitiveness. 
Despite having subsidised the watchmaking industry in 
earlier years, during the 1980s direct defensive subsidies 
were hardly used; instead, its limited direct forms of
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industrial intervention were conducted primarily through 
regional policies implemented by the cantons. Even so, 
Switzerland did not follow a truly "liberal" approach; 
Switzerland did have various forms of policy-making, and the 
Swiss market was not particularly open.
For the most part, the State attempted to influence 
industry through aggregate measures that affected all 
sectors equally, notably monetary policies and favourable 
corporate tax rates. Switzerland's societal disdain for 
inflation resulted in a distinctly Swiss form of State 
intervention: active monetary policies that attempted to (a) 
suppress inflation through monetary aggregates, (b) maintain 
exchange rate stability, and (c) keep real interest rates 
low for strong finance-industry relations. Under this 
strategy, Switzerland was able to maintain its status as an 
international financial centre.
At the same time, while not employing significant 
resources on labour market policy, Swiss policy-making 
included highly restrictive immigration laws. In times of 
recession the State quickly adjusted by closing off its 
borders, and in times of economic growth, it allowed 
foreigners to enter the country.
In terms of inward FDI, Switzerland was highly 
protected by Swiss multinationals who restricted share 
ownership in order to prevent foreign takeovers.
Giant Swiss firms such as Nestle were protected by Swiss 
laws on equity ownership, which allowed Swiss companies to 
differentiate between bearer and registered shares, the
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latter of which could only be owned by Swiss citizens.® As 
explained in one British newspaper, "The Swiss legal system 
allows Swiss companies to be virtually bid-proof."^
Moreover, under Swiss law, a company that was more than 
thirty percent owned by a non-Swiss company did not have the 
right to acquire real estate in Switzerland. Hence, foreign 
MNCs could not buy land for the purposes of development; 
this legal restriction remained another barrier to foreign 
companies' freedom of operations in Switzerland.
In Sweden the beginning of the 1980s was marked, most 
notably, by the State continuing to subsidise the ailing 
shipbuilding industry. Only by the end of the bourgeois 
interregnum in 1982 did direct subsidies to industry end. 
With the return of the SAP to power, the State pledged to 
reverse its old policies of defensive subsidisation and 
nationalisation, "creating favourable conditions" and 
avoidance of "regulating development in a predetermined 
way."® Such circumlocution translated into other forms of 
intervention, including various monetary, labour market, and 
industrial policies. The coordinated effect of these 
policies was a solid level of growth and a high degree of 
international competitiveness for Swedish MNCs.
Towards the end of the bourgeois interregnum the 
government attempted to stimulate growth through the two 
devaluations of 1981 and 1982. Different from Swiss 
monetary policy, which emphasised retarding inflation, 
Sweden's monetary policy was geared towards economic 
stimulation. With the return of the SAP and enhanced
390
economic performance primarily because of the devaluations, 
the government imposed several labour market and industrial 
policies. In particular, retraining and mobility programmes 
provided employment opportunities in those areas where 
former shipyards were located. The combination of active 
labour market policies with industrial policies, which 
provided financial and tax incentives for companies to 
locate in formerly distressed areas, increased employment 
and growth in these previously unproductive areas.®
During the 1980s the Swedish government attempted to 
stimulate its enterprises' technological competitiveness by 
providing significant State R & D funds. On a percentage 
basis the Swedish State used more of its budget for 
industrial technological development than any other State in 
the world. Moreover, as was discussed in Chapter Five, 
while Sweden and Switzerland were rated first and second in 
gaining patents abroad per 100,000 inhabitants, they were 
also third and fourth in restricting non-residents from 
securing patents.^
In addition, similar to Swiss MNCs, Swedish MNCs also 
had both restricted and free shares. Swedish companies 
owning property in Sweden were allowed to issue free shares 
up to forty percent of the share capital or twenty percent 
of the votes, and purchase of free shares by foreigners 
required the permission of the Swedish Exchange Control. As 
T.E. Cooke explains, "This unusual distinction between 
restricted and free shares has protectionist overtones ... 
the limitation on foreign purchases of shares in Sweden
391
effectively prevents a hostile takeover by a foreigner."^ 
Around three-fifths of the Stockholm bourse's capitalization 
remained in firm hands, the majority of which was controlled 
by the Wallenberg family. Only about a fifth of the stock 
market took the form of unrestricted shares, which 
foreigners could own but have few or no voting rights.
In a completely different vein from both Sweden and 
Switzerland, because of Ireland's relatively underdeveloped 
economy and weak industrial structure, the Irish state 
remained quite open. While maintaining an industrial policy 
that featured various tax and capital enticements for 
foreign MNCs to locate on Irish soil, the State also heavily 
subsidised a large commercial State sector, although exact 
figures on subsidisation to particular State commercial 
enterprises are difficult, if not impossible, to uncover in 
the literature provided by the government, the Ministry of 
Industry, or the IDA.
State interventionism in Ireland was directed primarily 
through the IDA'S inward FDI incentives schemes, while 
monetary and labour market policies were de-emphasised. 
Because of wage-inspired inflation, Ireland's monetary 
policies throughout most of the 1980s were based on measures 
to slow inflation, primarily through high real interest 
rates. Unlike Sweden, which used labour market policies as 
a means to suppress unemployment, Ireland had relatively few 
manpower programmes; instead, the State offered generous 
unemployment insurance benefits that discouraged unemployed 
workers from seeking jobs.
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Only by the end of the decade under The Programme for 
National Recovery did interventionism become an integral 
part of the State's effort to improve economic performance 
and modernise its industrial structure. The programme 
featured a monetary policy to suppress real interest rates, 
labour market policies to retrain yesterday's unemployed 
workers for tomorrow's employment opportunities, and an 
active industrial policy geared to building sunrise sectors 
through more selectively targeted inward FDI promotion.
Throughout the 1980s in Denmark, the State continued to 
subsidise the ailing shipbuilding industry, providing 
significant funding to a sunset industry. Despite these 
defensive subsidies, the Danish State insisted that it was 
not granting "crisis" support or "aid to enterprises in 
difficulties;" it instead was providing "sectoral 
m e a s u r e s . W h i l e  the State provided these defensive 
subsidies, national subsidy limits imposed by international 
and EC rules were not surpassed. Indeed, the Danish State 
spent a significant proportion of its budget on its welfare 
state, yet there were few policies that integrated these 
social policies with other forms of policies to spur 
employment opportunities, as in Sweden.
Unlike the other three case studies, the Danish State 
was relatively passive in developing any form of policy­
making. Monetary policies to inhibit inflation were 
ineffective primarily because of wage drift (in contrast to 
the experience of states such as Switzerland); as a result, 
Danish monetary policy throughout much of the 1980s was
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restrictive, while in nearby Sweden monetary policy-making 
stimulated growth. Moreover, even with high levels of 
unemployment, the Danish State had relatively few labour 
market programmes designed to create employment, as did the 
Swedish State. Instead, a generous unemployment insurance 
programme decreased incentives for Danish labour to work. 
Finally, even with a relatively weak industrial structure, 
Danish industrial policy-making was centred on defensive 
subsidisation to the shipbuilding industry. Beyond this 
subsidisation, the State had few industrial policies to 
stimulate growth and renewal of Danish industry; certainly 
the first half of the decade could be characterised by 
"persistently liberal" industrial policy-making in 
Denmark.
Only in the mid-1980s did the Danish State introduce an 
industrial policy aimed at stimulating Danish industries' 
technological competitiveness. Yet these policy measures 
were an example of "too little, too late." Other forms of 
interventionism were still not actively employed; monetary 
policies still stifled growth, and there were few if any 
labour market programmes designed to stimulate employment. 
The result of such inadequate interventionism was weaker 
economic performance - unemployment, inflation, a current 
account deficit, a continuing weak industrial structure, and 
greater reliance on the EC.
Moreover, unlike small European states with weak 
industrial structures, such as Ireland, the Danish State had 
few incentives for foreign MNCs to locate on Danish soil.
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According to The World Competitiveness Report, out of 
twenty“two OECD countries Denmark ranked sixteenth in terms 
of "the extent to which inbound foreign investment is 
welcome;" Ireland ranked first, Switzerland second to last, 
and Sweden fourteenth.^® To a great extent, the high 
taxation rate in Denmark inhibited inward FDI into the 
country.
In sum, during the 1980s despite being vulnerable to 
international political pressures, to varying degrees small 
states implemented forms of intervention to maintain or 
augment their levels of international competitiveness. In 
cases such as Sweden and Switzerland policy-makers publicly 
stressed their support for openness, but restrictive 
practices in terms of patents, land ownership, and 
immigration, as well as strict corporate laws regarding 
foreign share ownership were less than subtle forms of 
protectionism. Because Ireland and Denmark had relatively 
weak industrial structures, different strategies of 
intervention were followed. While the Irish State provided 
significant capital and taxation incentives to entice 
foreign subsidiaries onto Irish soil, the Danish State's 
relatively high taxation system and lack of incentives 
failed to bring inward FDI into Denmark.
According to The World Competitiveness Report, Ireland 
ranked last out of twenty-two OECD countries in terms of 
"the extent to which inward trade is hampered by 
protectionist policies," while Switzerland, Denmark, and 
Sweden ranked fourth, fifth, and sixth, respectively.^^ At
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the same time, small state rhetoric seemed to be paying off. 
In terms of "the extent to which the [domestic] business 
community suffers from protectionism abroad," graded from 
least to worst, Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland ranked 
third, fourth, and eighth, respectively. Only the Danish 
business community seemed to be suffering from foreign 
protectionism - Denmark ranked seventeenth.^®
Notably Switzerland and Sweden had state-specific 
forms of interventionism that during the 1980s engendered 
successful economic performance and strong industrial 
structures. In Ireland, only by the end of the decade did 
interventionism take on a favourable light through The 
Programme for National Recovery. In Denmark, however, the 
State exercised relatively ineffective policy-making in all 
three areas examined in the thesis - monetary, labour 
market, and industrial policies. Only by the end of the 
decade did Danish policy-makers wisely begin to move away 
from its past "persistently liberal" industrial policy.
In all cases small state policy-making to stimulate 
industrial competitiveness was based on augmenting the 
state's social infrastructure of financing, labour skills, 
education, and technology, which allowed for favourable, 
flexible market change. Despite rhetoric claiming that 
industrial policy-making was not used, that the State 
followed a "liberal" form of economic policy-making, or that 
small states were forced to remain open because of their 
fear of large state retaliation, during the 1980s the 
successful employment of the various forms of
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interventionism discussed in previous chapters was a
necessity for the small European state. As John Hall and
G. John Ikenberry contend in their book on The State,
...small countries in modern capitalist societies have 
no choice but to develop State capacity in order to 
respond flexibly to the market by internal change; they 
do not have the option of larger states, better 
insulated from international economic shocks to seek to 
change the rules of international economic life. 
However, ... State power depends, at least in part, 
upon the intelligence, nimbleness, and skill of
political actors; if social actors are given particular
cards much depends upon the way they play them.
If policy-making was constructively employed, it acted as a
necessary complement to working relations between industry,
financial institutions, and labour. If intervention was not
used effectively, decreasing levels of international
competitiveness resulted.
6.3 Small European State International Competitiveness;
A Product of the State's Internal Interactive Process
A. Lessons in Studvina the Small European State's 
Internal Interactive Process
This thesis has taken a step beyond the concepts 
introduced by Peter J. Katzenstein in his book Small States 
in World Markets. Katzenstein has advanced the argument 
that the small European state attempts to achieve its 
competitive advantage against larger states by opting 
against protectionism and direct intervention. The small 
European state utilises its small size to achieve fluid and 
effective lines of communication among peak associations, 
allowing for a flexible response to global economic changes.
This thesis argues that the Katzenstein model
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ineffectively evaluates small European state political- 
economic performance by over-generalising at the expense of 
state-specific analysis. The quadrilateral model developed 
in this thesis provides a framework that accounts for both 
the dynamic and the individual nature of states. At the 
same time, the model does not assume that (1) small European 
states develop economic programmes based on economic 
liberalism, (2) they have effective bargaining processes,
(3) their small size breeds effective political-economic 
performance, or (4) all small European states have high 
levels of international competitiveness. This thesis offers 
a framework by which these states can be analyzed and their 
bargaining processes differentiated. Divergences from the 
Katzenstein model are discussed below.
Interventionism. Previous chapters and former sections 
of this chapter argued that the small European state did 
indeed use state-specific policy programmes in the 1980s to 
stimulate political-economic performance. While several 
scholars have argued in the political economy literature 
that small states are forced to develop economic programmes 
based on laissez-faire principles and openness as a result 
of comparatively weak international political and economic 
statures, it has been argued in this thesis that the small 
state interventionism in the 1980s was consistent with the 
pressures of the world market and necessary because in most
cases small state industries were price takers. At the same
time, the impact of such state intervention was not large
enough to provoke retaliation.
3 9 8
Corporatism. Many scholars have accepted that 
corporatism is the competitive advantage necessary for the 
small European state to remain internationally competitive. 
However, small European states did not necessarily have "an 
ideology of social partnership, shared by both business and 
expressed in national politics," nor was there necessarily 
"a voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting 
objectives.Both of these are central tenets to 
Katzenstein*s democratic corporatism. As was shown in 
previous chapters, during the 1980s the economic performance 
of Denmark was relatively poor despite most Danish scholars 
agreeing that domestic interaction in Denmark should be 
characterised by 'negotiation.Perhaps most detrimental 
to the Danish economy was the inability of its actors, 
particularly its trade unions and industry, to solve 
difficult economic problems.
Size. This thesis has not accepted that the size of 
states necessarily brings political-economic success. While 
the competitive advantage of the small European state is its 
geographic proximity that breeds actor familiarity, not all 
small European states were able to use their monocephalic 
communication advantage to bring high levels of 
international competitiveness. For example, in both Denmark 
and Ireland the inability of trade unions and industry to 
effectively minimise wage drift induced significant wage- 
inspired inflation. As a result, during most of the 1980s 
both states were forced to employ austerity policies that 
hindered economic growth.
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State-specific analysis. This thesis contends that the 
best method of studying small European state political- 
economic performance is to study each state individually, 
examining state-specific internal interaction during a 
particular time period. The internal interactive processes 
of states are not only dynamic, but each state has different 
state priorities and societal values. State priorities 
include such factors as the state's level of economic 
performance, the strength of the state's industrial 
structure, and the state's ability to maintain independence 
and autonomy. Societal values affect the way in which these 
priorities are pursued - through various state-specific 
policy preferences and through the role of state actors in 
facilitating these means. Referred to in this thesis as 
industrial culture, the unique history and current 
political, social, and economic positions of states pave the 
individual path that the state will follow in attempting to 
maintain or augment international competitiveness.
The communication process. The communication process 
of actors in each small European state remains unique, 
though variances in the ability of actors to effectively 
communicate influence the relative success of political- 
economic performance. As was expressed in Chapter Two, each 
state's industrial culture either nurtures or inhibits a 
general domestic environment under which values and 
priorities should be convergent for high levels of 
political-economic performance. Under cooperative 
relations, interaction between actors is familiar.
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consultation and exchange is both frequent and orderly, and 
the policy-making process is typically efficient and 
effective. However, under detached relations, actor 
exchange is distant and infrequent; policy-making is usually 
unproductive and ineffective. Depending upon the level of 
cooperation or detachment of relations among actors, the 
small European state fashions a state-specific process of 
interaction that either breeds or obstructs international 
competitiveness.
The continuity of relations. The ability of the small 
European state's major economic actors - industry, financial 
institutions, labour, and the State - to interact under a 
system of cooperative relations leads to economic success. 
Under continuous quadrilateral relations, the small European 
state is able to fashion a process of interaction 
characterised by orderly and relatively uninterrupted 
communication among the state's four major economic actors.
A principal actor sets priorities, develops programmes, and 
implements changes as a result of the power it has garnered 
through years of development and interaction with other 
actors. This systematised process is complemented by 
effective domestic intervention. However, when relations 
between two or more actors becomes detached, relations 
become intermittent. Under intermittent quadrilateral 
relations, the small European state's level of international 
competitiveness depends on the degree of detachment between 
and among actors and the effects of this on actor 
coordination and policy progress.
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B. Usina the Small European State Interactive 
Framework: The Case Studies Compared
This thesis has argued and interpreted why some small 
European states were more internationally competitive than 
others during the 1980s. In all cases, state-specific 
interaction was complemented by various forms of domestic 
interventionism, necessary because of the small state's 
international vulnerability and its role generally as a 
price taker. As evidenced by the Swiss and Swedish cases, 
the degree of international competitiveness of the small 
European state resulted from its systematised process of 
internal interaction, derived from its industrial culture, 
which is composed of both state priorities and societal 
values. However, as evidenced by the Irish and Danish 
cases, without the capability for dialogue and 
communication, and without effective complementary policy­
making, the small European state lost the small state 
competitive advantage necessary to compete for growing 
markets against larger states.
This section will analyse the interactive processes of 
each of the four small European states. Following 
narratives on each of the states will be diagrams that 
summarise the main points of discussion within the body of 
the thesis. While Switzerland and Sweden had relatively 
continuous quadrilateral processes of interaction among 
important economic actors, in Ireland and Denmark 
intermittent quadrilateral relations thwarted higher levels 
of international competitiveness. (See Figure 6.1.)
Figure 6.1
THE NATURE OF RELATIONS AMONG FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, TRADE UNIONS, 
INDUSTRY, AND THE STATE: THE CASE STUDIES COMPARED
DENMARK IRELAND SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
Financial institution-industry 
relations, 1980-1987
Relatively cooperative Detached Cooperative Highly cooperative
Trade union-industry relations, 
1980-1987
Detached Detached Cooperative Cooperative
State-industry relations, 1980- 
1987
Detached Relatively cooperative Cooperative Relatively detached
Quadrilateral relatbns (financial 
institutions, trade unions, 
industry. State), 1980-1987
Intermittent Intermittent Continuous Relatively continuous
Quadrilateral relations: 
forecasting from 1987 into the 
1990s
More of the same More Continuous Less continuous Somewhat less continuous
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Switzerland. During the 1980s, strong economic 
performance and socio-political stability bred high levels 
of international competitiveness in Switzerland. Relations 
between industry, labour, financial institutions, and the 
State were marked by a highly systematised interactive 
process. While the State maintained relatively few labour 
market policies and limited unemployment benefits, 
decentralised wage bargaining between labour and industry in 
Switzerland led to low levels of labour unrest. Wages, 
though relatively high, grew slowly, and impressive labour 
productivity as a result of the Swiss work ethic resulted in 
comparably low real unit labour costs.
Because of the SNB's ability to provide monetary 
stability through a policy geared to fight inflation yet 
maintaining relatively low real interest rates, private 
financial institutions, notably the Big Three Banks, not 
only continued their strong international presence but were 
also capable of furnishing necessary industrial investment 
capital. Ties between Swiss MNCs and financial institutions 
were reinforced by principal bank financing and managing 
relationships as well as by the maintenance of high debt- 
equity ratios by Swiss MNCs. These ratios reduced costs of 
capital, increased return to equity, induced equity 
investments in firms, and allowed Swiss MNCS to act more 
aggressively in the international marketplace. Moreover, 
such highly leveraged industries ensured financial 
institution participation in corporate investment decisions. 
With the Big Banks being able to provide significant capital
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for industrial investment, large high tech Swiss MNCs such 
as Ciba Geigy and Hoffman La Roche were able to maintain 
world market shares through significant capital investment 
in R & D. At the same time, large Swiss banks such as 
Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Union Bank of 
Switzerland, maintaining strong working relations through a 
permanent and exclusive Swiss syndicate, fostered a strategy 
for preserving Switzerland's impressive international 
financial centre. Hence, the commanding ability of the SNB 
to affect economic policy-making in such a way that monetary 
policies remained the preferred mechanism for ensuring 
domestic economic stability was strategically combined with 
the domestic and international presence of Swiss private 
banks. This financial institution coalition stimulated high 
levels of economic performance and helped Swiss industry 
remain highly competitive in world markets.
In sum, relations among important economic actors 
within Switzerland from 1980 to 1987 were typically 
cooperative; the process of interaction among financial 
institutions, industry, labour, and the State could for the 
most part be characterised as continuous quadrilateral. 
Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the following section, 
by the end of the decade Switzerland faced increasing 
political, social, and economic obstacles which would test 
its ability to maintain the very high standards it had set 
in previous years. (See Figure 6.2.)
F ig u r e  6 .2
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STATE
(CVP. FDP)
FINANCE*
(National Bank; Bankers' 
Association; "Big Three" 
Banks - Credit Suisse, 
Swiss Bank Corporation, 
Union Bank of Switzerland)
LABOUR
(SGB, CNG)
General lalssez-fake attitude
Active participation by central organisations
with Interest In general economic
policymaking
Regional policies
Export credits/export promotion
R A D  pondes (but Ngh level of enterprise
R A D )
Decentralised bargaining with binding 
arbitration facility
•Peace at Work* agreement; almost no 
Industrial action
Extertded work week (42 hours)
Limited number of labour market policies - 
education, retraining, employment 
programmes
Restrictive Immigration poildes 
Low level of unemployment benefits
Maintenance of strong, stable Swiss Franc 
pegged to Oeutschemark 
Monetary policy geared to fight Inflation 
Relatively low real Interest rates 
Deregulated, non-restrtctive banking laws 
Very high level of savings, reserves 
Intemational perception of political stability 
condudve to financial centre
Principal bank financing/managing 
relationship, up to 20% ownership 
Intemational presence of Swiss banks 
Strategy of Switzerland as an International 
financial centre
Secrecy, confidentiality of banks 
Strong working relations between Big Three 
Banks; permanent and exdustve Swiss 
syndicate
INDUSTRY
(Vorort and member sectoral organizations; 
Employers' Confederation - OSAO; Large, 
oligopolised industry)
Dertotes Principal Actor
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Sweden, After the bourgeois interregnum ended in 1982, 
Sweden also maintained a solid level of economic performance 
coupled with socio-political stability. The Swedish 
interactive process remained highly systematised, in which 
industry, financial institutions, and labour actively worked 
together to induce higher levels of international 
competitiveness.
With a monetary policy geared to stimulate growth 
primarily through devaluation, relations between financial 
institutions and industry in Sweden were encouraged. The 
sphere structure of industry ownership by financial 
institutions provided strong links between the two; for 
example, Sweden's largest bank, SE Banken, and largest 
company, Volvo, maintained close ties as a result of this 
structure. Cross board directorships between banks and 
industry and highly leveraged Swedish MNCs also ensured 
strong finance-industry relations. Under such conditions, 
Sweden's largest banks. Se Banken, Svenska Handelsbank, and 
PK Banken, were capable of furnishing capital to large high 
tech Swedish MNCs, such as Alfa Laval, Atlas Copco, 
Electrolux, and Ericsson, for important R & D financing.
As a consequence of Sweden's communitarian ideology, 
the essential catalyst of the Swedish economy was labour, 
notably the LO. Under the Solidaristic Wage Policy, which 
attempted to maintain wage equality, previously agreed to 
and sector-specific wages forced firms to pay particular 
wages. The Solidaristic Wage Policy had three effects. 
First, it resulted in a highly concentrated industrial
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structure, in which only large and efficient enterprises 
survived these wage pressures. Second, it forced Swedish 
industry to possess an exceedingly productive workforce in 
which Swedish real unit labour costs remained relatively 
low. And third, it forced firms to be innovative in order 
to be able to pay these relatively high wages and at the 
same time maintain competitiveness in world markets.
The Solidaristic Wage Policy was necessarily 
complemented by the most comprehensive labour market 
programme in the OECD. Retraining and mobility schemes 
acted as obligatory concomitants to the competitive 
pressures induced by the Solidaristic Wage Policy. During 
the 1980s these corresponding policies strengthened Sweden's 
level of international competitiveness; the Swedish State 
continued to provide significant welfare state measures, the 
Swedish standard of living continued to be impressive, 
unemployment was scarce, and growth was vigorous. Moreover, 
Sweden's large, high tech MNCs continued to remain highly 
competitive in the world market.
In sum, relations among important economic actors in 
Sweden from 1980 to 1987 were typically cooperative; the 
process of interaction among financial institutions, 
industry, labour, and the State could for the most part be 
characterised as continuous quadrilateral. (See Figure 6.3.) 
However, as will be discussed in the following section, by 
the end of the decade bilateral relations, particularly 
between labour and industry, became increasingly detached, 
resulting in a major wage-price spiral.
F ig u r e  6 .3
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STATE
(Social Democratic Party)
FINANCE
(Central Bank; large Swedish 
Banks such as Skandlnavlska 
Enskllda Banken, Svenska 
Handelsbank, PK Banken)
LABOUR*
(LO. TCO)
Limited Subsidisation (eiiminatlon of 
shipbuiiding subsidies after bourgeois 
Interregnum)
Limited State sector 
Export credits (SEK)
Regional poildes
R & D poildes (and high level of enterprise 
R & D)
Sphere structure of ownership ensuring strong
finanoe-industry relations
Irxyeasing intematlonai strength of Swedish
financial institutions
Limited presence of foreign banks
Highly centralised wage bargaining 
Centralised employment, work hours 
negotiation
Limited unemployment Insurance benefits 
Pension fund investment (debate)
Exchange rate pegged to "Currency Baskef 
Devaluation (1981, 1962)
Liberalisation of Financial Markets (post-1986) 
Monetary environment conductive to growth
Solidaristic wage policy • "pay up or get out 
system* that eliminates Ineffldent producers 
EFO model - wage guideline to combat 
Inflation: competitive "C" sectors 
Active labour market poildes • mobility and 
retraining programmes to combat 
unemployment
INDUSTRY
(Employers* Confederation - SAP; Large 
ollgopolized industry)
Denotes Principal Actor
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Ireland. Different from both Sweden and Switzerland, 
Ireland's economic performance was mediocre during the 
1980s, having been plagued with unemployment approaching 
twenty percent, high amounts of inflation, a current account 
deficit, and large amounts of foreign debt. Certainly 
Ireland's lower level of industrialisation, semi-peripheral 
location, and weak infrastructure could explain much of the 
reason for its domestic employment problems and the lack of 
international competitiveness of its indigenous industry. 
However, throughout most of the 1980s the Irish interactive 
process involving industry, financial institutions, labour, 
and the State did not effectively stimulate an environment 
conducive to generating higher levels of economic 
performance.
From 1980 to 1987 decentralised wage negotiations 
engendered increasing levels of labour unrest and wage 
drift. Inflation continued to be a problem through 1987 as 
a result of a wage-price spiral. Unlike small European 
states such as Switzerland, which utilised a binding 
arbitration mechanism, wage differences between labour and 
the private sector were handled under a non­
binding system.
Wage inflation was also accompanied by high levels of 
unemployment and emigration. In contrast to small European 
states such as Sweden, which emphasised retraining and 
mobility programmes, the Irish State provided significant 
unemployment insurance benefits without incentives to work, 
while limiting its manpower programmes. Even though
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Ireland's educational system was highly effective in 
training its large population of youth, emigration from 
Ireland was extremely high. As a consequence, "brain drain" 
sapped Ireland of perhaps its greatest resource - its well 
educated, abundant supply of youthful workers.
Irish financial institution-industry relations also 
remained relatively weak. Despite a monetary policy geared 
to fight inflation in which real interest rates remained 
high, some of the larger Irish enterprises did maintain some 
banking relationships with the largest Irish banks, notably 
the Bank of Ireland and the Allied Irish Banks. Yet for the 
most part relations between Irish industry and financial 
institutions was patterned in the British and American 
"separatist" style of banking; board directorships were not 
mixed between banks and industry but were rather strictly 
divided. Irish industry was not afforded the same financing 
and managing benefits that its counterparts in Switzerland 
and Sweden were in their principal bank and sphere 
relationships.
Given Ireland's weak industrial structure, the State 
acted as the principal actor in attempting to revitalise its 
sagging economic performance and enhance its industrial 
structure. Because of programmes designed to entice inward 
FDI onto Irish soil, foreign subsidiaries tended to locate 
inside the country. However, Irish indigenous industry was 
not capturing the technological benefits from the sunrise 
industry plants operating in ireland. Moreover, while the 
IDA attracted various high tech industries to Ireland,
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operations were either ephemeral or a single, unrelated step 
in a company's vast operations.
By the mid-1980s, however, the opposition Flanna Fail 
party along with the CXI, ICTU, and FUE - the so-called 
"social partners" - devised a plan to attempt to rejuvenate 
the languid Irish economy. Through the State's Programme 
for National Recovery under Fianna Fail leadership, from 
1987 to 1990 the ICTU agreed to limit wage increases to two 
and one-half percent per year. The Irish policy would 
stress control of inflation while reducing real interest 
rates (a possibility now that wage growth was limited) in 
order to inspire capital investment and improve relations 
between financial institutions and industry. Finally, the 
State's industrial policy strategy changed towards value 
added rather than employment. Focus would be on elevating 
specific sunrise sectors by carefully scrutinising the 
technology transfer effects of inward FDI projects.
Thus, from 1980-1986 while the Irish State attempted to 
modernise its industrial structure by inducing foreign 
subsidiaries, the lack of technological knock-off effects 
did not result in an improved indigenous industrial 
structure. Moreover, with significant levels of labour 
unrest, wage drift, emigration, and unemployment, economic 
performance did not improve. However, with coordination and 
consultation among the "social partners" by the mid-1980s, 
Ireland began a constructive course of action, one which 
intended to stimulate economic performance and strengthen 
its industrial structure.
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In sum, relations among important economic actors in 
Ireland from 1980 to 1987 were often detached, particularly 
between industry and labour. The process of interaction 
among financial institutions, industry, labour, and the 
State could for the most part be characterised as 
intermittent quadrilateral. (See Figure 6.4.) However, as 
will be discussed in the following section, by the end of 
the decade relations among these actors, particularly 
between labour and industry, became increasingly 
cooperative. Under the Programme for National Recovery, the 
historical wage-price spiral was controlled under a 
collective agreement to dampen wage growth.
Figure 6.4
THE IRISH INTERACTIVE PROCESS (1980 - 1987)
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STATE*
(Fine Gael, Fianna Fall Coalition)
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Unilateral 20% devaluation against British Pound 
High real Interest rates through much of 1980's 
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Controlled Inflation and lower Interest rates. 1987 
Relatively passive monetary policy 
Programme for National Recovery, 1987 - 
emphasis on real Interest rate reduction
FINANCE
(Central Bank and 
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Allied Irish Bank, 
Bank of Ireland 
and foreign banks)
significant unemployment Insurance programme 
Limited number of retraining programmes 
(decentralised), especially for youth (which 
composed a significant proportion of the 
population)
Emigrating Youth - "brain drain* - despite 
excellent educational system
High level of Inward direct Investment promotion/ 
facilitation from IDA (low corporate taxation) 
Relatively large seml-State sector (Peat Board. 
Sugar Mills. Aer Lingus)
Regional policies (mainly Indirectly as result of IDA- 
Inspired Inward foreign direct Investment)
Limited R & D program (emphasis away from 
overall technological development; orientation 
towards foreign direct Investment product 
development; limited Indigenous enterprise R & D 
development as a result of small size); advent of 
EOLAS In 1987
Change of Industrial policy strategy towards value 
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Programme for National Recovery, 1987-sectoral. 
sunrise Industry orientation of Industrial policy
Maintenance of Irish Industry relationship with 
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"Section 84" Irish corporate banking/flnandng 
advantage
Significant presence of foreign banks - BNP. 
Algemene, Citibank
Significant foreign (I.e.. US) corporate presence; 
foreign MNC preference for Home Banks
LABOUR
(ICTU)
Decentralised wage negotiation from 1980 - 
1987 (Increasing levels of Industrial action, wage 
drift)
Non-binding arbitration system 
Return of Centralised Bargaining. 1987 
Programme for National Recovery. 1987 - 
limitation of wage Increases to 2 ’/2% for 1988 - 
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INDUSTRY
(Employers' Confederation - FUE; Confereration of Irish 
Industries - Cll; mostly small and medium-sized Irish 
enterprises; numerous foreign-owned subsidiaries)
Denotes Principal Actor
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Denmark. Despite maintaining a high standard of 
living, Denmark's economic performance was relatively poor 
during the 1980s, and its industrial structure continued to 
be significantly weaker than that in Switzerland and Sweden. 
Much of the reason for Denmark's declining levels of 
international competitiveness during the decade can be 
attributed to a confused interactive process among industry, 
financial institutions, labour, and the State.
Because Denmark's monetary policy was geared to fight 
its current account deficit and inflation throughout most of 
the 1980s, the domestic monetary environment in Denmark 
thwarted close financial institution-industry relations. 
Nonetheless, industry did maintain links with financial 
institutions through principal bank relations between 
particular banks and enterprises, and similar to Swedish and 
Swiss MNCs, Danish businesses remained highly leveraged, 
which facilitated close bank-industry association. However, 
in contrast to both Sweden and Switzerland, because Denmark 
had a domestic monetary environment detrimental to growth, 
in which real interest rates remained high, these relations 
were severely stifled throughout much of the decade.
Under a system of wage negotiation mixed between 
centralisation and decentralisation, wage drift continued to 
be a problem in Denmark. While Denmark experienced a wage- 
price spiral, it also faced major unemployment problems; 
however, different from Sweden, Denmark had few labour 
market policies, opting instead for an unemployment 
insurance programme that provided significant benefits for
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the unemployed worker with little motivation to return to 
the workplace. Having emphasised its welfare state, Denmark 
was unable to devise a formula that could balance its 
communitarian principles with economic efficiency. 
Neighbouring Sweden, which had similar societal values, did 
equate egalitarianism with equality, using a solidaristic 
wage "equal pay for equal work" scheme with complementary 
labour market programmes that provided employment 
opportunities made necessary by the competitive pressures of 
the wage policy.
Moreover, the Danish State's relatively passive 
attitude towards monetary and labour market policy-making 
pervaded into industrial policy-making; even with a 
relatively weak industrial structure, Denmark had few 
industrial policies. While holding the advantage over other 
European states of not having big sunset sectors, such as 
the coal and steel industries, the Danish State industrial 
policy, nevertheless, was primarily composed of 
subsidisation to its sunset shipbuilding industry.
While maintaining an overall preference of non­
intervention, by the middle of the 1980s a group of Danish 
policy-makers and industrialists - the so called "industrial 
modernists" - began to realise that the state's industrial 
structure, composed primarily of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, was technologically deficient. Perceiving that 
Denmark's greatest competitive disadvantage was its weak 
industrial structure, the State acted as the catalyst - the 
principal actor - in fostering programmes, notably in bio­
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technology and information technology, designed to stimulate 
technological advancement in industries.
Despite the State's initiating these constructive steps 
by the mid-1980s, significant economic problems continued to 
inhibit Denmark's economic performance. The trade unions 
and industry continued to lack the ability to bargain 
effectively, resulting in wage-inspired inflation and labour 
unrest. Still maintaining significant levels of 
unemployment and inflation, a current account deficit, and 
high levels of debt, the State attempted to maintain its 
welfare state commitment through substantial personal and 
corporate taxation as well as high real interest rates.
Under such deleterious conditions during the decade, and 
with generally detached relations among industry, financial 
institutions, labour, and the State to combat these 
problems, such highly intermittent quadrilateral relations 
resulted in deteriorating economic performance. (See Figure 
6.5.)
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STATE*
(Coalition Governments)
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Interest rate swings to combat Inflation/debt
Devaluation 1982
Deregulation by 1986
Very tight monetary policy post-1986
FINANCE
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6.4 The Small European State In the 1990s
A. The International Pressures of the 1990s:
Increasing International Competition and Europe 
”1992”
This section will briefly examine the prospects for 
maintaining or augmenting small European state international 
competitiveness in the 1990s. The international marketplace 
of the 1980s was characterised by increasing competition 
primarily from Asia. The presence of such NICs as South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand 
will further press industries in small European states for 
world market shares.
Perhaps the single most important pressure that the 
small European state will face during the 1990s will be the 
continuing cooperation of European states within the Common 
Market. Under the Single European Act, the twelve EC member 
states will attempt to bridge state policies and practices 
to create a single market by the end of 1992. While 
arguments vary as to how European unity might affect 
particular member states, there is little doubt that the 
primary effect on the small European state will be on its 
ability to maintain political autonomy and economic 
independence. While the EC will offer meaningful benefits 
to member small European states, it will test the ability of 
each State to develop and implement state-specific policies 
to maintain or augment its level of international 
competitiveness.
By the latter part of the 1980s industrialists in
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Europe and around the world formed strategies as a result of 
this European unification process. Under a possible 
scenario in which product specifications and government 
regulations become standardised, the Europe of the 1980s 
characterised by fragmented markets could be transformed 
into one that would be increasingly consolidated and 
concentrated. Indications already existed by the latter part 
of the 1980s that consolidation through merger and 
acquisition was occurring^" in such industries as 
pharmaceutical products, financial services,and 
telecommunications.^* Moreover, merger and acquisition 
activity by non-EC MNCs in the European market increased 
dramatically as a result of the fear of a closed European 
market;^® in 1988, mergers and acquisitions jumped by 
twenty-five percent from the preceding year
For the small European state whose industries tend to 
be price takers, a more concentrated and consolidated 
European market will bring further challenges for their 
industries to remain competitive in world markets in the 
1990s. Uncertainty over a possibly barrier-free Common 
Market and its consequences provoked policy-makers and 
industrialists in non-member small European states, such as 
Sweden and Switzerland, to reconsider their industrial 
strategies. By 1987 large Swiss and Swedish MNCs were 
gaining footholds in the European market through vast 
acquisitions. For other small European states with 
membership in the EC but with weaker industrial structures, 
such as Denmark and Ireland, industrial strategies for the
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future will differ; these states' policy-makers and 
industrialists will stress gaining niche market shares and 
enticing foreign subsidiaries into their state markets 
through their affiliation with the EC. Because of 
differences in industrial structure, out of fifteen European 
countries, Switzerland ranked fourth, Sweden sixth, Denmark 
eighth, and Ireland eleventh in a survey that asked 
industrialists and state policy-makers to rate states by 
their preparation for Europe 1992.^®
Hence, during the 1990s the small European state will 
face expanding competition, not only from the U.S. and 
Japan, but notably from Asia's NICs and from the pressures 
of the increasingly unified Europe. Small European states 
will be increasingly challenged to avoid penetration of 
those foreign markets in which their industries have gained 
shares. Increasing competition from such rising economic 
powers as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and 
possible dilution of their economic power from an 
increasingly concentrated and consolidated European market, 
will further test the ability of small European state 
industries to remain internationally competitive. How small 
European states will react to these competitive pressures to 
maintain a prosperous economic environment coupled with 
political stability, and how the small European state's 
industries will respond to these international pressures, 
are briefly discussed below.
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B. Into the 1990s; The Case Studies Examined
Switzerland. Of the four case studies, Switzerland was 
the best example of a small European state during the 1980s 
that was able to integrate successfully state priorities 
with societal values. Despite some international pressures 
to change its financial practices and anxiety with regard to 
EC membership, there is little indication that the 
political-economic stability of Switzerland in the 1980s 
will degenerate in the following decade.
With financial institutions historically acting as the 
catalyst for Switzerland's high level of international 
competitiveness, perhaps the most significant question will 
be whether its financial institutions will be able to hold 
the same amount of authority and influence in the 
Switzerland of the 1990s as they did in the previous decade. 
By the end of the 1980s Switzerland experienced inflationary 
pressures because of an uncharacteristically lax SNB 
monetary policy; under conditions of high growth, the Swiss 
Franc remained unusually low, which despite helping Swiss 
exporters, tarnished Switzerland's matchless reputation as a 
safe haven for foreign investors to deposit their money. 
Switzerland's historically distinct and successful financial 
practices will also be challenged in the 1990s. Secrecy, a 
trademark of Swiss banking, was significantly strained not 
only from external pressures as a consequence of the Iran- 
Contra affair, but also under the so-called "Koppgate" 
affair, which involved a Swiss bank, the Minister of
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Justice, and money derived from drug trafficking.^® Indeed, 
the lack of inflation, a strong and stable Swiss Franc, and 
banking secrecy remained the roots of Switzerland's 
international financial success in the 1980s but may require 
some adjustments in the 1990s.
Moreover, during the 1990s Switzerland will no longer 
be virtually alone among financial communities with 
universal, deregulated financial systems as it was during 
most of the 1980s; a giant worldwide deregulation process 
transpired by the mid-1980s, and this process should 
continue throughout the 1990s. Several states that achieved 
increasing economic strength during the 1980s will also 
compete with Switzerland as alternative international 
financial centres, not only other small European states such 
as Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands, but also such 
Asian NICs as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
As the EC continues to work towards greater economic, 
monetary, and financial union, there will be greater 
financial market competition within Europe; Switzerland's 
financial system and practices will be forced to be modified 
to ensure that Switzerland's own legislative framework does 
not impede Swiss banks to integrate into the European 
financial system.^ The Cartel Commission has initiated 
steps to investigate the permanent and exclusive Swiss 
syndicate in the Swiss capital markets, much as result of 
Switzerland's fear of potential obstacles to access in the 
financial markets of EC states. Steps for reciprocal access 
to insurance markets between the EC and Switzerland were
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initiated by the end of the 1980s.
Moreover, while during the 1970s and much of the 1980s 
Swiss industries had followed internalisation strategies for 
growth, fear of fortress Europe has caused Swiss firms to 
recast past industrial strategies, stepping up investment in 
industries within the Common Market. For example, from 1987 
through 1989, Swiss MNC acquisitions of European firms 
included Nestle*s purchase of Britain's Rowntree and Italy's 
(and France's) Buitoni, Jacobs Suchard's of Belgium's Cote 
d'Or and Greece's Pavlides Chocolates, and Brown Boveri's of 
Italy's Sadelmi.^^ At the same time, Swiss financial 
institutions have sought to become larger in the European 
market: acquisitions included Swiss Reinsurance's purchase
of Italy's Lloyd Adriatic, Zurich Insurance's of Spain's 
Union Iberoamericana, and Swiss Bank Corporation's of 
Britain's Savory Miln.^
All of these changes - from Switzerland's reformed 
financial system to altering industrial growth strategies - 
seem to underscore changes in Switzerland's historical 
ability for almost complete independence and autonomy. As 
further evidence, Swiss MNCs' less than subtle historical 
form of protectionism by restricting share ownership has 
begun to change; Switzerland's most celebrated company. 
Nestle, has awarded equal registered share rights to Swiss 
citizens and foreigners.^ Moreover, by the end of the 
1980s its acclaimed socio-political stability was 
challenged. High levels of drug addiction, evidenced by 
Zurich's PI atzpromenade (a park where drug use has been
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legalised), has highlighted Switzerland's continued 
integration into the world's darker side, and on a per 
capita basis, Switzerland has the highest level of AIDS in 
the world.Despite all of these diversions, if the 1980s 
were any indication of how flexible a state's actors can be 
to conform to changing international economic conditions, 
Switzerland will successfully adjust.
Sweden. While also enjoying a relatively high level of 
political and economic success in the 1980s, Sweden will be 
pressed to maintain the same degree of international 
competitiveness in the 1990s. Sweden's biggest problem in 
the latter part of the 1980s, and one that will most likely 
continue into the 1990s, is the ability of its powerful 
unions to gain higher wages. Under conditions of high 
growth in the 1980s, by the end of the decade high levels of 
personal consumption inspired significant inflation; with 
factories running at full capacity and a continuing strong 
demand for labour, a wage-price spiral was generated.^®
During the 1980s the trade unions remained the catalyst 
of the Swedish economy through a complementary wage - labour 
market policy that engendered high levels of labour 
productivity and an innovative and concentrated industrial 
structure. As a result of this labour market scheme and the 
EFO model that attempted to gauge wage growth with 
inflation, while real wages were comparably high, high 
levels of productivity produced relatively low real unit 
labour costs. Yet by the end of the decade levels of 
working time decreased, labour absenteeism increased, and
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most importantly, unions demanded higher wages. As a 
response to wage pressures, by the latter part of the 1980s 
Swedish monetary policy-makers dampened growth by increasing 
real interest rates.
Consequently, by the 1990s the Swedish trade unions 
will be forced to exercise wage moderation or face 
decreasing levels of growth similar to their Scandinavian 
neighbour Denmark. Much of this will depend on a possible 
overhaul of the Swedish tax system, which in the past had 
boosted inflation and depressed incentives to work, yet 
remained a necessity to pay for its welfare state. However, 
signals from the 1980s indicate that the Swedish taxation 
system might be modified; tax revenues will not decrease, 
but personal taxation rates will be reduced while former tax 
loopholes will be removed.^
In terms of financial institutions, the powerful 
financial sphere structure of the 1980s will be meaningfully 
reduced in the 1990s as a result of the increasing 
securitisation of the Swedish financial markets. By the 
middle of the 1980s, Swedish monetary authorities began to 
ease restrictions on foreign share purchases and other forms 
of deregulation, such as the lifting of foreign exchange 
controls.^® Similar to Switzerland, the Sweden of the 1990s 
will be forced to be more open, to enact legislation in line 
with that of EC countries.
Most important, Swedish industries have already 
responded to the market pressures engendered by Europe 1992. 
During the 1980s Sweden's powerful MNCs had grown through
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internal development, rarely acquiring foreign enterprises. 
Yet by the end of the decade, Sweden's fear of a protected 
European market initiated a Swedish MNC European buying 
spree similar to that of Switzerland's largest enterprises. 
In order to gain a foothold in the European market, Swedish 
MNCs were involved in a number of mergers and acquisitions: 
Volvo's purchase of Britain's Leyland Bus Group, Svenska 
Cellulosa's of France's Peaudouce, Iggesund's of Thames 
Board of Britain, and Furoc's of Britain's Castle Cement.^® 
The most prominent merger occurred between Sweden's ASEA and 
Switzerland's Brown Boveri - the combination of these 
already large MNCs was a means to create a pan-European 
electrical machinery company.Even within Sweden a 
further concentration of Swedish industry occurred by the 
end of the 1980s; sectors such as forestry and building were 
consolidated into blocks, "an interesting example of a 
change in attitude of the tightly knit web of Swedish 
industry.
Consequently, similar to Switzerland, Sweden has 
strengthened its industries' already powerful position in 
the European market through a significant acquisition spree. 
Such moves illustrate how disproportionately powerful 
Swedish multinationals have been in comparison to its 
country size. Yet the problem of the 1990s at this time 
appears to be whether Sweden's principal actor of the 1980s, 
labour, will continue to be as productive in the 1990s. 
Indications from the latter part of the decade point to 
mounting labour costs with decreased levels of productivity.
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the combination of which would not only incite a tightening 
of monetary supply, but even further inflation and reduction 
of growth.
If economic performance deteriorates in Sweden, or in 
Switzerland, and with fear of possible economic isolation, 
policy-makers in these states will have little choice but to 
consider membership in the European Community.Different 
from Austria, which submitted its application for EC 
membership in 1989, during the 1980s Sweden and Switzerland 
maintained solid economic performances coupled with powerful 
industrial structures that bred economic independence. Only 
under conditions where Swedish or Swiss international 
competitiveness degenerated, or European integration 
progressed to the point where Swedish and Swiss 
participation was excluded in the European market, would 
either state seek membership in the EC.
Ireland. Throughout much of the 1980s Ireland 
struggled with a number of economic problems, notably 
unemployment, inflation, a significant foreign debt, and a 
high degree of emigration. Yet in 1987 the Irish State 
initiated constructive steps through The Programme for 
National Recovery, which suppressed wage growth and set new 
industrial policy priorities. While it is too early to 
evaluate Ireland's industrial policy changes from the 
programme, wage-inspired inflation has decreased. In 
addition, under the Taoiseach Charles Haughey, the Fianna 
Fail government initiated an austerity programme to bring 
the economy under control and halt the outflow of capital.
428
which by the end of the decade seemed to be paying off. In 
1987 and 1988 exports surged by fourteen percent and eight 
percent, respectively, unemployment decreased to seventeen 
percent (the first fall in unemployment in almost a decade), 
GDP growth remained at around four percent in 1989, and most 
important, inflation stabilised to just over three 
percent.Yet while the Fianna Fail government seemed to 
be enjoying significant popularity, by the end of the 1980s 
an election by Haughey to gain a majority in the Dail 
failed.** An unprecedented coalition government has since 
ensued. As a consequence, by the beginning of the 1990s 
Ireland will face difficult, unexpected political pressures.
Irish industrial policy, which changed courses (at 
least in rhetoric) by targeting specific sunrise industries 
and ensuring that carefully scrutinised inward FDI would 
effectuate industrial technology transfer, will be faced 
with mounting pressures from the increasingly harmonised 
European market. While there is little question that a 
unified Europe can lead to more efficient European industry 
through rationalisation and concentration, smaller and less 
developed economies within the market, such as Ireland, if 
not backed by the Community through structural funds, face 
increasing economic vulnerability.*^ Such concerns have 
been recognised by Irish policy-makers because of Ireland's 
already weak industrial structure, inferior infrastructure, 
and semi-peripheral location in comparison to the rest of 
Europe.*®
Hence, the 1990s will pose continued economic
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challenges to Ireland; it should continue on the course the 
State initiated in 1987 to overcome major economic problems, 
notably its foreign debt and unemployment. The 1987 
Programme for National Recovery was an excellent example of 
valuable State intervention that resulted in improved 
economic performance. The 1990s will further test whether 
the "social partners" - the State, ICTU, FUE, and CXI - will 
be able to continue this progress, suppressing wage-inspired 
inflation, limiting real interest rates, and pinpointing 
State industrial priorities in sunrise sectors. The State 
will also have to improve on some primary weaknesses, 
enhancing its infrastructure and preventing the emigration 
of its highly educated youth. Most importantly, Ireland 
will face its most serious challenge from a more unified 
European market; its already fragile economic independence 
as well as its political autonomy will be tested in an 
increasingly competitive and concentrated European market.
Denmark. Throughout the 1980s Denmark was plagued by 
significant wage drift, and without the ability of the LO 
and the DA to negotiate effectively lower wages in the 
1990s, there will be little hope for improved economic 
performance. Moreover, from 1988 to 1990 only New Zealand 
ranked worse than Denmark among OECD states in terms of 
employment change; Denmark's employment actually decreased 
by 2.6%, while all other OECD countries (with the exception 
of New Zealand) experienced employment g r o w t h . T h e  dual 
problems of inflation and unemployment continued throughout 
the 1980s without significant constructive government
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intervention. There were not any labour market policies to 
combat unemployment, as in Sweden, and the government did 
not intervene in wage negotiations, as in Ireland.
According to a poll taken in 1989, a vast majority of Danes 
would support government intervention to reduce wage 
increases; this included forty-four percent of the workers 
questioned.
The Danish State's inability to use various forms of 
intervention throughout nearly all of the 1980s inhibited 
improvement in economic performance. Indications from the 
end of the 1980s point to increasing State intervention, 
notably through industrial policies to stimulate 
technological competitiveness. Yet such steps must be 
coupled with interventionism that would slow inflation and 
generate employment. Hence, two forms of intervention seem 
felicitous: government involvement to suppress wage-
inspired inflation and labour market policies to promote 
employment (as opposed to simply furnishing significant 
unemployment insurance benefits).
At the same time, Denmark's relatively weak industrial 
structure will need to be strengthened. While non-EC small 
European states such as Sweden and Switzerland strengthened 
their industrial presences in the Common Market through 
merger and acquisition, Denmark's relatively weak industrial 
presence obviates the need for such actions. Different from 
both the Swedish and Swiss industrial strategies for the 
1990s, by the end of the 1980s Danish industrial strategies 
appeared to be oriented towards market expansion in niche
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products by using its technology programmes to remain 
competitive in distinctive areas, such as bio-engineered 
products like enzymes produced by such Danish firms as NOVO. 
Moreover, being the only Scandinavian country in the EC, by 
the end of the 1980s Danish industries and financial 
institutions began to emphasise Danish links with the EC to 
its Nordic neighbours in order to entice Scandinavian inward 
FDI into Denmark.^®
Consequently, Denmark will face two significant 
challenges in the 1990s. First, it must overcome domestic 
economic problems, most notably wage drift, in order to 
generate higher levels of growth and productivity and 
overcome its ageless current account deficit and foreign 
debt. Second, Danish enterprises must devise constructive 
industrial strategies conducive to strengthening Denmark's 
relatively weak industrial structure. While being a member 
of the EC, Denmark's economic problems will not be overcome 
simply through EC membership; as an example, the significant 
benefits Denmark historically accrued from the CAP began to 
change by the end of the 1980s as a consequence of CAP 
reforms, and there is little indication that the EC will 
further provide extraordinary assistance to the Danish 
agricultural sector relative to other EC states during the 
1990s.^
The increasing harmonisation of Europe will also pose 
new problems not only for Danish industries attempting to 
attain niche markets, but also in the Danish State's ability 
to enhance domestic economic conditions for improved
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industrial activity. For example, Denmark has had among the 
highest tax rates in the EC; EC tax harmonisation would most 
certainly necessitate a lowering of Danish taxes, severely 
straining the Danish State's ability to finance its 
expensive welfare state. Yet such a measure may be the 
necessary challenge for Denmark to adjust to the pressures 
of the 1990s - being forced to better equate its societal 
value of egalitarianism with higher levels of efficiency.
C. Lessons From the 1980s; The Small
European State in the International Svstem 
In the 1990s
Despite limited political power, economic necessity 
dictated that during the 1980s the small European state had 
little choice but to employ state-specific forms of 
interventionism to remain internationally competitive. Small 
European state interventionism and state-specific actor 
interaction materialised in various forms throughout the 
1980s, including monetary policies, labour market policies, 
industrial policies, trade policies, and even overtly 
protectionist practices to impede inward foreign direct 
investment. In the 1990s small states will be continue to 
be compelled to use domestic interventionism to stimulate 
economic and industrial performance.
By the end of the 1980s the principal focus of policy­
makers, industrialists, and academics concerned with the 
future of the European economy was on the unification of the 
Common Market projected for 1992. However, the lessons of 
the 1980s indicate how vital state-specific actor
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interaction and domestic interventionism was to remain 
internationally competitive in the international 
marketplace. It should not be construed that a state- 
specific process of interaction is an advantage for small 
European states to remain internationally competitive, since 
an implicit assumption in this thesis is that all states 
have state-specific means to attempt to achieve high levels 
of political-economic performance. Rather, a vital message 
in this thesis is that in studying small European states, 
rules cannot be made for every state. The lessons of the 
1980s demonstrate that, if utilised successfully, the small 
European state's competitive advantage against larger states 
with greater natural and human resources was its geographic 
proximity that generated actor familiarity; intimate 
relations among industry, financial institutions, labour, 
and the State; the guidance of the economy by the state's 
principal actor; and state-specific policy-making.
This message from the 1980s illuminates the necessity 
of the small European state to attempt to maintain its 
economic independence, utilising its size to facilitate a 
systematised process of interaction coupled with 
constructive policy-making. The examples of Switzerland and 
Sweden illustrate how successful small European state 
interaction and interventionism could promote high levels of 
international competitiveness and consequent economic 
independence and political autonomy. The Danish and Irish 
examples, however, demonstrate that misdirected policy­
making and a confused process of interaction in the small
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European state could generate a lower degree of economic 
independence.
In sum, the 1990s will test small European state 
industries - usually price takers - to remain competitive 
not only in a world market characterised by aggressive 
competition from Asia,but also in a more consolidated and 
concentrated European market. Such pressures will test the 
ability of small European states to use their state-specific 
processes of interaction and intervention to maintain or 
augment their foreign market shares, both within and outside 
Europe.
While the European market of the 1980s was 
characterised by segmentation, during the 1990s a more 
integrated European market under conditions of increased 
internal competition will foster the potential for 
increasing consolidation and concentration of production and 
distribution structures. Having been able to use state- 
specific forms of intervention in the 1980s, small European 
states will be challenged to continue to use state-specific 
intervention under a more active and intervening European 
Community. In this respect, the small European state will 
be challenged to maintain economic independence and 
political autonomy in an increasingly unified Europe.
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